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As provided for under Article 1308 of the Treaty, the 
Commission presents its first cohesion report 'on the 
progress made towards achieving economic and so-
cial cohesion and on the manner in which the various 
means provided for in this article have contributed to 
it'. The report aims to answer four major questions: 
•  have  economic  and  social  disparities  between 
Member States.  regions  and  social  groups nar-
rowed over time, leading to an improvement in 'the 
overall harmonious development' of the Union? 
•  what has been the role and the achievements of 
Member States' policies in this respect? 
•  how have the  Union's non-structural policies re-
sponded to the Treaty obligation to take account 
of cohesion objectives? 
•  what has been the effect of the Union's structural 
policies? 
In  so  doing,  the  Report  attempts  to  draw out  the 
implications for policy at both the Member State and 
Union levels. 
Social and economic fortunes 
Over the past decade. economic growth in the Union 
has averaged just over 2% a year, while employment 
has grown at 0.5% a year. Some 7 million jobs have 
been created in net terms since 1983. 
Disparities  in  income  per head  between  Member 
States  have  narrowed  significantly  over  the  same 
period. This is largely due  to a catching up on the part 
of the cohesion countries-Spain, Portugal, Greece 
and Ireland-with income per head increasing from 
66% to 74% of the Community average. Ireland has 
had the most remarkable performance with an aver-
age  growth rate of 4.5%  a year between  1983 and 
1995, followed by Spain with  3% and Portugal  with 
2.6%.  On  the  other hand,  Sweden and Finland lost 
ground compared to the rest. 
The experience across the Union with regard to em-
ployment was  more  mixed.  In  the  country with  the 
highest economic growth. Ireland, employment grew 
by a mere 0.2% over the  period 1983-93, although 
growth has accelerated more recently. Similar growth 
rates were  recorded in  many other Member States 
while the deep recession in Finland and Sweden led 
to an absolute decline in employment. Countries such 
as  the  Netherlands,  Germany,  Greece  and  Spain, 
succeeded in creating jobs at a higher rate than the 
average. 
In Portugal, Belgium, West Germany, the Netherlands 
and the UK employment creation, while variable, has 
nevertheless been sufficient to reduce the unemploy-
ment.  In  most  other  countries  there  have  been 
increases  in  unemployment  rates.  These  are  most 
dramatic in Finland and Sweden as well as in two of 
the cohesion countries, Spain and Greece. In Spain, 
more than one in five of the work force is now unem-
ployed. 
Income  disparities  between  the  regions  of  the 
Union  have  remained  largely  unchanged  over 
time:  in  the 25  best-off regions income per head 
rose marginally from  140% of the Union average 
to 142% while there it increased in the 25 poorest 
regions from 53 to 55%. Nevertheless, the poorest 
- 'Objective 1' - regions as a group improved 
their average level of income per head by 21/2 per-
centage points from 64.6% to 67.2%. 
5 Over the  past decade,  regional  income disparities 
widened  in  all  Member  States,  in  which  they  are 
measured,  with  the  exception  of the  Netherlands. 
Similarly, regional differences in unemployment rates 
also increased within many Member States. with the 
UK  as  a  notable  exception.  In  France,  Germany 
(West)  and other countries this  has  gone  hand-in-
hand with  a  more  unequal  distribution of personal 
income and a fall in the share of wages in total income. 
Across the Union as a whole, the incidence of unem-
ployment has become much more uneven. While over 
the ten years,  1983 to  1993, the 25 regions with the 
lowest rates of unemployment were able to reduce 
their average rate  even  further from  4.8%  to 4.6%, 
there has  been a dramatic  increase from  17.2% to 
22.4% in the 25 regions with the highest rates. 
Moreover. unemployment tends to have the most serious 
effects on weaker social groups. Some 5 million young 
people, or 21% of the total, are without a job.lhe propor-
tion of \\Omen in paid employment has increased largely 
due to the  expansion of  service employment and part-
time working. On the other hand, the rate of unemploy-
ment of women remains,  at 12'/2%, considerably higher 
than that for men at 9
1/2%. 
People without qualifications are  particularly vulner-
able to long-term unemployment. Nearly half (  49%) of 
the  unemployed have  been  without  a job for  more 
than a year. In view of this, it is unsurprising that many 
people live below the poverty line. In several Member 
States their number has been rising, especially in the 
UK, Italy and France. 
Socio-economic trends are clearly not the only deter-
minants of the quality of life of the Union's people. The 
preservation of peace and respect for  fundamental 
rights  are  real  even  if  they are  generally taken  for 
granted. Nevertheless, they are an essential basis for 
the  success  of  efforts  aimed  at  the  promotion  of 
harmonious development. 
Years of work on indicators to measure quality of life 
in the broader sense, and the more recent reflections 
in the Union on the 'greening' of national accounts, 
have identified the !imitations of conventional income 
measures  such  as  GOP,  even  if  as  yet there  is  no 
operationally  viable  alternative.  Overcoming  these 
limitations would allow due account to  be  taken  of 
environmental effects, and more broadly of the  sus-
tainability of economic development. 
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Role and achievements 
of Member State policies 
Member  State  policies  are  the  Union's  primary 
instruments  for  achieving  cohesion.  In  that  sense, 
'solidarity in  the  Union begins  at  home'. Moreover, 
Member  States  have  the  means  at  their  disposal. 
Public spending accounts for between 40% and 60% 
of national GOP compared to the Community Budget 
of about 1  .2% of Union GOP. 
The  measures undertaken by the Member States 
to strengthen cohesion have generally gone in the 
right  direction.  Macro-economic  policies  have 
brought about significant progress in nominal con-
vergence. Inflation rates have decreased to levels 
which are among the lowest in 30 years. In Portu-
gal,  Spain,  Italy and Greece,  Inflation has  come 
down but remains above the Community average. 
Interest  rates  have  also  declined  and  the  dif-
ferences between Member States have narrowed, 
thus improving the general climate for investment 
and  growth  Public  deficits  and  debt,  however, 
remain  a major cause for  concern. Over the  last 
decade the  financial  burden of debt repayment 
has  increased  on  average  by  1.2  percentage 
points of GOP,  and  in  Greece, Finland  and  Italy 
the rises has been even more dramatic. 
Through Member States' public expenditure and 
taxation, interregional transfers of resources take 
place.  According  to  a  specially  commissioned 
study of seven countries (containing over 80% of 
the Union population) net transfers amount to 4% 
of  the  GOP  of  donor regions  and  8%  of that  of 
recipient regions. These transfers have a signifi-
cant cohesion effect within Member States. reduc-
ing  regional  income  disparities  by  20-40%.  A 
major  explanation  for  this  redistributive  effect  is 
the fact that Member States spend about 50-70% 
of total  public expenditure on education, health, 
social  security and welfare. housing and cultural 
activities. 
Expenditure  on  employment  policies,  regional 
policies, and RTO accounts for between 6 and 14% 
of the total. RTD spending is highest in relation to GOP 
in the more prosperous countries and is concentrated 
in the richest regions in all countries for which regional 
data exist. Executive Summary 
So  far  as  employment  policies  are  concerned, 
Member States  have made a concerted effort to 
bring about improvements. concentrating on the 
five priority areas agreed at the Essen Summit in 
1994: improving labour skills, promoting more em-
ployment  intensive  growth,  reducing  non-wage 
labour  costs.  improving  the  effectiveness  of 
labour market policies and assisting those hardest 
hit by unemployment. 
The regional policies operated by Member States 
themselves cover some 46.7% of the Union's total 
population. Around half cover the least developed 
regions (in the sense of Art. 92.3.a of the Treaty). 
For these.  the  maximum aid  levels vary between 
30% and  75% of eligible investment expenditure. 
For  national  regional  aids  authorised  under 
Art.  92.3.c of the  Treaty the  maximum aid  limits 
vary between  10-30%, only Finland and Sweden 
being permitted to go up to 35%  for a small per-
centage of their population. 
These  results  in  terms  of  population  coverage 
and  aid  intensity are the  outcome of actions by 
the Commission  under competition rules  to  con-
trol  population  coverage and  aid  intensities  ap-
plying  to  national  aid  schemes  for  regional 
purposes. 
The variation of aid intensities has helped the least 
favoured regions to compete for new investment. 
although, richer Member States can afford to use 
more  public  money  to  support  new  investment 
than poorer ones. Consequently, between  1989-
93.  national regional  state aid per capita was on 
average much higher in Eastern Germany and the 
Mezzogiorno in  Italy than  in  the  cohesion  coun-
tries,  with  the  result  that  two  thirds  of  the  total 
amount of regional national state aid in  the Union 
is spent in Germany and Italy. 
The contribution of 
Community policies 
Due to their specific nature and objectives there 
are  wide  differences  in  the  contribution  which 
Community  policies  make  to  the  attainment  of 
cohesion objectives. Important examples are con-
sidered below. 
Social policies, education 
and vocational training 
Social policies favour by their nature the process 
of  integration  and  cohesion.  Their  impact  has 
been particularly important in labour law,  health 
and security at work. free movement of people and 
equal opportunities for men and women.  Beyond 
this and through, for example, the social dialogue. 
the Union has acted as a catalyst for the promotion 
of basic social rights and values. Support for edu-
cation and vocational training plays, with modest 
but well targeted spending, a similar role as cata-
lyst for  stimulating the free  movement of people, 
for raising competitiveness and for enhancing the 
opportunities of individuals. 
Environmental policies 
By promoting the notion of sustainable development. 
environmental policy is also directly relevant for cohe-
sion.  The starting position of the cohesion countries 
is a favourable one and pollution is less in relation to 
both population and GOP than in the richer Member 
States. On  the other hand,  expenditure on  environ-
mental protection is lower than anywhere else in the 
Union.  The  cohesion  countries  are  faced  with  the 
huge task of implementing many environmental pol 
icy  measures,  covering  for  example.  fuel  quality 
standards,  lower  vehicle  emissions.  nitrates  and 
water quality. Investment needs up to the year 2005 
have been estimated to amount to 17 billion ECU for 
the four  countries together.  Expert studies come to 
the conclusion that environmental objectives can be 
met, with possible gains in GOP and employment, by 
introducing  an  appropriate  package  of  fiscal 
measures, charges and public expenditure. 
RTD 
The  RTD  policy  of the  EU  is  aimed  at  promoting 
European  competitiveness through  scientific excel-
lence. RID programmes have sought to exploit Euro-
pean potential in technology and innovation. This has 
meant a greater concentration of research activities 
in the major specialist centres most of which are in the 
North where a limited number of RTO-islands stand 
out.  To  counteract this,  efforts  have  been  made to 
integrate  less-developed  and  more  peripheral  re-
gions.  Research  programmes  have  developed  re-
search capabilities in weaker Member States and as 
a consequence, their institutes are  becoming more 
7 involved, strengthening the scientific and technologi-
cal base of these countries and accelerating innova-
tion and economic development in the regions over 
the longer term. 
Internal Market and trade policy 
The  most  far-reaching  of the  Union's  framework 
policies to raise competitiveness has been the Single 
Market  Programme  (SMP}  which  has  swept  away 
many of the obstacles to trade and created a ge-
nuineiy integrated European economy. Fears that this 
would overwhelm the poorer countries have not been 
borne out in practice. Spain and Portugal appear to 
have been the most successful in taking advantage 
of increased opportunities for exporting to their part-
ners. Ireland also appears to have benefited but the 
impact has been marginal for Greece and Southern 
Italy. 
There is a wide consensus on the positive effects of 
trade on growth and also, therefore, on employment. 
But the reduction of external protection needs to be 
accompanied by internal economic adjustment. High 
tariff  industries account for  almost half of industrial 
employment in  Portugal  and Greece,  and the  four 
cohesion countries are generally more vulnerable to 
trade liberalisation. All have trade deficits in services 
which is one of the sectors expected to benefit from 
the recent Uruguay Round liberalisation. 
Competition policy 
In applying rules on state aids for regional purposes, 
the Commission's objectives have been two-fold: en-
suring that aid is concentrated on the most disadvant-
aged  regions  and  maintaining  a  differential  in  aid 
intensity between regions, to enable the poorest ones 
to compensate for their structural weaknesses. 
Network policies 
The net cohesion effect of EU transport, telecommuni-
cation and energy policy is  difficult to assess.  In all 
three areas,  liberalisation is  likely to reduce overall 
costs,  leading to  greater  competitiveness  and  in-
creased growth and employment. The effects on the 
periphery depend largely on the extent of the reduc-
tion in transport or transmission costs brought about. 
In transport policy, cohesion countries stand to gain 
in absolute terms from trans-European networks but 
not necessarily in relative terms. With regard to tele-
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communications policy, advanced services essential 
to the Information Society are not common in poorer 
regions because of their inferior infrastructure. There 
is, therefore, a risk of creating an  Info-rich/Info-poor 
divide - with negative effects on. the innovative ca-
pacity of the  whole  economy.  Since  the  cohesion 
countries have relatively little domestic energy sup-
ply,  however, they stand to benefit from  energy lib-
eralisation and better access to energy sources. 
The CAP and fisheries policy 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP} accounts for 
about 50% of the Community budget and involves a 
significant redistribution of income between both re-
gions  and  individuals  as  a  result  of  supporting 
farmers indirectly through market prices and directly 
through subsidies. According to estimates, the 1992 
reform  had  a  positive  cohesion  effect,  with  more 
cohesion countries receiving net transfers after than 
before. A detailed description of the situation and of 
possible explanations are provided in the report. 
Within many Member States, it is possible to discern 
a positive effect of the CAP on regional income dis-
tribution and this has increased after the 1992 reform; 
nevertheless,  the  pattern  of net  transfers  is  highly 
differentiated. Before the reform,  some estimates in-
dicated that 80% of transfers went to the 20% most 
profitable farms;  after the  reform,  gaps have  been 
reduced, but not by as much as if the Commission's 
proposal to put ceilings on direct aids had been fully 
accepted. 
Although fishing is a relatively small sector of activity 
and employs comparatively few people, it can be very 
important  in  some  of  the  less  developed  regions 
where alternative job opportunities are scarce. Fish-
eries  policy,  by supporting the  restructuring of the 
industry in the face of limited fish stocks, will help to 
increase competitiveness and maintain  jobs  in  the 
regions concerned over the medium-term. 
Effects of EU structural policies 
The  main features of present EU  structural policies 
are  summarised in  the Box.  The  1988 reform of the 
Structural Funds has significantly increased their re-
distributive  effect  in  favour  of the  less  prosperous 
Member States and regions. The main reason for this Executive Summary 
EU structural policies: main features 
The Union has six major financial instruments with which to implement its structural policies: 
the Regional  Development Fund,  the Social  Fund,  the  EAGGF:Guidance, the financial 
instrument  for  fisheries  guidance,  the  Cohesion  Fund  and  loans  from  the  European 
Investment Bank (EIB). The Cohesion Fund and the EIB are based on a project financing 
approach and are governed by  their own specific rules. The Structural Funds operate within 
a  common framework  based on  the  basic principles of concentration,  programming, 
partnership and additionality. 
The resources for EU structural policies have increased substantially. frOI!l 3.7 billion ECU 
in 1985 to 18.3 billion ECU in 1992 and to 33 billion ECU in 1999. For the period of 1994-99, 
around 170 billion ECU is available from the Community's budget for structural policies. 
This represents about a third of totdl Community spending and 0.45% of Community GOP. 
Over the decade 1989-99, spending amounts cumulatively to 6.5% of annual Community 
GOP.  A comparison makes its importance clear: Marshall aid to  post-war Europe was 
equivalent to 1% of US GOP per year and amounted cumulatively (1948-51) to 4% of US 
GOP. 
The interventions of the Structural Funds are concentrated on four regional policy Objec-
tives which account for 85% of the funding: 
•  Objective 1. for regions where development is lagging behind (about 70%  ); 
•  Objective 2, for the adjustment of regions worst affected by industrial decline (11 %); 
•  Objective 5b, for structural adjustment in rural areas (4%); 
•  Objective 6, for adjustment of sparsely populated areas (0.5%). 
Three objectives apply Community-wide, having no geographical limitations. They receive 
15% of the funding: 
•  Objective 3 focuses on long-term and youth unemployment; 
•  Objective 4 as~ists the adaptation of workers to industrial change; 
•  Objective 5a promotes adjustment in the agricultural and fisheries sectors. 
90% of the total volume of finance is decided upon at the initiative of Member States. For 
the period of  1994-99 more than 300 programmes were agreed in partnership between 
the Member States and the Commission, about half of them for Objective 1. Some 9% of 
the finance is reserved for Community Initiatives. Under 13 different themes, there exist 
about 400 Community Initiative programmes. Some  1% of the finance  is  reserved  for 
technical assistance and innovative measures. Most of this is decided by the Commission 
after  _calls for tender. 
Three broad areas of Intervention are covered by  the Union's structural policies; infrastruc-
ture, human resources and productive investment. Some 30% of the Structural Funds is 
spend on infrastructure investment in, for example, transport, telecommunications, energy, 
water supply and environmental protection. A further 30% is devoted to strengthening 
education and training systems and supporting labour  market policies. The remaining 40% 
of total funding goes mainly on productive investment, much of it aimed at building a 
dynamic business environment and supporting investment aid schemes for industry, in 
particular, for small and medium-sized enterprises.  . 
9 was the creation of Objective 1 which was effectively 
designed to ensure that resources are concentrated 
on the regions with the lowest GOP per head. Under 
Objective 2, there is almost no equalisation effect for 
the  period  1994-99 towards  the  regions  worst af-
fected by industrial  decline.  In the  revisions to the 
regulations in 1993, less weight was attached to these 
criteria compared to the previous period. 
In the first programming period, 1989-1993, an over-
all income equalisation (in terms of GOP per head) of 
3% was achieved with transfers of 0.3% of EU GOP. 
For the current programming period, funding equival-
ent of 0.45% of EU  GOP is estimated to result in an 
equalisation effect of 5%. The equalisation effect is, 
therefore, about 10 times the original amount of public 
finance.  This  is  similar to the income redistribution 
effect achieved by the "Finanzausgleich" in Germany 
in  1990 or,  alternatively,  twice  as  high  as  that  for 
specific purpose grants in the USA. 
The  primary purpose of  Community transfers  is  not to 
redistribute money.  Instead they are  intended, through 
investment, to strengthen the economic base in recipient 
regions, including human caprtal formation. Union struc-
tural policies have contributed to a significant narrowing 
of the gaps between poorer and richer Member States. 
Structural Funds assistance in the 1989-93 programming 
period, are estimated to have increased growth by 0.5% 
a year in the four cohesion countries, from 1. 7% to 2.2%. 
Given  the  increase  in  assistance  in  the  present  pro-
gramming period (1994-99), the increase in growth may 
be even  greater on average than 0.5%  per year.  The 
number of jobs created or maintained during the  first 
programming  period  is  estimated  at  over  500,<XXl,  ie 
2.5% of the total. 
In  Objective  1  regions,  structural  policies  have 
brought about a general improvement in basic infra-
structure  and helped to  modernise their  economic 
base. Concrete examples are numerous: in Greece, 
the number of towns with a waste water treatment 
system will more than double by 1999, thus serving 
71% of the population. In Portugal, firms assisted by 
the  Union have achieved productivity increases of 
around 5% per year and employment growth of 2.5% 
per year. In total, more than 7,000 industrial projects 
have been undertaken with Union aid. In Ireland 50% 
of the students in post-compulsory secondary voca-
tional  education  have  received  Community  assist-
ance. Some 14,000 km of major roads will have been · 
built or upgraded in Spain by 1999. 
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But it  is  not only the poorest Member States which 
have benefited. Estimates show that around 3G--40% 
of all  funding  that  flows  into  the  poorest  Member 
States returns to the richer ones in  the  form of pur-
chase of know-how or capital equipment. 
Moreover, encouraging results have also been recorded 
for  other ·objectives.  The  poorer  regions  and  social 
groups in many of the richer Member States have, wrth 
the help of the Union's structural policies, been encour-
aged to explort ecoromic opportunities.  In  Objective 2 
regions,  for  example,  estimates  suggest that the  pro-
grammes created or maintained 530,000 jobs in net terms 
in the period 1989-93. For Objective Sb, the figure is an 
estimated SOO,CXXl jobs for the period 1989-99. Objective 
3 has financed between 2% and 15% of Member States' 
active  labour market  policies wrth  a specific focus on 
reducing exclusion. 
In  addition,  through  specific Community Initiatives. 
although with varying degrees of success, the Union 
has helped to target European problems, to identify 
new opportunities and to improve interregional and 
cross-border  relations  in  order  to  tackle  common 
problems. 
Part of the added value of EU  policies relates to the 
emphasis on innovation linked to the specific qualities 
of the  delivery system itself.  It  has helped Member 
States to target resources on the worst-affected areas 
and problems.  Solutions  are  organised to regional 
and  social  problems  through  medium-term  pro-
grammes which are focused on investment and inno-
vation.' The  specific  features  of  Community 
interventions have  in  some cases enhanced policy 
changes and the development of new structures. An 
example  of  this  is  Objective  4  's  preventative  ap-
proach  to  unemployment  resulting  from  industrial 
change. The devolution of responsibilities is encour-
aged, in particular through partnerships formed with 
those who benefit most from the programmes. Addi-
tional financial resources are levered from public and 
private sources. A Europe-wide framework of oppor-
tunity has been created through co-operation across 
borders. 
Outlook 
The Union faces major challenges including globali-
sation,  rapid  technological  change,  EMU  and Executive Summary 
enlargement. The European model of society remains 
the most appropriate framework for confronting them. 
Market  forces  and  entrepreneurial  initiative  are 
necessary for  seizing  new opportunities.  Solidarity 
and mutual support are an equally important basis for 
progress,  not  only  for  social  reasons  but also  for 
optimising overall economic benefits since there  is 
ample  evidence  of the  detrimental  effects  of in-
equality on growth. 
Cohesion  must  therefore  be  further  strengthened. 
Nevertheless, the report at this stage avoids making 
concrete proposals for change. Rather, a number of 
themes are identified as a basis for further discussion 
and common reflection. Their proper treatment,  re-
specting fully of the principle of subsidiarity, should 
lead to better policy-making for enhanced cohesion 
in the future. 
For  many  Member  States.  the  emergence  of  greater 
internal regional and social disparities will be a matter of 
concern.  While  the  need  for  sound  public finances  is 
indisputable, major questions for policy-making arise: 
•  how to  secure  sufficient investment,  including in 
human resource development; 
•  how to favour job creation, 
•  how to  make  national  structural  and social  pro-
grammes more effective in  coping with widening 
disparities. 
For EU non-structural policies several themes need to 
be addressed, including: 
•  fct the CAP, how to put into practice the intention to 
continue reform in such a way that environmental and 
social benefits are further developed in the context of 
a more integrated rural development policy; 
•  for state aid policy, how to combine administrative 
simplification with stricter control on state aid ex-
penditure; 
•  for network policies, how to develop public service 
contracts/universal service obligations in parallel 
with progress on liberalisation of markets, and 
•  more generally, how to seize the opportunities for 
synergy  between  policies,  including  structural 
policies. 
For EU structural policies, it is recognised that there 
is  scope  for  improvements  in  effectiveness,  for 
greater performance orientation and for enhancing 
their policy relevance. The main questions to be ad-
dressed to  make  structural  policies more  effective 
are: 
•  how to target scarce resources better on the most 
serious problems; 
•  how to optimise the use of grants and loans and 
public and private funding; 
•  how to simplify procedures; 
•  how to  strengthen  subsidiarity by clarifying the 
respective roles of Member States and the Union, 
to broaden participation at regional and local level 
and to involve with the social partners; 
•  how to maintain sufficient flexibility to respond to 
new opportunities and challenges. 
Orientating  structural  policies  towards  increasing 
performance depends on effective monitoring, con-
trol and evaluation. It requires further examination of 
the  additionality of EU  transfers,  absorptive  capa-
cities  of the  Member States,  built-in  incentives  to 
promote  quality  and  competition  for  scarce  re-
sources. 
Enhancing policy relevance  is  an ongoing process 
which has already begun with the preparation of new 
Objective 2 Programmes for 1997-99 and which will 
be followed by the mid-term review, in particular for 
Objective 1. This will  provide the basis for strategic 
thinking on future priorities. 
Finally, the general climate of financial rigour in Mem-
ber States has implications for the Union's policies. A 
major theme will be  how to combine, in a balanced 
way,  fiscal  discipline  with  solidarity  both  with  the 
poorest Member States and regions and with the most 
disadvantaged regions and people in the more pros-
perous Member States. 
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What do we mean by cohesion? 
The first Cohesion Report is presented in accordance 
with Miele 130b of the  Treaty on European Union. 
The Treaty calls on the Commission to 'submit a report 
to  the European Parliament,  the  Council,  the Econ-
omic and  Social Committee and the Committee of  the 
Regions  every three  years on  the  progress made 
towards  achieving  economic  and social  cohesion 
and on the manner in which the various means pro-
vided for in this Article {130b} have contributed to it'. 
The  organisation  of society  in  European  countries 
reflects the values of the social market economy. This 
seeks to combine a system of economic organisation 
based on market forces, freedom of opportunity arid 
enterprise with a commitment to the values of internal 
solidarity and  mutual  support which  ensures  open 
access  for  all  members  of  society  to  services  of 
general  benefit  and  protection.  With  growing 
European integration,  it  is  inevitable that the  Union 
should  increasingly  share  responsibility  with  the 
Member States for the maintenance of this European 
model of society. The Union, no less than the Member 
States,  must  also  have  the  means  at  its  disposal 
-the  cohesion policies -to  do so. 
Until now, the national and Community level policies 
to  promote  cohesion  have  not  been  subject  to  a 
single,  comprehensive  examination,  although  the 
Commission has reported from various perspp.ctives: 
on  the  situation  in  the  regions,  employment  and 
macroeconomic  developments.  The  first  Cohesion 
Report represents an opportunity to consider syste-
matically how policies at these different levels have 
contributed to  European  cohesion  and  to  examine 
their interaction. 
A fundamental prerequisite for this analysis - if 
only for operational  purposes - is  to  clarify the 
Union's cohesion objective. General aims such as 
solidarity and mutual support must be distilled into 
substantive,  and  measurable,  economic  and 
social targets. 
In  its  methodological  approach  to  economic  and 
social cohesion the present Report takes as its inspir-
ation Article  130a of the  Treaty on European Union 
where it is set in terms of 'harmonious development' 
with  a  specific  geographical  dimension:  'reducing 
disparities between the levels of development of the 
various regions  and the  backwardness of the  least 
favoured regions, including rural areas'. Ttl is reflects 
an explicit recognition that wide disparities are intoler-
able in a community, if the term has any meaning at 
all. 
Imbalances do not just imply a poorer quality of life 
for the most disadvantaged regions and the  lack of 
life-chances open to  their citizens,  but indicate an 
under-utilisation of -human  potential and a failure to 
take  advantage  of economic  opportunities  which 
could benefit the Union as.a whole. 
So far as the geographical dimension is concerned, 
the reduction of disparities between.Memoer States 
and regions is held, following the Com~ssion's  1993 
White Paper on these themes, to mean corwergence 
of basic  incomes  through  higher  GOP  growth,  of 
competitiveness and of employment.  Improving the 
competitiveness of the weaker regions is particularly 
important  in  the  context  of  the  European  Single 
Market.  By  permitting the  free  movement of goods 
and services,  labour and capital, the Single Market 
has removed obstacles to trade creating conditions 
for  faster growth in  the  Union as a whole and new 
opportunities for ircreased prosperity in its Member 
States. 
13 So far as social cohesion is concerned, this is more 
difficult to define in operational terms. A starting point 
would be to link social cohesion with the objectives 
of the European model of society which is founded 
on the notion of the social market economy as  de-
scribed  above.  The  solidarity  dimension  is  given 
practical effect through universal systems of social 
protection,  regulation to correct market failure  and 
systems of social dialogue. In addition, policies which 
promote  solidarity  and  mutual  support  are  them-
selves a factor in  strengthening the  productivity of 
European society and contributing to economic and 
social well-being. 
The promotion of social cohesion requires the reduc-
tion  of  the  disparities  which  arise  from  unequal 
access to employment opportunities and to the  re-
wards in the form of income. Such inequality tends to 
have serious social consequences through the mar-
ginalisation of sections of society, such as the  long-
term  unemployed,  the  young  unemployed and the 
poor. The incidence of poverty is also a result of policy 
choices  affecting  inter-personal  income  transfers. 
These are all measurable aspects of social cohesion 
which are considered in the analysis of this report. 
More  generally,  it  is  important  to  underline  that 
increasing cohesion  in  the  Union  is  about change. 
Improvements in  living  standards and the reduction 
in  economic  and  social  disparities  depend,  to  an 
important extent. on increases in  productivity. How-
ever,  increasing  competitiveness  almost  inevitably 
implies change; the acceptance of new technologies, 
new ways of  working, the need to learn new skills. This 
can give rise  to  adjustment problems in  the  labour 
market if economic growth is  slow and job creation 
is  insufficient  to  compensate  for  the  productivity 
growth which  derives  from  increased  competitive-
ness.  However,  experience  shows  that  'freezing' 
existing economic structures to protect jobs is not a 
viable, lasting, solution. Delaying the introduction of 
change can make it a more difficult and painful pro-
cess later on. 
Mcre than ever, national and regional ecooomic perfor-
mance depends on flexibility in an ever more competitive, 
global marketplace. The evidence shows that countries 
and regions  can  combine  improved productivity (high 
output  per  worker)  and  high  levels  of employment 
(the percentage of the  v.uking-age population  in  em-
ployment).  The  two  are  reconciled  CNer  time  by the 
re-employment of wakers in new activities. lnnCNation is 
14 
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at the heart of this process. Technological and organisa-
tional change and rew dernar'x:Js generated both by this 
and by rising real income levels are factors which create 
rew opportll1ities to  replace  the old.  Changes  in  the 
composition of emptc¥nent are part of the process by 
v.tlich successful COll1tries grow and develop ecoromi-
cally. 
This suggests that the aim must be to accelerate the 
rate  at which  new opportunities  are  created  while 
attempting to ensure that labour force skills match 
requirements.  Where  the  scale of redeployment is 
substantial or where workers have difficulty in finding 
new employment opportunities and the adjustment to 
change is  slow,  there  may  be a  role  for  cohesion 
policies in attempting to reduce the rate at which jobs 
are lost in declining sectors. But the preceding ana-
lysis suggests that such an approach ought not to be 
generalised and  ought not to  be  pursued  for  very 
long. 
While the report places much emphasis on  quanti-
fying trends and policy impacts. it is important to be 
aware of the  limits and risks of measurement in  this 
context.  First,  it  is  necessary  to  avoid  the  wider 
political aims of the European Union for  its  citizens 
becoming reduced to a debate on the relative merits 
of different macro- and microeconomic policies. The 
Union's political  goals of  solidarity,  mutual  support 
and cohesion may be pursued through largely econ-
omic means, but, as underlined above, these goals, 
nevertheless, remain the irreducible ambitions which 
structure European society and help to determine its 
sense of identity. 
Secondly, although considerable strides have been 
made in the development of techniques of evaluation, 
economic policies inhabit a complex world where it is 
not always possible to quantify outcomes precisely 
or, indeed, to assign effects to particular causes. 
Thirdly, the outcomes tend to emerge over the longer 
term,  perhaps especially in  the  EU  context where 
cohesion policies address the often extremely disad-
vantaged position of the weakest Member States and 
regions  with  the  aim  of improving the  supply-side 
conditions for economic activity to develop. 
While the preceding represents the essentials of the 
operational approach to cohesion, four further points 
should be made. First, it is important to underline that 
cohesion  is  concerned  with  increasing  economic Chapter 1 What do we mean by cohesion? 
growth and new opportunities in the  poorer regions  · 
and for  disadvantaged social groups and does not 
imply a reduction in either growth or jobs for others 
('negative convergence'). Secondly, improving econ-
omic circumstances  is  not an end in  itself,  but the 
means to an end. The creation of wealth should widen 
opportunity and raise living standards and the quality 
of life generally. In the European context, it should not 
only  be  a  consequence  of  closer  integration  but 
should also contribute to increasing the exchange of 
ideas across national borders and appreciation of the 
benefits  of  solidarity.  Thirdly,  it  should  heighten 
awareness of the need for development to be sustain-
able and for a long-term view to be taken of the use 
of natural resources. 
Fourthly, cohesion is not to be confused with harmoni-
sation or uniformity. Its sole aim is to achieve greater 
equality  in  economic  and  social  opportunities. 
Cohesion and diversity are not conflicting objectives, 
but can be mutually reinforcing. 
Outline of report 
Chapter 2 quantifies  the  extent of the cohesion 
challenge: the nature and scale of economic and 
social  disparities  between  Member  States,  re-
gions and social groups. It focuses on the gaps in 
income per head, competitiveness and unemploy-
ment between different parts of the Union, as well 
as the situation of disadvantaged social groups in 
relation  to  their  access to employment  and  the 
related incidence of poverty. 
The  remaining  chapters of the  Report consider the 
contribution of national  and Community  policies to 
reducing the  gaps  and hence to  the  promotion  of 
convergence and cohesion. 
Chapter 3 contains observations on the contribution 
to cohesion of policies which are the responsibility of 
the Member States. Macroeconomic policies to pro-
mote stability are examined in this context, as well as 
national policies designed to redistribute income at 
the  inter-personal  level or promote national and re-
gional competitiveness. 
Chapter 4 considers how the various policies of the 
Union in  different sectors contribute to the achieve-
ment of cohesion. A wide range of policies is exam-
ined, from those which have a major budgetary signi-
ficance at the Community level - notably agriculture 
and research and development-to those which are 
largely concerned with establishing a common Com-
munity framework for the development of the sector 
- such as the policies to establish the single market 
or  to  reinforce the  European  dimension  in  sectors 
such as transport, telecommunications and energy. 
The policies examined in this part do not have cohe-
sion as their primary objective but, because they are 
concerned  either  directly or  ir:Jdirectly  with  issues 
such as competitiveness or quality of life, they gener-
ally have cohesion effects. 
Chapter 5 of the Report examines the contribution of 
the  Community's  cohesion  policies  themselves. 
These have existed in their modern form since 1989, 
and the report presents the first extensive opportunity 
to evaluate their contribution - not only their direct 
impact on economic and social disparities, but also 
their wider contribution to improving the quality of life 
and giving substance to the idea of European citizen-
ship. 
Chapter 6 contains the Commission's reflections on 
the lessons learned from experience in the operation 
of cohesion  policies,  on  the  problems which have 
emerged and on the appropriate response to these. 
Finally, Chapter 7 summarises the main conclusions 
of the report. 
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The convergence process and cohesion: recent trends 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the extent 
of  geographical  and  social  disparities  in  the 
European Union with  particular reference to  income 
per head and employment. 
A  key  quest1on  is  whether  gaps  between  Member 
States.  regions  and  social  groups  have  tended to 
widen or narrow over time. According to a number of 
studies, convergence 1s a slow process and regional 
differences tend to be reduced by not more than 2% 
a year over tt1e  long-term. 
For convergence to occur, it is not enough for the 
situation  in  the  weaker parts of the  Union or the 
position  of  disadvantaged  social  groups  to 
improve in  absolute terms. Both must improve in 
relative terms, relative to other regions and more 
privileged groups. 
This chapter seeks,  in  the first instance, to quantify 
prevailing disparities. As outlined in Chapter 1, how-
ever, cohesion is also about more qualitative aspects 
- the  sustainability of economic  growth  and  the 
quality of European citizenship. These are discussed 
in the final section of the chapter. 
2.1  Income and employment 
The enlargement of the Community from six coun-
tries and a population of 175 million to 15  coun-
tries  and  a  population  of 370  million  has  been 
accompanied by an  increase in  its  diversity, not 
least in  socio-economic terms. Major differences 
exist between the Member States and regions  in 
terms  of income per head and their capacity to 
generate jobs. 
Cohesion between Member States 
Income per head 
At the Member State level, income per head today 
(as measured by per capita GOP  in  1995) is  sig-
nificantly  - 10%  or  more  - above  the  Union 
average  in  Belgium,  Denmark,  Luxembourg and 
Austria.  It  is  also  above  average  in  Germany, 
France,  Italy  and  the  Netherlands.  around  the 
average in  the UK and  slightly below in  Sweden 
and Finland.  The  remaining  four  Member States 
have income per head between 64% of the Union 
average (Greece) and  90%  (Ireland). The  'cohe-
sion  gap'  is  most  clearly  seen  in  the  fact  that 
average  income  per  head  in  the  two  poorest 
Member  States,  Greece  and  Portugal,  is  some 
40%  below  that  in  the  four  most  prosperous 
Member States listed above. The gap is consider-
ably wider now than  immediately before the first 
enlargement of the Community in 1973 when GOP 
per head in Germany at one extreme was only 25% 
above that in Italy at the other. 
But while the entry of Ireland in 1973, Greece in 1981 
and  Spain  and  Portugal  in  1986 resulted  on  each 
occasion in  the gap widening, the key issue is how 
these  countries  have  fared  compared to the  other 
Member States over time. 
Taken  as a whole,  the economies of the  Fifteen 
have grown at an  average rate of just over 2% a 
year over the past two decades, though there have 
been  considerable  cyclical  variations.  This  is 
slightly less than in  the US  over the same period 
but markedly slo.wer than in Japan (though Japan 
has  undergone  prolonged  recession  over  the 
17 1990s). It is, nevertheless, equivalent to GDP dou-
bling every 30 years or so.
One of the most striking features of economic devel-
opments over this period has been the closer integra-
tion of Member States as witnessed by the growth in
trade between them, especially during the 1980s
when for every country imports from other parts of the
Community grew much faster than those from the rest
of the world. For all Member States, trade with the
rest of the Community now accounts for well over half
of the total and for all apart from Germany, the UK,
Ireland and Finland, for over 60%.
There have been some differences, however, in
the growth of individual Member States and — as
discussed in the next section — regions (Graph
1). Since the beginning of the 1980s, four Member
States, Spain, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal,
have grown on average appreciably faster than
the rest. For Spain and Portugal, growth accel-
erated in the period after their accession in 1986.
For the rest, apart from Greece, Finland and
Sweden, growth has been close to the average. In
the case of Finland and Sweden, there has been
a reversal of economic fortunes without precedent
in the Union in the post-war years. Both experi-
enced a sharp fall in GDP in the early 1990s which
led to their income per head declining from above
the Union average to below in the space of a few
years.
This is particularly striking in the case of Sweden.
Over the 10 years 1983 to 1993, GDP per head,
measured in terms of purchasing power standards
(PPS), declined from 12% above the Union average
to 2% below. In Finland, GDP per head measured in
the same terms was the same as the Union average
in 1983 and 9% below in 1993. In both cases, the fall
occurred largely after 1990 when output fell markedly.
Both economies have experienced faster growth than
the Union average since 1993, but they have some
way to go to recover their former position among the
wealthier European economies. The signs are espe-
cially positive for Finland where both investment and
GDP have picked up strongly after several years of
decline (though, as noted below, this recovery is
concentrated in certain regions). 
The Cohesion Four
The relative growth of the four poorest Member
States, Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal, is of
particular relevance for cohesion. In 1983, the four
had an average income per head of 66% of the Union
average, and it remained at this level until after 1986
(the year of accession of Spain and Portugal). Since
then, annual growth in the four has averaged just over
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18one percentage point above average, giving rise to a
slow but steady process of convergence with the rest
of the Union. By 1993, GDP per head in the four
reached 74% of the EU average, an increase over 10
years of 8 percentage points).
In general, strong growth of the European economy
has tended to favour convergence. This was the case
in the second-half of the 1980s (Graph 2). On the
other hand, the recession of the early 1990s greatly
affected some of the weaker countries and disparities
widened again (though the effect is disguised by the
unification of Germany). Since 1994, growth has re-
sumed in the Union and in these countries. 
Growth of the Union economy as a whole means that
the weakest Member States have, in effect, to hit a
moving target to achieve convergence. Though they
have tended to grow at an above average rate, con-
vergence has been slow and the gap in income per
head between them and the EU average diminished
by only around a quarter in the 10 years 1983 to 1993.
There have been marked differences in develop-
ments between the four. Ireland has recorded the
fastest growth of any Member State in recent
years, maintaining a high rate even during the
recession in the early 1990s. GDP per head, which
stood at 64% of the European average in 1983,
increased to 80% by 1993, rising further to 90% in
1995 and at the present rate will overtake Finland
in 1996/97.
Relatively high rates of economic growth were also
achieved in Spain and Portugal, where GDP per head
increased by 7 and 13 percentage points, respec-
tively, relative to the Union average between 1983
and 1993. Both countries were particularly hard-hit by
the recession, however, and their GDP per head
remained largely unchanged relative to the average
between 1993 and 1995.
In Greece, GDP per head increased slightly
relative to the rest of the Union between 1983 and
1993, from 62% of the average to 65%, though
growth has tended to vary widely from year to
year. Whereas in 1985, 1989 and 1991, it ex-
ceeded the Union average at 3 to 4%, GDP fell in
1987 and 1993 and stagnated in 1990. The weak
performances in 1987 and 1990 are particularly
striking, since they were against a background of
strong growth in the rest of Europe. 
Employment and unemployment
The major economic challenge facing the Union is the
persistence of high rates of unemployment (Graph 3).
It is this feature above all which marks it apart from
other major economies, specifically Japan and the
US. It is a feature which dates back 20 years. From
1973 to 1985, unemployment in the Fifteen increased
each year from an average of only 2% to 10%. Al-
though the economic recovery in the second half of
the 1980s brought unemployment down, it still left the
rate only just below 8% in 1990 when the upturn came
to an end. Unemployment peaked at over 11% in
1994 and in 1995, it was only slightly below this level,
with over 18 million people unemployed. By contrast,
the rate was under 6% in the US and 3% in Japan. 
Unemployment rates in Member States in 1995 varied
considerably, from less than 5% in Luxembourg and
Austria to 15% or more in Spain and Finland. They
were also above average, at close to 12%, in France
and Italy. 
While the present rate of unemployment in the Union
is slightly above the level a decade ago, the number
in employment is, nevertheless, higher. Despite the
image to the contrary, net job creation has been
higher over the past 10 years than in the previous 10
and the number employed in the Fifteen went up by
almost 7 million over this period (although the employ-
ment rate — the proportion of the working age popu-
lation in jobs has remained unchanged). The rate of
net job creation, however, has varied from year to year
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19reflecting the effects of the cycle. Growth in jobs was
particularly pronounced in the second half of the
1980s when a total of 10 million net new jobs were
created, a growth of 11/2% per year. 
In the period 1991 to 1994, however, the Fifteen lost
an estimated 4 million jobs although employment
started to grow again in 1995. However, at the same
time, growth in employment has been accompanied
by, and was a contributory factor in, the relatively
rapid expansion of the labour force, predominantly
among women. In the 1980s, labour force growth
averaged nearly 1% a year, adding to the difficulty of
reducing unemployment rates. 
In general, economic growth has tended to be less
employment-intensive in the EU than in the US which
has experienced job growth of 11/2% a year over the
last decade or so, while in Japan the figure was just
over 1% a year. In the Union, economic growth over
the long-term, averaging just over 2% a year, has
been associated with productivity growth of just
under 2% a year and so has generated an increase
in employment of around 1/2% a year.
The 1995 enlargement of the EU added three Member
States, where, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, un-
employment was much lower than elsewhere and
two, Austria and Sweden, where unemployment was
not much above the frictional levels associated with
workers changing jobs. This remains broadly true for
Austria, but the fall in GDP in Finland and Sweden in
the early 1990s was accompanied by large-scale job
losses and dramatic rises in unemployment.
In Finland, the number employed fell by over 20%
between 1990 and 1994, largely due to the fact
that trade with the former Soviet Union collapsed,
and unemployment soared from 3% to 18%,
although as noted above, the economy has been
recovering since and unemployment has fallen. In
Sweden, there were similar difficulties, some of
the problems being associated with delays in
adjusting macroeconomic imbalances and with
problems of international competitiveness in some
industrial sectors. Employment fell by 13%
between 1990 and 1994 while unemployment rose
from under 2% to 10%.
The Cohesion Four
Unemployment in Spain — the highest in the
Community — has tended to affect between one-sixth
and one-fifth of the labour force since the beginning
of the 1980s, the proportion rising to almost a quarter
in 1994. These fluctuations mirror the pattern of econ-
omic growth, unemployment declining significantly in
the second half of the 1980s (when employment grew
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by 31 /2% a year) and significant increases in the 1990s 
(when employment fell by almost 2% a year). 
In the case of Ireland, where unemployment has also 
been traditionally high, the strong economic perfor-
mance over the past 10 years or so appears at last to 
be reducing the rate. Economic growth of nearly 5% 
a year in the period 1983 to  1993 was accompanied 
by growth  in  employment  only  slightly  above  the 
Union  average.  Unemployment  remained  around 
15% of the labour force, though recently the numbers 
employed have  nsen markedly and unemployment 
fell  to  below  12
1/2%  in  1995.  Ireland  is  the  only 
Member State where migration has been on a signifi-
cant scale over the past 15 years, net outward migra-
tion helping to keep down unemployment in the 1980s 
- facilitated  by  the  existence  of  large  Irish  com-
munities in  the  UK, the  US and,  increasingly, other 
Member States of the Union-and net inward migra-
tion  increasing the  work  force  in  the  1990s as  the 
demand for labour has risen. 
Portuguese  experience has  been  similar  to  that  of 
Ireland  insofar  as  rapid  economic  growth  has  not 
been matched by  higher than average job creation. 
On the other hand, labour force growth in Portugal is 
much  slower,  partly  because  participation  among 
women was  already higher at  the  beginning of the 
1980s  and  has  increased  by  much  less  than  in 
Ireland, and the rate of unemployment has remained 
below the  EU  average.  The  unemployment rate  in 
Greece has  also consistently been  below average, 
though,  in  the  1990s,  it  has  been  2-3 percentage 
points higher than in Portugal. 
Cohesion between Regions 
Income per head 
Despite  these  considerable  differences  between 
Member States, economic disparities in the Union are 
most evident at the regional level and, in  particular, 
between  the  centre  and  the  periphery.  Income 
per head is  below or well  below average in  all  the 
southern peripheral Mediterranean regions, including 
southern Italy, as well as in those on the eastern and 
nortr.ern  periphery  - in  eastern  Germany  and 
northern  and  eastern  Finland - and on the  north-
western  periphery,  in  Ireland  and  parts of the  UK 
(Map 1  ).  They are well above average in a cluster of 
regions  in  northern  Italy,  southern  Germany  and 
Austria with a second cluster in the Benelux countries 
and northern Germany. 
Disparities can be demonstrated in a number of ways. 
For example, a simple comparison between regions 
with the highest and lowest levels of income per head 
(again measured by per capita GOP  in  purchasing 
power standards) reveals that,  in  1993, the average 
level in Hamburg (D), the most prosperous region in 
the Union, was 4 times that in Acores or Alentejo (P) 
and in Guadeloupe (F). 
Taking more representative groups, a comparison of 
the  10 richest and the 10 poorest regions indicates 
that,  in  1993, in  the  former,  average GOP  per head 
was  some 3.3  times  higher  than  that  of  the  latter, 
though this  was slightly less than  a decade earlier 
when the figure was 3.5 (Table 5). 
Over the  10 years 1983 to  1993, growth in GOP has 
varied markedly between regions (Map 2).  The  dif-
ference  in  GOP  per  head  between  the  10  richest 
regions and the  EU  average has widened while the 
gap between the  10 poorest and  the  average  has 
narrowed at a slightly faster rate.  Excluding the new 
German  Lander,  the  regions  making  up  the  two 
groups remained remarkably similar over the 10-year 
period. The top 10 regions were exactly the same in 
1993 as in 1983, though rankings changed within this 
group. Half of these are (West) German regions while 
the  rest  are  made  up of  five  northern  capital  city 
regions: Bruxelles, 11e de France, Wien, Luxembourg 
and Greater London. The  bottom group was domi-
nated by the  same group of Greek and Portuguese 
regions in 1993 as in 1983 together with the Departe-
ments  d'Outre  Mer  (F).  With  German  unification. 
however,  one  of  the  new  Lander,  Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, was included in this group in 1993, with 
three others being only just outside. 
Enlarging the  scope of the analysis to  compare. 
for  example,  the  top  25  and  bottom 25 regions 
reveals  a  picture  of  relatively  unchanging  dis-
parities over  the  10  year  period,  but  with  more 
changes in the regions making up the groups. 
The unchanging nature of regional disparities is 
confirmed  by  more  formal  statistical  measures. 
For example, the average dispersion around the 
average, which provides summary information on 
differences between all  regions  and not just be-
tween the extremes, afso shows little net change 
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23over the 10 years to 1993 (Graph 2). Though there
was a slight widening of disparities during the
relatively unfavourable economic climate of the
early 1980s, this was gradually reversed during
the period of recovery between 1985 and 1989.
Disparities then widened again with the entry of
the new German Länder into the Union before
narrowing again to reach virtually the same level
as in 1983. The average disparity in income per
head in the EU is twice that in comparable regions
in the US.
Growth of income per head has tended to vary be-
tween regions according to their degree of depend-
ence on different sectors (Table 6). The regions most
dependent on primary sector employment (mostly
agriculture) — located in the four cohesion countries
(Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal) and Finland —
have GDP per head substantially below the level in
the rest of the Union and have experienced slower
than average growth, reflecting the trend decline in
this sector over the long-term and the difficulties of
diversifying economic activity in a rural context. The
most industrial regions — half of which are in Ger-
many and the rest in north-eastern Spain, northern
France, northern Italy, Austria and central UK — have
above average GDP per head and have grown at a
rate only marginally below the EU average. Regions
with a strong service sector have, on average, the
highest level of GDP per head and have experienced
a rate of growth of around the Union average. This
group of regions contains the capital cities of all the
Member States, except Lisbon (P), as well as regions
in Belgium, the Netherlands and northern Germany.
Economic activity is strongly concentrated in the
most urbanised areas of the Community. Regions
with more than 500 inhabitants per square
kilometre account for only 4% of the land area of
the Union but for more than half the population. In
1993, their average GDP per head was 14% above
the EU average. This implies that between two-
thirds and three-quarters of the EU’s total wealth
creation occurs in urban areas — although, as
described in the next section, inner city areas
have some of the most serious social and
economic problems in the Union. 
The prosperity and growth of many large cities has
given rise to a marked feature of development in
a number of Member States in the form of signifi-
cant differences in economic performance be-
tween certain regions, often including the capital
city, and the rest. This has led to a widening of
disparities in income per head, in particular, in
Spain, Portugal and Greece in the South and Bel-
gium and Germany (West) in the North (Table 7,
Map 2).
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4 GDP per head by Member State and regional extremes, 1993
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24In Spain, which is the fifth largest Member State in
terms of population and the second biggest in land
area, development has been particularly uneven.
Growth has tended to occur most strongly in the
industrial areas on the eastern coast as well as in
certain central and southern regions. For example,
the level of GDP per head in Valencia increased from
70% of the European average in 1983 to 75% in 1993,
while in Asturias, it fell from 77% to 75%. Growth in
the more favoured regions was especially strong at
the end of the 1980s, before faltering in the recession
of the 1990s.
Development has also been uneven in Portugal,
where regions with two thirds of the population
(Lisboa and Norte) saw their level of income per head
rise by more than 10 percentage points relative to the
European average in the 10 years 1983 to 1993, while
in the other regions the relative level remained much
the same. The most dramatic example of a growing
city and a declining hinterland is in Portugal; GDP per
head in Lisboa increased from 81% of the Union
average in 1983 to 96% in 1993, while in neighbouring
Alentejo, it fell from 48% to 42%. As a result of the
growing prosperity of Lisboa, its GDP per head in
1993 was well over twice that of the Açores, the
poorest region in Portugal (Graph 4).
Leaving aside France, where the DOM have a lower
income per head than anywhere on the EU mainland
and the smaller Member States, where capital cities
have relatively high levels of income per head, inter-
nal disparities are particularly acute in Italy and
Germany. In the former, income per head in the North
is typically between 120% and 130% of the Union
average compared to 60% to 90% in the regions in
the South. For much of the 1980s, the disparities
tended to widen even further, but then narrowed in
the recession of the early 1990s which affected the
South to a lesser degree. As a result, over the 10-year
period as a whole, the pattern of regional disparities
changed by less in Italy than in other Member States.
Many of the characteristics of a dual economy are
also evident in Germany. The new Länder, however,
are different from other parts of the Union, with struc-
tural problems characteristic of lagging regions in
general, but also with problems inherited from the
previous era of central planning and environmental
neglect: outmoded infrastructure, environmental de-
gradation and a lack of competitiveness in much of
industry. In the year after unification, 1991, GDP per
head was around a third of the EU average (but after
substantial efforts at national level and with assist-
ance from the Union, this is estimated to have risen to
more than 50% in 1995).
Employment and unemployment
The Union’s unemployment problem is most acute at
the regional and local level. The evidence confirms
that it is in terms of unemployment that regional dis-
parities are particularly acute and show little sign of
narrowing.
Comparisons of regions at opposite extremes serve
to underline the scale of the disparities (Map 3). Thus,
in the 10 worst-affected regions, the average unem-
ployment rate was 26.4% in 1995 or nearly seven
times the average rate (just under 4%) in the 10 least-
affected regions. The 25 worst-affected regions had
an unemployment rate averaging 22.4% in 1995,
nearly five times the average for the 25 least-affected
regions (4.6%). 
The changes over time in these groups of regions are
revealing (Map 4). For both the group of 10 and the
group of 25 least-affected regions the average unem-
ployment rate was virtually the same in the mid-1990s
as it had been a decade earlier. But for the group of
10 and the group of 25 worst-affected regions, the
picture is quite different. For the former, the average
unemployment rate increased significantly over the
10 years, from 19.4% in 1983 to 26.4% in 1995, an
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27increase of 7 percentage points. For the latter group,
the increase was 5 percentage points.
The tendency for disparities in unemployment to
widen over time is confirmed by the summary statis-
tics for all regions (Graph 5). The long-term trend for
regional differences to increase, which dates back to
the mid-1970s, was interrupted by the economic
upturn between 1987 and 1990. The subsequent
recession led to unemployment increasing through-
out Europe and was associated with a substantial
widening of disparities which continued into 1995.
However, the regions worst-affected by unemployment
today are not always the same as 10 years ago. The major
change which has occurred is that many old industrial
regions of the UK which featured among the 25 worst-af-
fected regions a decade ago have been replaced by
regions in southern Italy. Spanish regions are the constant
feature of this group throughout the period. With the
enlargements of the first half of the 1990s, a number of
regions in eastern Germany and Finland joined the group.
A growing phenomenon is that of urban unemployment,
which tends to show itself in particular parts of cities rather
than across cities as a whole. The co-existence of areas
with high added value activities and high income resi-
dents alongside areas with low incomes, high unemploy-
ment, high dependence on welfare benefits and
overcrowded and poor housing has become increasingly
common throughout Europe. For such small — if popu-
lous — areas, few comparable statistics are available at
the European level to capture the underlying realities, but
national sources point to unemployment rates of 30% and
more — and occasionally as high as 50% — in some
districts:
Unemployment in 49 districts 
with an EU URBAN programme
Unempl. (%) <15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30+
No. of cities 5 10 10 9 15
At the broader regional level, there are often significant
differences in unemployment rates within Member States
(Graph 6). The variation in rates in Spain, Italy and
Germany is considerable. In 1995, the worst affected
region in Spain (Andalucia) had an unemployment rate of
close to 35% and the least affected region (Navarra) one
of around 13%. In Italy, the difference between the most
and the least affected region was some 20 percentage
points and in Germany, around 15 percentage points.
High average rates of unemployment also exist in some
capital cities despite their high income per head, prime
examples being Brussels, Berlin and London. In general,
as for regional GDP per head, the disparities in unem-
ployment rates within most Member States have tended
to widen over time (Table 8).
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6 Unemployment rates by Member State and regional extremes, 1995
Vlaams 
Brabant
Hainaut
Oberbayern
Magdeburg
E15 = 10.7
Ionia Nisia
Attiki Comunidad 
foral de 
Navarra
Andalucia
Alsace
Nord - Pas-
de-Calais
Trentino-
Alto Adige
Campania
Utrecht
Groningen
Berks, 
Bucks, 
Oxon
Merseyside
Ahvenanmaa/
Åland
Itä-Suomi
Centro
Alentejo
Småland 
med 
Öarna
Övre 
Norrland
Salzburg
Wien
Chapter 2 The convergence process and cohesion: recent trends
28The pattern of employment growth at the regional level in
the EU has also been mixed (Map 5). The regions with
the highest rate of net job creation in the period 1983 to
1993 were located in the Netherlands, Germany,
Luxembourg and the UK in the North and in eastern
Greece, Spain and northern Portugal in the South. For a
large number of regions — nearly 60 at the NUTS 2 level,
or around 30% of the total — there was no change in
employment or a fall over this period. Among those with
the poorest record are many Nordic regions in Finland
and Sweden, as well as a diverse group including old
industrial regions in the UK (Merseyside, South Yorkshire
and West Midlands), France (Lorraine and Nord-Pas de
Calais), Spain (Galicia and Asturias) and rural or less
developed regions such as Dytiki Ellada (GR), Auvergne,
Limousin and Poitou-Charentes (FR) and Basilicata (IT). 
Similarly, the distribution of employment between
sectors of activity differs widely across the Union
(Maps 6 to 8). Typically, northern regions have the
highest concentration of activity in the service sector
while Greece and Portugal, and to a lesser extent,
Spain and Ireland, lag substantially behind. The ex-
ception to this pattern is Germany where employment
in industry remains particularly high.
As expected, there are strong concentrations of ser-
vice employment in the large urban centres and capi-
tal cities in all Member States, including Athens and
Madrid. At the same time, there are still many regions
in the Union where the employment structure remains
very traditional, with over a quarter of total employ-
ment in agriculture in parts of Greece, southern Spain,
Portugal and southern Italy. 
As noted in the previous section, regional depend-
ence on different sectors has an important bearing on
performance. The regions most dependent on the
primary sector have unemployment rates well above
the EU average, which is largely explained by the
presence in this group of many Spanish and southern
Italian regions. Largely unchanged levels of
employment have meant that unemployment rates
have also risen over time at a rate significantly above
the Union average, as the numbers looking to work
have increased. The consolidation of farm holdings in
the agricultural sector has continued with the esti-
mated loss of 800 thousand units, 9% of the total,
between 1989/90 and 1993, and it has been esti-
mated that, in 1993, agriculture provided full-time
employment for only a quarter of those working in the
sector. 
Unemployment rates are below the EU average in
regions most heavily dependent on industry and have
fallen over time — except in the French and Austrian
areas — partly as a result of employment growth
above the EU average. The regions most dependent
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33on the service sector have higher unemployment
rates on average than the industrial regions but still
below the EU average. 
The components of
geographical disparities
An insight into the underlying causes of regional
disparities in income per head can be obtained by
dividing this into two components: productivity (GDP
per person employed) and the number employed in
relation to population. GDP per head is the product of
these two factors. It is informative to examine the
degree to which the income disparities described
above are attributable to one or other of these two
magnitudes — whether, for example, a Member State
or region has high GDP per head because it has a
high level of productivity or a high proportion of its
population in employment. 
In order to visualise simultaneously the relative roles
of variations in productivity, on the one hand, and
employment, on the other, information for each has
been set out in a graph (Graph 7). This shows how
the different Member States and regions (at NUTS 1
level) compare to the EU average. The results are
revealing. They show that Member States have widely
different combinations of productivity performance
and employment levels, even where their final GDP
per head is similar. The variations are even more
marked between regions. 
Among the three most prosperous Member States, for
example, high income per head in Belgium is attribut-
able to relatively high productivity, while in Denmark
it is due to a high proportion of population in employ-
ment (a Nordic characteristic in general, although
less so today in Finland). In Austria, the third Member
State in this group, high income per head results from
a more equal contribution from both components.
Three of the four large Member States (Germany,
France and Italy) are clustered comparatively closely
together, while the fourth large country, the UK, has
lower productivity and a higher employment level
than the rest. These Member States are characterised
by wide internal variations, especially Germany and
Italy. In these two countries, Italy in particular, regions
tend to be at one or other of the extremes, with either
a combination of low productivity and low employ-
ment or high productivity and high employment. This
underlines the extent to which these countries exhibit
the characteristics of dual economies. 
The graph also shows a cluster of regions centred in
Germany, northern Italy and Austria where relatively
high productivity and employment levels are com-
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34bined. This is a practical illustration that high produc-
tivity — or low labour intensive methods of produc-
tion — can be combined with high employment. As
discussed elsewhere, in a dynamic framework it re-
quires a flexible, adaptable and innovative economy
capable of generating new opportunities to replace
those made obsolete for technological or other rea-
sons.
The situation in the four cohesion countries is of
particular interest. In practice, there are almost as
many differences as similarities between them.
Ireland and Spain are relatively similar, both having a
level of productivity which is now close to the EU
average combined with a low level of employment.
Greece and Portugal have a productivity level signi-
ficantly below the average, but in Portugal employ-
ment is above average. In Spain, the largest of the
countries, the internal variations are considerable
especially as regards productivity (which is above the
EU average in the East and North-east and in the
capital, Madrid).
For all of the cohesion countries (and to a lesser extent
for Finland) the challenge is generally one of seeking
to improve both productivity and the numbers in
employment. Not only will this increase income per
head but it will also tend to reduce the numbers of
unemployed (or will provide employment for discour-
aged workers who are now economically inactive).
The emphasis needs to be different in different
Member States and regions within the group. For
Ireland and Spain, productivity has already con-
verged to the EU average (Graph 8 and Map 9), so
that the main challenge for the future is the generation
of jobs. Both countries are characterised by high
unemployment, as noted above, and also have rela-
tively low rates of female participation in the labour
force. For Portugal, where employment is generally
high, the challenge is to increase productivity, and
income per head, while avoiding substantial rises in
unemployment as the necessary structural changes
take place. In Greece as well as some Spanish
regions (and others in southern Italy), the challenges
are generally more serious, involving progress on
both productivity and employment fronts simulta-
neously. This is an extremely difficult — and long-term
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36— task, but one of the messages of the preceding
analysis is that it is not an impossible one.
Underlying the productivity gaps are significant dif-
ferences between different parts of the Union in the
conditions for production. In particular, the economi-
cally stronger and more prosperous parts of the EU
are generally more richly endowed with modern com-
munication infrastructure, a skilled and qualified
labour force and the capacity for advanced research
and development.
The gaps in infrastructure can be seen in the dif-
ferences in systems of transport, in road and rail
networks. In the South of the Union and Ireland, the
provision of motorways — which are particularly
important for the transport of both passengers and
freight — is 50% or less of the EU average (Graph 9).
Railway networks are also less extensive in the South
although the disparity is not so great as for roads, but
the gap widens once the degree of modernisation is
taken into account (Graphs 10 and 11).
Telecommunication links are a prerequisite for the growth
of modern industries and services which need efficient
telephone, fax and, increasingly, digital data transmission
systems. Telecommunication networks in the Union are
developing rapidly, but major variations remain in the level
of provision. Typically the poorest parts of the Union score
less well with regard to the availability of telephone lines
(Graph 12), but as a result of the more recent develop-
ment of their systems, better in relation to the provision of
modern digital networks (Graph 13). 
It is increasingly recognised that the competitiveness
of regions is dependent on the know-how and skills
of their people. In modern industrial economies, most
employment does not depend on low-skill mass pro-
duction. Rather, employment is increasingly concen-
trated in smaller enterprises, where the capacity to
innovate is often essential and where the need for a
trained and adaptable work force is correspondingly
greater. Skills are also at a premium in the public and
private provision of many business, social and per-
sonal services which together account for some 64%
of total employment in the EU. 
While progress has been rapid over recent years,
more remains to be done to develop the potential of
Europe’s work force especially — but not exclusively
— in the poorer regions. In the latter, the weight of the
past is particularly important so that today a large
proportion of the adult labour force has not pro-
ceeded beyond basic schooling, ranging from 45%
in Ireland to almost three-quarters of the total in
Portugal compared to 36% in the Union as a whole
(Graph 14). Virtually all young people in the Union are
in school to at least the age of 15 and almost all remain
in education to 18 in many Member States (Graph 15).
But more needs to be done to improve the higher
education and vocational training of these to equip
them for an increasingly competitive marketplace.
The availability of specialist skills is important for
innovation and the development of Research and
Technological Development capacities. The propor-
tion of employment in RTD in the South and in Ireland
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37is generally around a half that in the more prosperous
Member States (Graph 16), and the overall invest-
ment in RTD is correspondingly low — for example,
Germany invests 5 times more than Greece in relation
to GDP (Graph 17).
2.2 Social Cohesion
Previous sections have been concerned in part
with the spatial dimension of labour market prob-
lems and the implications of regional disparities in
unemployment for economic and social cohesion.
This section focuses more explicitly on social
cohesion through an investigation of trends in two
key areas affecting the well-being not just of dif-
ferent social groups but of European society as a
whole:
· the access of individuals to income generating
activities. This aspect can be best understood in
terms of developments in the labour market, not
just of levels of unemployment but also levels of
participation and access to job opportunities;
· the distribution of household incomes net of trans-
fers after tax, where, in terms of social cohesion,
indicators of the incidence of poverty are particu-
larly relevant.
These are matters of concern to all Member States in
the Union and to their policies for social integration
and solidarity. They represent two defining elements
of the European model of society. Given the general
difficulty in defining social cohesion, as discussed in
chapter 1 above, for operational purposes any nar-
rowing of differences in individual access to employ-
ment and a reduction in poverty can be regarded as
signifying an improvement in social cohesion.
Access to employment opportunities
Changing patterns of employment
There have been fundamental changes in the global
economy over the past two decades which have had
far-reaching consequences for the pattern of employ-
ment in Europe and elsewhere. The most obvious
long-term employment developments in Europe are
an expansion of employment in services coupled
with declining employment in agriculture and manu-
facturing, a growth of part-time jobs, filled predomi-
nantly by women, and a shift in the occupational
structure of the work force towards those with high
educational and technical qualifications and knowl-
edge-based skills.
The expansion of service employment, associated
both with increasing demand for services as real
incomes rise and the more labour-intensive nature of
service activities, is a feature of all advanced econ-
omies and shows little sign of abating. In 1995, 64%
of employment in the Union was in services as against
57% 10 years earlier, while only 31% was in industry.
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38This, however, still leaves a gap between Europe and
the US, where 73% of employment was in services in
the same year and where some 22 million additional
jobs in this sector were created between 1980 and
1993. This is not so many more than were created in
services in the European Union over the same period
— around 18 million — but the big difference is that
in the US this was coupled with a increase in total
employment of 20 million, in Europe of only 5 million.
Whereas Europe lost 5 million jobs in agriculture and
8 million in industry, losses in the US in these two
sectors together totalled only 2 million between them.
Differences between Member States in the distribu-
tion of employment between sectors have narrowed
considerably. Over the Union as a whole, there has
been a decline in the share of employment in agricul-
ture, a large decline in the share of industry and a rise
in services (see Table 10 in the Annex which shows
sectoral shares for the years 1983 and 1993 compar-
ing the cohesion countries with five other Member
States — Belgium, Germany, France, the Netherlands
and the UK). In the cohesion countries, there was a
dramatic fall in agricultural employment (the decline
in share ranging from 6 percentage points in Ireland
to 8–9 percentage points in Greece and Spain and to
13 percentage points in Portugal). In effect, the struc-
ture of employment in the cohesion countries appears
to be converging towards that in the more ‘mature’
economies in the North of the Union in which employ-
ment in agriculture has declined to very low levels,
while dependence on the service sector for jobs has
grown considerably. The increase in employment in
services in the cohesion countries ranged from 6 to
15 percentage points while in the rest of the Union, it
was around 7 percentage points. In effect, in the
former, the average share of service employment is
similar to that in the rest of the Union 10 years ago.
Large numbers of people remain employed in agri-
culture in the cohesion countries, and it seems likely
that further restructuring will take the form of a direct
shift from agriculture to services, missing out the
intervening step of a shift to industry first.
Many of the additional jobs created in Europe in
services were part-time, most of them taken by
women. Whereas the number of full-time jobs in the
Union declined markedly during the recession years
1990 to 1994, the number of part-time jobs increased
by around 3% a year. In the majority of Member
States, all or nearly all the extra jobs for women over
this period were part-time. By 1995, over 31% of
women in employment worked part-time, 67% in the
Netherlands, 45% in the UK and 43% in Sweden, a
higher proportion than in the US (28%). By contrast,
part-time working remains on a relatively small scale
in the four Southern European countries, though,
apart from in Greece, it is tending to increase signifi-
cantly. The corollary of the expansion of service
employment and part-time working is the significant
growth in the importance of women in the labour
force.
While many of the women joining the labour force
went into comparatively low skilled jobs in services,
there was also a marked growth in jobs demanding
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40Map 11
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high skills and high education levels. Between 1983 
and  1991,  the  employment  of those  classified  as 
technical and professional workers expanded by 2% 
a year across the Union, twice the rate of growth of 
total  employment,  while  the  number of  manual 
workers declined. The former continued to increase 
despite the recession in the first half of  the 1990s while 
the number of manual workers fell markedly. 
Non-manual jobs in services filled largely by women 
have expanded, while manual jobs largely filled by 
men  in  industry  and  agriculture  have  contracted. 
Nevertheless,  over  the  long-term,  it  is  the  higher 
skilled jobs which offer the surest prospect of growth 
for both men and women. 
The effects of the changes: 
participation In the labour force 
The  changes  in  the  global  pattern  of employment 
have  been  a  factor  in  the  different experiences of 
different  social  groups.  One  of  the  most  striking 
changes  has  been  the  increase  in  the  number of 
women  working,  up by over 6 million  over the  last 
10 years. But this was 1 million less than the increase 
in the number of women joining the labour force, so 
that female unemployment has also risen. 
The  increased  participation  of women  in  the  work 
force has  been a major factor,  of more  importance 
than differences in demographic trends, underlying 
the differential rate of labour force growth across the 
Union over the past decade or so (Map 1  0). 
There have been other differences, notably among 
those under 25 and those in their 50s and older. 
The  proportion of young  people in  the  labour force 
and employment has declined over a number of  years 
as more have remained longer in education and initial 
vocational training.  However,  in  three of the poorer 
Member States (Spain, Ireland and Greece) the num-
ber of young people looking for work has not fallen as 
fast as the fall in employment resulting in an increase 
in unemployment. among young women more than 
young men. 
For  the  so-called  prime-aged  population  (aged 
25-54  ). the striking feature is the difference between 
the sexes.  For men, participation rates are similar in 
the North and the South, though they have declined 
over  time  everywhere,  though  less  in  Greece  and 
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Portugal  than  in  other Member States.  For women, 
participation rates are much lower in the South,  ex-
cept in  Portugal,  and in  Ireland. though they have 
risen markedly over the past 1  G-15 years, converging 
gradually towards those in the rest of the Union. This 
is especially true in Ireland and Spain where partici-
pation rates of women aged 25 to 54 have increased 
by over 10 percentage points over the past decade. 
While this has had the positive result of promoting the 
greater integration of women into the labour market, 
it has added to the challenge of reducing unemploy-
ment  especially  in  these. two  countries.  It  is  likely, 
moreover, to continue to add to the challenge in the 
future since rates of participation of women still tend 
to  be  much  lower  in  most  of the  less  prosperous 
regions of the Union than in other parts (Map 11 ). 
There  is  a general  tendency  for  people  to  remain 
longer in the work force in the poorer Member States 
than in the North resulting in higher employment and 
participation rates among the over 55s. This is espe-
cially true for men, although in both North and South 
rates of participation and employment are falling as a 
result  of earlier retirement,  linked to the  lack of job . 
opportunities for them combined with the more wide-
spread availability of pension and disability insurance 
schemes. 
In sum, wh1le it is difficult to draw general conclusions 
on the trends of disparities between social groups on 
the  labour  market,  one  result  appears  to  be  that 
participation and employment patterns in the poorest 
countries are converging towards those in the more 
prosperous Member States. 
Unemployment 
Different social groups are  affected differentially by 
unemployment.  In genera,! its  impact is greatest on 
young people, women and those working in declining 
sectors and/or in low-skilled jobs and serves to rein-
force the general disparities between different parts 
of the Union. 
The rate of youth unemployment among those under 
25, has mirrored the movement in the overall rate, but 
is  around twice as  high, averaging some 21% over 
the  Union as a whole in  mid-1996, giving a total  of 
5 million young people unemployed. The rate, how-
ever, has come down slightly faster than the overall 
rate  since the  present recovery began.  Indeed, the 
gap between the two has tended to narrow a little over time, reflecting in part the declining numbers of young
people across the Union (the result of falling birth
rates), in part, the tendency for a growing proportion
to stay longer in education, in part, the range of
measures taken in Member States to prevent those
leaving school with few or no qualifications moving
straight into unemployment.
Except in Germany and Austria, high unemployment
among the young is universal across the Union, the
rate rising to over 40% in Spain, around 35% in Italy
and 25% or more in Greece, Belgium and France
(though in all three of the latter countries, this partly
reflects the very small number of young people in the
labour force — only around 35% of the 15 to 24 year
olds).
The rate of unemployment among women in the
Union is also high, averaging some 121/2% in mid-
1996 compared with 91/2% for men, with the result
that despite there being many fewer women than
men in the labour force almost as many of them
are unemployed.
With the exception of Sweden and the UK, as well
as Finland, where the rates are much the same,
the rate of unemployment of women is higher than
for men throughout the Union, over 60% higher in
Spain and Belgium and almost 90% higher in Italy
and Greece. Moreover, although unemployment
rates for women generally rose less sharply than
for men during the recession, partly reflecting the
disproportionate presence of women in service
sector jobs which were affected much less than
jobs in industry, they have also tended to fall less
quickly during economic recovery as participation
of women in the labour force has continued to
increase.
In all economies, there are significant movements of
people between jobs going on all the time, in part
because of a desire for change, in part in response
to shifts in the composition of economic activity and
in the demand for different skills. Such movements
are almost bound to be associated with spells of
unemployment for some, though these need not be of
long duration. In Europe, however, one of the most
marked features of the labour market is the high and
persistent incidence of long-term unemployment,
especially in comparison with the US, indicating the
structural, and deep-seated, nature of its unemploy-
ment problem.
In 1995, in the Union as a whole almost half (49%)
of those unemployed and seeking work had been
looking for employment for a year or more (compared
with only 12% in the US) and over a quarter for at least
two years, only slightly below the proportions 10 years
earlier. High long-term unemployment creates prob-
lems of its own which are particularly intractable.
Those affected face social exclusion, a loss of con-
fidence, a degradation in their skills and increasing
difficulty finding a job the longer they are out of work,
reinforced by the general reluctance of employers to
take on people who have not worked for some time.
Member States differ considerably as regards the
average duration of unemployment, or more rele-
vantly the relative numbers of long-term unemployed,
which determines the scale of the problem. For
example, two countries or regions can have the same
level of unemployment but one may have a high inflow
combined with a short average duration and the other
a low inflow combined with a long average duration
and a large number of people who have been unem-
ployed for a year or more. The former implies lower
rates of ‘exclusion’ and, accordingly, is less damag-
ing to social cohesion. 
Member States differ according to the inflows into un-
employment — or the chances of someone becoming
unemployed — and, most relevantly for social exclu-
sion, the prevalence of long-term unemployment.
Some indication of these differences can be gained
from the relationship between the overall rate of
unemployment, on the one hand, and the proportion
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of the unemployed who have been out of work for a 
year or more (i.e. who are long-term unemployed), on 
the other. In  1995, the highest rate of overall unem-
ployment in the Union was in Spain, at almost 23%. 
The proportion who were long-term unemployed, at 
just under 55%, was also above the Union average 
(of 49%), but less so than in  Italy and Ireland, where 
the  overall  rate  of unemployment was  much  less, 
though still above the Union average, but over 60% 
of the unemployed had been out of work for a year or 
more (Graph 18).  1[1  Belgium, the incidence of long-
term  unemployment  among  the  unemployed  was 
much the same as in these two countries, but the rate 
of unemployment was slightly below average. It is in 
these four  countries, therefore,  that the  problem of 
social exclusion seems particularly acute. 
By  contrast,  in  Finland,  unemployment  was  well 
above the Union average in  1995, but a much lower 
proportion of those  affected were  long-term unem-
ployed (37%). This is  partly explained by compara-
tively recent and  rapid  growth  in  unemployment to 
present levels.  In  France,  unemployment was  also 
relatively high, but long-term unemployment relatively 
low.  In  these countries.  therefore,  despite relatively 
high levels of unemployment. social exclusion seems 
less of a problem. 
In the other Member States. overall rates of unemploy-
ment were below average to varying extents. These 
can  be  divided  into  two  groups  - Luxembourg, 
Austria,  Denmark  and  Sweden  (not  shown  in  the 
graph  because  of  data  comparability  problems), 
where  the  proportion  who  were  long-term  unem-
ployed was  much less than average, and the  other 
five Member States, where it was around the average 
level  (though the  number affected was  significantly 
higher in  Greece, where the  proportion was slightly 
above average, than in the Western part of Germany, 
where the overall unemployment rate in particular was 
well below average). The UK, however, is somewhat 
different from the other four countries in this group, in 
that not only was the  incidence of long-term unem-
ployment less  in  1995,  but it  had also been signifi-
cantly below the  Union  average in  earlier years (in 
1990, only a third of the unemployed had been out of 
work for  a year or more as  compared with a Union 
average of 48%). 
In general, the relative scale of the long-term un-
employment problem as between Member States 
was similar in  1990 before the rise  in  unemploy-
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ment rates which occurred subsequently, sugges-
ting that the problem is a deep-seated one as well 
as  being distinct from the problem of unemploy-
ment as such. 
There are also differences between social groups. 
Women seem to be less likely to lose their job than 
men once in employment, but experience difficul-
ties  in  finding a  job when  unemployed or when 
trying to return to work after a spell of inactivity to 
take care of children. Long-term unemployment is, 
therefore, slightly higher among women than men 
in most Member States {though not all,  Denmark, 
Ireland,  the  Netherlands and the  UK are  signifi-
cant exceptions). 
Unemployment among young people is also a prob-
lem,  though the number affected has risen  by very 
much less than the rate over recent years because of 
the increasing numbers staying longer in education 
and initial vocational training (which has,  therefore, 
reduced the size of the youth labour force). Moreover, 
the  proportion of those under 25 who are long-term 
unemployed  has  not  tended  to  rise  significantly, 
though it remains a serious problem in Italy and, to a 
lesser extent, in Greece, where it takes much longer 
on average for those looking for their first job to find 
one. 
Long-term unemployment is a particularly serious 
problem  for  older  workers,  especially  men  and 
women who lose their jobs in  industry and find it 
particularly difficult to find another one.  In  1995, 
62% of those unemployed aged between 55 and 
59 had been out of work for a year or  more and 
two-thirds of these  had been out of  work  for  at 
least two years. Many others, moreover, had with-
drawn  from  the  labour  force  completely  into 
enforced early retirement, a large proportion after 
trying to find another job (in  1995, around a third 
of men in this age group were no longer in the work 
force, well below the official age of retirement-
65- in most countries). 
In  general, the  chances of  being unemployed  are 
much greater for those with low skills and few qualifi-
cations.  In  1995, the rate  of unemployment among 
those  aged  25  to  49  with  only  basic  schooling 
averaged 13% across the Union compared with 8% 
for  those  with  additional  secondary  level  qualifica-
tions  and 7%  for  those with  a university degree or 
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The incidence of poverty 
Earlier sections of this chapter discussed the growth 
and  distribution  of  basic  income  from  production 
- GOP - in Member States and regions. It showed 
that  GOP  growth  in  the  Community  has  been 
achieved largely by raising the output of each worker, 
rather than by additional employment, although the 
latter has also increased. 
This has also been associated with a fall over time in 
the share of total income (GOP) accruing to labour in 
the form of wages and salaries (pre-tax) in virtually all 
Member States,  while the share accruing to capital 
has increased. At a time of acute threat from interna-
tional competition, these developments underline the 
contribution that European labour has been making 
to the restructunng of the economy to meet the chal-
lenges posed. 
As  also  discussed  above,  there  are  evident  dif-
ferences in the capacity of Member States to integrate 
the more disadvantaged members of society fully into 
the  labour  market.  This  affects  the  incidence  of 
poverty at household level in the EU, which is deter-
mined in  large measure by access to  paid employ-
ment  as  well  as  by  the  scale  and  prevalence  of 
transfers  under  systems  of  social  protection.  One 
of the main characteristics of the European model of 
soc1ety is the commitment to combat poverty and to 
correct large income inequalities through taxes and 
social transfers. 
The degree to which society suffers from poverty is 
generally assessed in terms of the poverty line, which 
is a relative rather than an absolute concept, usually 
defined as the proportion of households with income 
of 50%  or  less of the  average for the  country as  a 
whole. 
The  impact of  social  transfer  payments on  the  in-
cidence of poverty is considerable. It is estimated that 
without such transfers around 40% of all households 
would  find  themselves  below  the  poverty  line, 
whereas this ts  reduced to less than 15% as a result 
of transfers. 
At  the  Union level, inequalities between households 
have tended to be examined by reference to levels of 
household  expenditure,  for  which  some  estimates 
exist for a number years, rather than income, for which 
no comparable data exist over time.  These  should 
show a more equal distribution than income levels to 
the  extent  that  savings  tend  to  be higher among 
wealthier households than poorer ones. The data for 
expenditure,  which  come  from  general  surveys  of 
household spending, are adjusted for differences in 
purchasing power and household size and composi-
tion  {a  smaller weight is  accorded to  children,  for 
example, than to adults). 
A brief overview of the results (see Annex, Table 3) 
shows that, at the end of the 1980s, the incidence of 
poverty was generally higher in the South than in the 
North of the Union.lt was particularly high in Portugal, 
where 27% of all  households fell  below the poverty 
line and to a lesser extent in  Italy (22%) and Greece 
{20%). At the other extreme, only 5-6% of households 
in  the  three  BENELUX  countries and Denmark had 
expenditure of less than 50% of the national average. 
In  the  remaining  countries,  the  proportion  ranged 
from 11% in Germany to 17% in both Spain and the 
UK. 
The  data  suggest that there  was  some  increase  in 
rates  of  poverty  measured  in  these  terms  in  most 
Member States during the  1980s, and it was only in 
Ireland and Spain and to a lesser extent in Portugal, 
where the proportion of households below the poverty 
line declined. These countries had among the highest 
incidence of poverty at  the  beginning of the  1980s 
and it appears that the fruits of subsequent economic 
growth have been more evenly distributed than pre-
viously,  perhaps reflecting the stage of their  econ-
omic  development.  More  and  more  up-to-date 
information, however, is required to determine how far 
these  changes  represent  long-term  trends  and  to 
assess  the  effects  on  distribution  of the  economic 
recession of the 1990s. 
More  recent  data on  poverty  in  the  1990s can  be 
obtained from  the  first results of the new European 
Community  Household  Panel  (ECHP),  which  col-
lected  information  on  household  income - rather 
than expenditure-for 1993. For most countries, the 
income measure for this year indicates that there was 
more inequality between households than shown by 
the  expenditure  measure  for  the  late  1980s  and, 
therefore,  a higher incidence of poverty. Given the 
different basis of measurement, it is not possible to 
conclude anything about changes during the 1990s, 
but the ECHP at a minimum suggests that the problem 
in some countries remains serious. 
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2.3 Other dimensions 
of cohesion: quality of life 
and European citizenship 
The previous sections presented a traditional analysis 
of the relative circumstances of Europe's population. 
The indicators used, relating to income and employ-
ment,  remain  the  most  solidly-based  and  widely 
understood which are available. They have provided 
the basis for decisjon-makers in undertaking difficult 
regional and social policy choices at European' and 
national level. 
At the same time, they are insufficient in themselves 
to assess the full situation and other aspects need to 
be taken into account. perhaps especially at Union 
level.  In  the EU  today there  is  widespread concern 
about two further issues which relate directly to the 
quality of life and cohesiveness. First, there is concern 
about the consequences of economic growth for the 
environment, in terms of increased congestion, pollu-
tion and degradation. This has given rise to a concern 
with  'inter-generational  cohesion' and the  need for 
national and regional development to be sustainable 
over the longer-term. Secondly, there is concern that 
European integration should not become a geopoliti-
cal  process  remote  from  the  needs  of  ordinary 
people, but should be about the quality of European 
citizenship in all its facets. 
Sustalnablllty 
Sustainable development has been defined as 'develop-
ment  which  meets  the  needs  of  the  present  without 
compromising the abilrty of future  generations to meet 
their own needs' (World Commission on Environment and 
Development ( 1987), Our Common Future, OUP). At its 
heart, sustainable development emphasises the need to 
move towards patterns of growth which lower the con-
sumption  of non-renewable  resources  and which  are 
therefore reproducible over time. 
According to the White Paper, Growth, Competitive-
ness, Employment, the essential contradiction in the 
existing  economic  order  is  that  production  is  too 
intensive in natural resources which are scarce, often 
non-renewable,  and uses too little  labour which is 
plentiful.  It  called  for  a  new framework  - which 
requires nothing short of 'a new model of develop-
ment' - based on  an  integrated approach where 
progress would be measured in terms of changes in 
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the  overall  quality of life  resulting  from  economic 
growth. This would attach particular importance to the 
generation of local, community-based employment, 
to  the  benefits  derived from  the  improvement and 
protection  of  the  natural  environment  and  to  the 
development of individual  and collective responsi-
bility as the guarantor of sustainable growth. This new 
model of development addresses cohesion - espe-
cially social cohesion- issues directly. 
A basic challenge recognised in the White Paper is 
to make the economic-ecological relationship a posi-
tive  one.  This  is  particularly  important  for  regional 
cohesion where the imperative, as discussed above, 
is to promote rapid catchin~up  on the part of low-in-
come regions. In this context, sustainability concerns 
must not be regarded as something which holds back 
regional  growth where it is  needed most,  but as a 
source of new opportunities. 
There are complex issues at stake in this regard. On 
the one hand, there is an increasing awareness that 
the quality of the environment is an important deter-
minant of a region's attractiveness for new activities 
and that regions can make best use of their natural 
assets if their economic policies are geared to sus-
tainable development. The  environmental  sector is, 
therefore, increasingly regarded by enterprises as a 
business opportunity and by regional authorities as 
an asset. Accordingly, sustainable development and 
the  narrowing  of  regional  disparities  can  be 
mutually-reinforcing. 
On  the  other  hand,  environmental  policy  choices 
need to have regard to existing regional disparities, 
which have to be taken into explicit account in order 
to  minimise  the  risk  of  a  further  widening,  to  the 
detriment of economic and social  cohesion,  espe-
cially in peripheral regions. 
Subsequent chapters  illustrate  how the  Union has 
sought  to  incorporate  environmental  issues  in  re-
gional  development programmes - which include 
investment in clean water supplies, waste manage-
ment and land reclamation. (see chapter 5)-as well 
as in transport and policies specifically for the envi-
ronment (see chapter 4). 
Citizenship, democracy and solidarity 
The idea of European citizenship- and the creation 
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been implicit in the  process of integration since the 
beginning. The only true foundation for integration in 
Europe is a sense of common purpose and solidarity 
on the part of all of itg people. Any notion of European 
cohesion is inevitably intertwined with that of citizen-
ship, democracy and solidarity. 
The  Union is  intended to develop opportunities for 
people  to  work  together  in  pursuit  of  shared 
objectives.  Beyond  citizenship,  which  grants  free 
movement  of  people,  political  rights  and  greater 
democratic participation, the Union promotes equal 
opportunities for all through the respect of fundamen-
tal  rights. The  sense of belonging to the  Union and 
democratic  participation  are  mutually  reinforcing. 
Democratic participation has been enhanced by the 
institutionalisation of the social dialogue and the dia-
logue between representatives of civil society. It finds 
concrete expression in the growth and development 
of institutions over four decades, most notably via the 
growing power and influence of directly-elected rep-
resentatives  in  the  European Parliament  and,  since 
1993,  through  the  involvement of the  regional  and 
local representatives in the Committee of the Regions. 
An enhanced sense of belonging to the Union implies 
more  than  bnnging  decision-making  closer  to  the 
grassroots.  It  is  interrelated with  a reduction in  the 
basic  economrc  and  social  disparities  discussed 
above.  The  existence  of  under-used  resources,  in 
disadvantaged  regions  or  among  excluded  social 
groups, serves to  fragment European society, apart 
from being a waste of economic potential. European 
citizenship, therefore, places obligations on the Union 
to  work  to  eliminate  major disparities  in  standards 
of living  between  citizens  in  one  part of the  Union 
and those  in  another and to  promote freedom from 
poverty  and  equal  access  to  employment  oppor-
tunities. 
Again,  it  is  not just the aims which are important to 
cohesiveness: the way in which they are implemented 
is perhaps as  important because it provides oppor-
tunities for people to come together. This has been a 
central component of European policies for solidarity 
and  cohesion  (see  chapter  5).  At one  level,  it  has 
produced  a  spirit  of  cooperation  between  the 
Commission and  representatives in the  institutions, 
fostering  a two-way  flow  of  information  and  ideas 
-extending beyond the formal requirements for con-
sultation contained in  Community law - which has 
contributed  to  the  conception  and  formulation  of 
cohesion policies, raising the quality of the interven-
tions for the benefit of those whose lives are directly 
affected. 
At another level, the implementation of EU policies is 
highly  decentralised,  devolving  responsibility  as 
close to the ground as possible to  promote partner-
ships  between  Member  States  and  regions,  and 
to encourage cooperation and exchanges of experi-
ence. Not only is this a vehicle for innovation and best 
practice, it is also essential for raising awareness of 
European issues.  · 
All of these developments have contributed to break-
ing  down  the  barriers  of  nationality,  without  com-
promising the virtues of diversity. In other words, they 
have helped lead to the formation of a genuine Europe 
for all. 
Concluding remarks 
The analysis of this chapter demonstrates that there 
has been significant progress in reducing economic 
and social disparities in some areas and that some of 
the  weakest  Member  States  and  regions  have 
embarked on  a long-term process of convergence 
with the  rest of the Union. This favourable outcome 
persisted through the  recession of the early  1990s, 
although  it  has  been  accompanied  by  a  general 
deterioration in the employment situation throughout 
the Union. 
Economic  convergence  at  the  Member State  level 
has  not  always  been  evenly  distributed  between 
regions and social groups. However, in countries in 
the  process  of  catching-up,  these  negative  side-
effects of development are often difficult to avoid due 
to the different dynamics of certain regions and indus-
tries. Within some of the most advanced countries in 
the  Union,  there  is  evidence  of weakening  social 
cohesion as a result of the  effects of unemployment 
on disadvantaged social groups and an  increasing 
incidence of poverty.  On  the other hand,  rates  of 
employment are higher than a decade ago, though 
women's  participation  in  the  work  force  has  risen 
significantly. 
The outlook for the labour market will be affected by 
demographic trends. One important feature remains 
the failure of fertility rates in the EU to pick-up, falling 
to a post-war record low in  1995 of only 1.4 children 
per women. This will reduce some of the inflows into 
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the labour market in the next century, although there 
can be other offsetting effects on total labour supply. 
More generally, there are reasons to believe that a 
process of fundamental  economic reform has been 
put in place in the weakest parts of  the Union encour-
aged, as later chapters of this report will demonstrate, 
by national and EU policies to develop infrastructure, 
human capital and productive activity. 
The  prospects  for  further  reducing disparities  will 
depend on this process continuing as well as on other 
factors  such  as  general  economic circumstances. 
Much also depends on policy developments. Policies 
geared to  macro-economic  stability to provide the 
conditions  for  growth  are  important in  this  context 
(see next  chapter),  as  are national and Community 
policies to promote competitiveness and growth and 
the creation of durable jobs. 
Finally, past enlargements of the EU have generally 
had  the  effect  of  widening  regional  disparities.  It 
seems  likely  that  future  enlargements  will  have  a 
similar  effect  since  many  candidate  countries  of 
Central and Eastern Europe have incomes per head 
significantly below the current Union average. As the 
experience of previous enlargements demonstrates, 
however,  the  Union  has  shown  itself  capable  of 
accommodating such differences and of moving for-
ward nevertheless. 
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Member State policies and cohesion: an overview 
3.1  Introduction: 
weakening internal cohesion 
The evidence presented 1n chapter 2 suggests that, 
even though a process of convergence between the 
Member  States  is  apparent,  economic  and  social 
cohesion within most Member States seems to have 
experienced a setback during the  1990s in the form 
of widening disparities in income and unemployment. 
There  are  a wide  range  of Member  State  policies 
which have implications for cohesion at national and 
EU level, particularly: 
•  structural  policies  aimed  at  maintaining  macro-
economic stability; 
•  redistributive policies aimed at achieving an opti-
mal  allocation of resources  in  social  as  well  as 
economic  terms  and  redistributing  income 
between persons and regions to avoid excessive 
disparities. 
These aims are not of course mutually exclusive and 
it is generally the case that the same expenditure will 
have  a direct or  indirect impact on  all  them  at  the 
same time. Each is examined below. 
3.2 Macroeconomic policies 
The  macroeconomic policies of the Member States 
are  important  in  creating  the  climate  for  economic 
growth. In the four poorest Member States, in particu-
lar,  where  regional  under-development  problems 
cover more or less the whole country, national-level 
macroeconomic policies have a key role in ensuring 
the effectiveness of EU cohesion policies designed to 
promote higher public and private investment. 
In  view  of  the  inter-dependencies  and  spill-over 
effects created by trade and the movement of capital 
as well as labour, countries have long since ceased 
to  regard  their  macroeconomic  policies  as  purely 
internal  and  have  engaged  in  coordination.  In  the 
European  Union,  macroeconomic  coordination  is 
focused  on  establishing  a  stable  macroeconomic 
framework which is a pre-condition for achieving sus-
tained growth in the medium-term and for participa-
tion  in  EMU.  Particular  attention  is  devoted  to  the 
convergence criteria of price inflation, exchange and 
interest rates, public deficits and indebtedness which 
- given the key role of these criteria in macroecon-
omic stability-even countries with an EMU 'opt-out' 
aim to fulfil. 
Stability  is  of  critical  importance  to  the  poorest 
Member States, providing the climate for investment 
and  hence  for  obtaining  the  most  from  European 
Union cohesion policies. 
The evidence suggests that three of these countries 
-Greece, Spain  and Portugal -as  well  as  Italy, 
where a large part of the territory is less developed, 
need to maintain their efforts towards nominal conver-
gence  although  the  emphasis  may  be  different  in 
each case. 
In global terms, significant progress in nominal con-
vergence has already been achieved, in particular in 
relation  to  inflation  rates  which  have  converged to 
levels  which  are  among  the  lowest  of  the  past 
30 years. In Gree'ce, Portugal, Spain and Italy, rates 
49 have declined considerably in the last years, but are
still high compared to the Union average, especially
in Greece (Graph 19). Differences in interest rates are
a reflection of a number of factors such as differences
in inflation rates, fiscal balances, exchange rate
movements, financial market confidence and the
credibility of the policy mix.
The current room for manoeuvre with regard to
exchange rate variation is determined, for coun-
tries participating, by the bands in the Exchange
Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary
System (EMS). Within the wider bands adopted in
August 1993, rates have remained remarkably
stable. Although the central rate of the Spanish
Peseta had to be devalued four times between
September 1992 and March 1995, partly followed
by the Portuguese Escudo, pressure on curren-
cies inside the ERM has not been as severe as on
currencies outside the ERM.
Excessive budget deficits result in upward pressure
on interest rates providing less favourable conditions
for investment and growth. In addition, they lead to a
build-up of debt over time increasing the burden of
interest payments in public expenditure, which
reduces the financial resources at the disposal of
Member States to carry out even the most productive
programmes, such as investment in economic infra-
structure and training, while placing additional strain
on social expenditure. Partly as a result of the
recession, average debt for the Fifteen has been
creeping upwards since 1992 from around 60% of
GDP to over 70%. High indebtedness remains a
particular problem for Belgium, Greece and Italy
(Graph 20).
With the introduction of a single currency, national-
level policies will continue to play an important role in
regional  stabilisation. Adjustment will occur partly
through the automatic transfer mechanisms which
operate at the inter-personal level within the Member
State (especially through social security payments
and taxes). From a regional perspective, the situation
after joining European EMU will not be so different in
economic terms from that of belonging to a national
monetary union.
Without further political integration, responsibility for
these transfer mechanisms is likely to remain with
Member States. The present Community Budget is
too limited to contribute significantly to macroecon-
omic stability across the Union as whole, although
Union-level policies will help to underpin the position
of the weakest regions and Member States. At
national level, Member States participating in EMU
will have to combine fiscal discipline with the
necessary flexibility to be able to cushion, via inter-
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50regional and inter-personal transfers, shocks which
temporarily threaten regional and social cohesion. As
discussed in the next section, adjustment is also
facilitated by improvements in the adaptability of the
work force.
3.3 Structural reforms and 
expenditure-based policies
Alongside policies to promote stability, the Member
States for which catching up is a major objective also
need to ensure that their economies are adaptable to
the requirements of faster growth. Impediments to
resource mobility in its widest sense reduce their
efficiency and their ability to restructure and to exploit
new opportunities.
The Member State allocative policies take the form of
structural reforms to improve the functioning of the
markets and expenditure-based policies to provide
incentives to overcome market failures.
In the European Union, the Single Market Programme
(SMP) has been the motor for structural reforms,
sweeping away a wide variety of national measures
which served to limit trade and protect inefficient
activities. Member States have generally accompa-
nied this with market reform policies of their own. 
These appear to have been largely successful in
Ireland and Portugal. Both countries have attempted
in this context to improve the flexibility of the work
force not only through reducing regulation but also by
raising skills, in tandem with determined industrial
development strategies to provide new opportunities
in modern activities and thus to attract FDI in export-
oriented sectors. In Portugal, this has been accom-
panied by deregulatory measures in the financial
sectors, in public services, the retail trade and the
housing market. Furthermore, administrative price
controls were lifted for many industrial products and
services. But in the other Member States most con-
cerned, more remains to be done. 
In Greece, market reform has gone furthest in the
financial sector, bringing the economy into the wider
European monetary environment. But progress re-
mains limited as regards the working of the labour
market: wage variations are insufficiently related to
productivity performance at sectoral, enterprise or
plant level; regulation has limited flexibility by acting
as a disincentive to the redeployment of labour. More-
over, the Greek economy continues to be charac-
terised by close relationships between the
government, the wider public sector, the banks and
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51selected  large  private  enterprises.  While  such 
arrangements  are  helpful  in  the  formation  of 
consensus  around  economic  policy  goals,  a  less 
desirable result is that the economy is less subject to 
the disciplines of the market. 
In Spain, while reforms linked to the Single Market 
Prograrrvne have been extensive, there have been 
only limited  changes  in  two  key  areas  affecting 
performance:  the  labour  market  and  the  non-
traded  {largely  service)  sector.  The  Spanish 
authorities  themselves  identified the  problem  in 
the convergence programme of early 1992 and its 
revision in  1994. A set of measures in the service 
sector to  improve competition and transparency 
were  planned,  along  with  measures to  enhance 
labour mobility through the reform of the education 
system and to  improve housing supply, adminis-
trative  procedures  and  management  of  public 
enterprises. Up to now, however, the assessment 
on the implementation of these proposals is some-
what mixed and much depends on the outcome of 
extensive reforms, mainly enacted in  1994, to ad-
dress the main labour market rigidities, including 
working time  regulations, occupational and  geo-
graphical  immobility,  wage  setting,  recruitment 
procedures  and  employment  contracts.  Signifi-
cant  progress.  on  the  other  hand,  has  been 
achieved in a number of areas linked to decisions 
taken at the EU level, including transport services 
and the financial system. 
Through their expenditure-based, allocative policies 
Member States can influence patterns of production 
and consumption in order to achieve a more optimal 
use  of  resources  in  social  and  economic  terms. 
Broadly  defined  in  this  way,  all  spending  by  the 
Member States  is  allocative  and mostly concerned 
with  social  aspects.  Thus  services  supplied to  the 
community and to households and persons directly 
(education,  health,  social  security  and  welfare, 
housing community and cultural services) account for 
50% to 70% of total general government expenditure 
in the Member States,  or between 20% and 30% of 
national  GOP.  This  social expenditure also  plays  a 
significant  redistributive  role  within  the  Member 
States,  often  supporting  spending  of  the  lower 
income groups who contribute  less  to  its  financing 
through  proportional  or  progressive  tax  systems. 
They,  therefore,  contribute  significantly  to  the 
internal  cohesion  of Member States,  as  discussed 
below. 
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Expenditure  on  economic  services  (regional 
policies, research and development, trade promo-
tion,  employment  policies,  etc.),  on  the  other 
hand, accounts for between 6% and 14% of total 
government expenditure or 3% to 10% of national 
GOP.  These policies are intended to improve the 
climate for firms and to affect the way in which the 
job market functions. Apart from  regional policy, 
which due to its importance will be treated separ-
ately below, these policies have no intended spa-
tial  effects  and· are  operated  largely  without 
reference to spatial considerations. Nevertheless, 
such effects exist and merit careful analysis. The 
analysis  will  be  limited to  R&D  and  employment 
policies. 
While  R&D  policies  vary  significantly  between 
Member  States,  they  are  generally  aimed  at 
national  objectives,  such  as  the  stimulation  of 
innovation and  the  improvement of  competitive-
ness.  While  some  of  the  larger  Member  States 
have  made  efforts  to  regionalise  public  R&D 
spending,  it  remains  the  case  that  though  the 
sums concerned are of a similar order of  magni-
tude to regional incentives, their spatial distribu-
tions are virtually the opposite. Both overall R&D 
spending and incentives are highest in relation to 
GOP  in  the  m'?re  prosperous  countries  and  are 
concentrated in the richest regions in all countries 
for  which regional data are available.  In  France, 
Spain  and  Italy,  public  spending  is  even  more 
unevenly distributed than private spending and is 
thus often the main engine of disparities. 
The net result is a reinforcement of existing disparities 
inside  the  EU,  contributing  to  a  virtuous  circle  of 
innovation  and  competitiveness  in  the  more  pros-
perous regions. This is an issue for European cohe-
sion which is unlikely to  be resolved at the  national 
level, creating the  space for more determined inter-
vention through  EU  structural  and R&D  policies, as 
examined in chapter 4 below. 
A major aspect of employment policy is that it helps 
to  prevent the  exclusion of people  from  the  labour 
market,  thus  furthering  social  cohesion.  Since  the 
European Council of Essen  in  December  1994,  EU 
Member States have been coordinating their employ-
ment policies within a Community framework, with the 
aim  to  achieve  a  structural  reform  of  the  labour 
market. Efforts have been concentrated in five priority 
areas: Chapter 3 Member State policies and cohesion: an overview 
•  to improve labour force skill, Member States have 
strengthened financial as well as fiscal measures 
to encourage firms to increase their investment in 
vocational  training.  Some  Member  States  have 
also launched extensive reforms of their vocational 
training systems while others have increased sub-
stantially the number of training places available. 
Specific measures have been introduced to im-
prove training levels for young people, in particu-
lar,  through  the  apprenticeship  system  and 
traineeships which combine work experience and 
formal training; 
•  to  promote  more  employment-intensive  growth, 
some Member States have encouraged the social 
partners to reach formal agreement on more flex-
ible and  shorter  working  hours.  In  other cases, 
regulatory reforms have been undertaken to facili-
tate the use of part-time and other flexible types of 
work.  The  expansion of services  in  social,  com-
munity  and  home-care  sectors,  fulfilling  unmet 
demand in the personal sector, has been encour-
aged  in  some  Member  States,  through  various 
means includ1ng regulatory reform, tax incentives 
. and the use of service-vouchers; 
•  to  reduce  labour  costs,  in  cases  where  they 
constitute a potential barrier to job creation, espe-
Cially  at the  lower end of the  skill  and  earnings 
scale,  several Member States have reduced the 
level ot social security contributions on selected 
groups of workers, the low paid and those who are 
disadvantaged in the labour market.  In a number 
of cases, total or partial exemption from contribu-
tions  have  been  introduced  to  encourage  the 
hiring  of  young  people or  the  long-term  unem-
ployed; 
•  to achieve a similar objective, of reducing charges 
or taxes imposed on labour to bring down the cost 
of employment and thereby stimulate job creation, 
in a number of Member States, an attempt is being 
made to shift the burden of tax from labour to other 
sources  by  extending  the  tax  base.  So-called 
'green' taxes  (such as the  new landfill tax in the 
UK) have, therefore, been introduced- or are in 
the process of being introduced-in some coun-
tries  to replace  part  of the  social  contributions 
levied on employers; 
•  to  improve  the  effectiveness  of  labour  market 
policy,  most  Member  States  are  attempting  to 
rebalance expenditure from passive income sup-
port to active measures aimed at the integration of 
the  unemployed  into paid jobs.  In  some  cases 
such efforts have sought to eliminate disincentives 
by  making the eligibility rules for  unemployment 
benefits stricter, in particular in connection with the 
refusal of job offers.  In other cases, the range of 
policy instruments was strengthened and diversi-
fied,  including training  programmes,  recruitment 
subsidies, temporary job offers, job-search assist-
ance and business start-up aids. In some Member 
States, reforms have been undertaken to improve 
the  efficiency of  employment  services,  through 
greater  de-centralisation,  deregulation  and  a 
greater focus on the needs of special groups. 
In all areas referred to above, priority has been given 
to actions in  favour of the re-integration of the most 
disadvantaged groups,  such as  young job-seekers 
and the long-term unemployed, as well as to achiev-
ing effective equality of opportunity between men and 
women in working life. 
Member States' own regional policies 
Most of the Member States operate their own policies 
to assist their less developed regions or to achieve 
other spatial goals. These policies are conceived and 
implemented differently in different national contexts. 
In some  countries,  it concerns incentives to  capital 
investment in the regions while in others, particularly 
in  France,  it  is  more  wide-ranging  also  including 
policies  of  spatial  planning  involving  infrastructure 
expenditure. The objectives of regional policies are to 
reduce  disparities  in  economic  development  by 
encouraging investment in  the  poorer areas and to 
reduce disparities in unemployment. particularly that 
linked to  industrial restructuring,  but also underem-
ployment  in  backward  regions.  In  some  Member 
States,  demographic  and  geographical  issues,  in 
particular  peripherality  and  the  associated  risk  of 
outward migration, also play a prominent role. Finally, 
urban policy, especially in the UK and France, also 
addresses problems linked to the decay in the physi-
cal and social environment in inner city areas. 
As  regards regional incentive policies - which are 
common to all Member States-grant expenditure is 
typically very low, accounting for between 1% and 4% 
of total  government expenditure.  In  Italy,  Germany 
and France,  how~ver, grants account for  less than 
53 40% of total regional aid expenditure, so that total
regional incentives are significantly higher in those
Member States. Germany and Italy, the large ’dual’
economies, also account for most expenditure,
around two-thirds of the total between 1989 and 1993
(Graph 21), although in Italy it is in sharp decline. Over
the same period, the four cohesion countries together
accounted for about one-fifth of total expenditure on
incentive while together they had almost one-sixth of
total population and just over one-tenth of total EU
GDP. In these Member States the amounts of regional
support are largely determined by the needs gener-
ated in co-financing the EU’s cohesion policies. 
An intertemporal analysis reveals that Member
States are spending less of their budgets on
regional investment incentives over time. In a
longer term perspective this is particularly true in
Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK. Given that
grants do not constitute the most important instru-
ment of support in Germany, Italy and France,
which have among the highest absolute amounts
of expenditure, and that the intertemporal devel-
opment of the other support measures is not
known, a reduction in grants would not necessary
imply that the importance of spatially-oriented pol-
icy is in overall decline in these countries.
National regional incentive policies have played a
necessary role in promoting EU-wide cohesion. The
lessons learned and experience gained in regional
policy at national level have contributed significantly
to the support for policies of solidarity and to the
quality of actions at EU level. In addition, insofar as
they help the most disadvantaged regions, Member
State policies contribute to European convergence
and cohesion. But while necessary from the point of
view of cohesion at the EU level, national policies are
not sufficient.
First, since they are faced with generalised problems
of lack of competitiveness across much of their terri-
tory, the intensity of expenditure in the cohesion coun-
tries — expressed per head of population in the
assisted regions — does not always give them a
significant advantage compared to many regions in
northern Member States. The northern Member
States concentrate their resources on a more
restricted population in the worst-affected regions,
typically between 20% and 40% of their total popula-
tion, often with some of the highest unemployment
rates in the Union and other serious structural prob-
lems. As a consequence, expenditure per head is
higher in the assisted parts of Italy, Germany or
Luxembourg than in the cohesion countries
(Graph 22). Across the EU as a whole, this has tended
to mean that the concentration of resources on the
assisted regions with the lowest GDP is not as clear-
cut as it might be. In effect, and as discussed below,
lack of budgetary capacity has reduced the impact
of EU competition policies which permit higher rates
of intervention in poorer Member States. As a result,
the receipt of regional grants is determined at least
as much by the Member States in which the region is
located, as by needs. However, with the help of the
EU’s Structural Funds, the poorer Member States
have been increasingly able to offer comparable sup-
port for regional investment to many northern regions.
Secondly, in the absence of a decisive advantage
with regard to incentives, the weaker Member States
have more difficulty in competing with northern
Member States where supplier networks are more
developed and, as regards producer services, often
of higher quality. The superiority of business infra-
structure probably lies behind the research finding
that the effectiveness of regional expenditure and the
quality of the foreign direct investment (FDI) attracted
(in terms of such factors as decision-making
autonomy or innovative capacity) are higher the more
developed the economy. Countries and regions with
a long history of FDI attraction and experienced
regional development agencies, such as Scotland
and Ireland, succeeded in attracting higher quality
investments.
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54Thirdly, the widespread availability of grant support
risks generating dead-weight, whereby incoming
investors receive grants beyond the level required to
make their investment profitable because of grant
competition between countries. Finally, given the par-
ticular problems of urban areas, the degree of suc-
cess of urban policy seems to be lower than that of
regional policy in general. 
3.4 Redistribution
Member State redistributive policies change the dis-
tribution of income between people through flows of
taxes and benefits. As a result of such policies, the
distribution of personal disposable income (PDI) can
differ significantly from the distribution of income be-
fore taxes and benefits.
The effects of these policies can be seen clearly at
the regional level: since tax payments are related
proportionately or even progressively to income,
while benefits tend to be constant or even to decrease
with income, they involve involuntary but significant
implicit transfers from high income to low income
regions. As a result, the regional distribution of PDI
per head within the Member States tends to be more
even than the distribution of GDP per head. For
example, Northern Ireland, the poorest region in the
UK, has a GDP per head which is 68% of the figure
for the South-East, the richest region, but its PDI after
transfers is 85%. Similarly in France, Languedoc-
Roussillon moves from 55% of the GDP per head of
Ile de France to 71% in terms of PDI per head.
The redistributive effects at the inter-personal
level also result from expenditure on the provision
of public goods and services, either free at the
point of consumption or at subsidised prices. The
inter-regional redistribution of such expenditure is
not transparent and cannot be found in published
accounts. They have had to be estimated for this
Report. 
This analysis suggests that the regional disparities
after taking account of the effects of tax and public
spending flows through national budgets are
between 20% and 40% lower than the disparities in
regional GDP per head (Map 12, which shows esti-
mates of the net amounts transferred in 1993).
Member State budgetary policies, therefore, make a
contribution to cohesion, though primarily at the
national level. 
National policies mostly concern aspects of social
cohesion and tend to impact on regional cohesion
indirectly. Study results suggest that even though
public expenditure accounts for between 40% and
60% of national GDP, the net regional transfers are
much smaller, equivalent to 4% of the GDP of donor
regions or 8% of recipient regions.
To the extent that national redistribution policies bring
regional and personal disposable incomes closer to
the national average, at the European level they also
bring the regional-level disparities closer to the
Member State-level disparities. As a result, they have
an important role to play in promoting convergence
and cohesion between regions at Community level. 
At the same time, they cannot substitute for EU-level
policies. Since they are organised nationally, the
transfers are not systematically related to differences
in GDP on a European scale. For example, East
Anglia in the UK is of a similar level of prosperity as
Bretagne in France and both are just above the EU
average. But in terms of transfers their position is quite
different. Bretagne receives net transfers equivalent
to around 3% of its GDP from the French State, East
Anglia transfers the equivalent of 3% of its GDP
(again, in net terms) to the British State.
The role of Member State redistributive policies is to
redress basic income inequalities and to widen
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opportunity and access to services. They serve an  · 
essential purpose in social terms especially in view of 
the  need to  combat poverty  in  the  Union,  as  dis-
cussed in chapter 2 above. This means that transfers 
which support consumption predominate over those 
aimed at expanding investment. This  is  one of the 
differences with Community policies which are mostly 
concerned with the latter. 
Striking  an  appropriate  balance in  public expendi-
tures between the  'social' and the  'economic' is an 
ongoing  difficulty facing  national  policy-makers. 
Thus, for example, the failure over·many decades to 
effect long-term structural change in southern Italy in 
spite of large-scale transfers - which have, never-
theless, served to reduce household disposable in-
come disparities - appears to be an example of too 
much of the former and not enough of the latter. 
In Italy, a new balance has now been struck, reducing 
the  emphasis on purely income transfers which are 
difficult to  sustain  over  the  longer  term.  This  has 
meant, in effect, that policies for the poorer regions of 
the Mezzogiorno increasingly work to a Community-
driven  cohesion  agenda  which  stresses  structural 
improvement and competitiveness. As noted above, 
in  the four  poorer Member States of the Union, the 
political priority given to  expenditures in  support of 
regional  economic  competitiveness  and  develop-
ment,  in  the  face  of  competing  demands  on  the 
national budget, can similarly be traced to the lead 
given by policies established by the EU. 
3.5 Concluding remarks 
The  preceding  analysis  pmvided  an  overview  of 
some of the policy instruments and political choices 
deployed  at  national  level  in  addressing  issues  of 
economic and social cohesion. These policies con-
tribute  to  reducing  income  and  employment  dis-
parities at national level and, indirectly, at Community 
level.  They  are,  above  all,  the  Union's  primary 
defence against poverty. The evidence of chapter 2 
suggests  that,  albeit  in  difficult  economic  circum-
stances, these policies have not been able to prevent 
a widening of regional and social disparities internally 
within the Member States. 
This inevitably has negative effects on the quality of 
life  of  sections  of  the  population  and  on  national 
cohesion, as well  as on cohesion in  the Union as a 
whole. It carries an additional risk of weakening over-
all efforts at the European level to promote solidarity 
to the extent that it contributes to disaffection in dis-
advantaged regions and among the unemployed and 
the poor. 
As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, there 
have been important constraints on the capacity for 
independent economic  policy  action  by European 
governments over the last deca9e or so.  Neverthe-
less, the preceding observations provide cause for 
further  common  reflections  on  appropriate  policy 
responses. 
In particular, they draw attention, firstly, to the role played 
by fiscal  policies over the last decade. One result has 
been that the financial burden for repaying the public debt 
has increased on average by 1.2 percentage points of 
GOP;  in some Member States such as Greece, Finland 
and Italy, the rise has been more dramatic. Under EMU, 
national budgets will have to be managed in such a way 
as to underpin economic stability and maintain low inter-
est rates while retaining sufficient flexibility to help smooth 
out  the  cyclical  ups  and  downs  in  economic  activity. 
Budgetary discipline is, therefore, an essential medium-
term objective and several Member States have already 
announced  their  intention  to  keep  public  finances  in 
balance, or even in surplus, partly in preparation for the 
longer-term effects of supporting an ageing population. 
Secondly, in relation to their overall budget, Member 
States typically devote relatively small sums to expen-
diture  on  strategic  economic  services  (regional 
policies,  research  and development,  trade  promo-
tion, etc.) which address long-term competitiveness 
problems. The issue of the correct balance between 
efforts to cure cohesion problems and those which 
seek to prevent them arising in  the  first  place may 
merit further reflection in this context. 
In this regard, the Union has attempted to give a lead 
by reinforcing the priority within all Member States of 
efforts  to  promote  investment  for  growth.  For  the 
weaker  Member  States,  however,  budgetary con-
straints inevitably limit their capacity to undertake the 
necessary rebalancing in favour of strategic expen-
diture in  the  fundamental  way required to  promote 
catching up with the  rest of the Union. Here, Union 
intervention  can  offer  financial  support  for  wide-
ranging  improvements  in  infrastructure  and human 
capital. 
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I  ntrod uctio n 
One  clear  manifestation  of  the  process  of  European 
integration is the W1de range of areas where the Member 
States have taken a deliberate decision to pursue com-
mon  policies.  In  each  case  there  is  a  specific  set  of 
objectives, the origins of which can be traced, at least in 
a formal  sense, to the provisions in the Treaties. These 
policies include those specifically targeted on improving 
cohesion,  which are  the subject of detailed analysis in 
chapter 5. The other policies - which are examined in 
this chapter- have other objectives,  though in  some 
cases, such as the trans-European netv.Jork programmes, 
they  include explicit  reference  to cohesion.  But  even 
where  cohesion  is  not explicitly part of the objectives, 
different regions and social groups tend, nevertheless, to 
be affected differentially. 
The concern of the following analysis is not to carry 
out a critical assessment from a cohesion perspective 
of  policies  designed  to  pursue  other  objectives. 
Rather, it is to examine how, and to what extent, they 
have helped to further cohesion aims and to consider 
whether, and under what conditions, they could do 
more to further this end without being diverted away 
from the pursuit of their primary objectives. This is an 
important issue in an era of continuous pressure on 
public  budgets,  at  both  national  and  Community 
level. In  both financial and efficiency terms, it makes 
sense, to take account. where relevant, of the effect 
on cohesion when designing policy measures and to 
take  advantage  of  any  opportunity  for  achieving 
multiple aims through a given set of actions. 
The Union policies examined here differ significantly 
in nature and scope, but can broadly be considered 
under four heads: 
•  agriculture and fisheries; 
•  measures  to  improve  competitiveness  - the 
single,  or  internal,  market  programme  (SMP), 
research and development, competition policies, 
industrial and trade policies; 
•  network policies-transport, telecommunications 
and energy; 
•  measures to  improve the quality of life - social 
policy, education and training and eQvironmental 
protection and improvement. 
4.1  Agriculture 
and fisheries policies 
Agriculture 
In expenditure terms, the most important policy of the 
EU  concerns its intervention in  agricultural markets 
under the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  (CAP).  The 
market support or 'Guarantee Section' of the EAGGF 
(the EU's Agricultural Fund) alone absorbed almost 
half of the total EU budget in 1994. 
By ensuring the orderly development of markets and 
by removing  the  uncertainty from  a  sector charac-
terised by long lead times in the production process, 
the CAP has helped to secure, over several decades, 
the supply of food for European citizens. It has also 
supported and stabilised incomes in a sector where 
employment has  been  under  constant  threat  (see 
chapter  2)  and (or  whom  there  are  generally few 
59 alternatives. The CAP has had a decisive impact on 
activity in the sector: it has been estimated that half 
the value of agricultural production is accounted for 
by these transfers. 
The CAP has also been the sectoral policy of the EU 
involving the largest redistribution of income among 
European citizens. Financial support under the Com-
munity Budget takes the form of a transfer of income 
from  consumers and taxpayers to agricultural  pro-
ducers.  The  differ~nce between  prices  inside  the 
Union and world prices, where these exist and where 
they can  be  considered as  valid reference  prices, 
also gives rise, implicitly, to income transfers. Direct 
measures  to  improve  the  longer-term  competitive-
ness  of  the  agricultural  sector  are  a  separate,  if 
related,  aspect of the  CAP,  specifically addressed 
under  another  part  of  the  EAGGF  budget,  the 
'Guidance  Section',  which  aims  at  improving  farm 
structures. This involves only a relatively small propor-
tion of the  EU's  agricultural  budget (around 8-9%) 
and its impact is considered later in chapter 5. 
The  CAP  is  a  policy  in  a  state  of  evolution,  most 
recently  with  the  1992  agricultural  policy  reforms, 
which in turn has effects on the nature and extent of 
the implicit transfers.  The  1992 reforms  addressed 
the problem of growing surpluses for many agricultur-
al products by reducing price support and weakening 
the  relationship  between  payments  and  output  in 
favour of more direct support for farmers' incomes. 
As already indicated, in supporting farmers indirectly 
through prices which are generally higher than world 
prices and directly through the payment of subsidies, 
the CAP also involves large implicit transfers between 
Member States and regions,  economic sectors and 
social groups. The  CAP,  therefore,  has an effect on 
cohesion. The  following analysis considers the first-
order effect of these  transfers  before  going on  to 
consider other effects. 
The  mechanism through which transfers from trade 
come about is particularly complex: first, taxpayers in 
one  Member  State  subsidise  domestic  as  well  as 
other  EU  producers  through  direct  payments  and 
export refunds. Secondly,  consumers subsidise na-
tional producers through purchases of domestically 
produced food,  but they also subsidise producers in 
other Member States through intra-EU imports of ag-
ricultural  products.  Income  is  therefore  transferred 
between Member States according to their differing 
60 
Chapter 4 The policies of the European Union 
patterns  of  production  and  consumption  (the  net 
trade transfer). 
The  net trade  transfer  and other  income  transfers 
(direct payments in certain sectors, such as tobacco 
and cotton, and Member State transfers to the EU's 
agricultural budget) generated by the market policies 
of the CAP have been estimated by external experts 
for the period 1989 to 1994 (the methodological diffi-
culties of doing this  are discussed in  the  statistical 
annex to  this  report).  The  data,  therefore,  contain 
information both for the period before and after the 
1992 reforms (see annex). The reforms, however, are 
not the only factor affecting the pattern of transfers: 
there  are  many others which  determine the  perfor-
mance  of  agriculture  in  any  country  in  any  given 
period  and,  accordingly, the  net gains  and  losses 
under the CAP. 
The pattern of transfers 
between Member States 
Transfers under the CAP can be assessed for  1994, 
the most recent year for which a complete data set is 
available. This is an interesting year because it is the 
first complete one under the new CAP regime, though 
full  implementation  occurred  only  in  the  course  of 
1995/96. The estimates for overall gains and losses 
by the external experts gave the following results: 
•  the  net  transfers  in  1994  were  positive  for  five 
Member States.  Ranked  in  order of the absolute 
transfer, the five  are GR.  E,  IRL, FR and OK. The 
explanation for the transfers varies, however, from 
country to country within this group. Typically, the 
northern  Member  States  - especially DK  and 
IRL- benefit more from trade transfers because 
of patterns of specialisation which favour produc-
tion in the more protected sectors. The southern 
Member States-GRandE-tend to benefit from 
direct  payments.  FR  also  gains  substantially 
through trade-in 1994, it had the largest positive 
effect from trade with EU partners of any Member 
State - but it received even more in the form of 
direct payments; 
•  the net transfers were negative for the remaining 
seven  Member States.  Of this  group,  the  three. 
large  Member  States,  D,  IT  and  UK,  made 
substantial gross contributions to the EU's agricul-
tural budget in the same way as FR, but unlike for 
the latter, the trade ~fleets were negative in each Chapter 4 The policies of the European Union 
The development of market policies under the CAP 
The traditional CAP was based mainly on mari<et price suflport of farm output. This particular approach to agricultural 
policy, being directly related to domestic supply, succeeded in generating a rapid increase in agricultural production 
and self-sufficiency within the EU. 
In  the first years of the CAP, import duties, apart from allowing higher domestic prices and farm  incomes, also 
provided an extra sou rca of  financial resources for the Community Budget. The costs of the policy were borne almost 
exclusively by consumers. From the end of the 1960s onwards, expanding domestic supply relative to domestic 
demand cr.eated surpluses of dairy products, meat and cereals with the result that the EU had to provide incentives 
to promote exports. In effect, European consumers and taxpayers were facep with a situation of ongoing support 
for the incomes of farmers through higher agricultural prices than wor1d levels, combined with the increasing costs 
of surpluses in the form of export subsidies, storage and disposal costs. 
In view of the changing circumstances, the EC Council of Ministers decided in 1984 to introduce production quotas 
for dairy farmers to limit the budgetary costs which were particularly high in the dairy sector. By directly restricting 
supply, the objective of reducing surpluses and associated costs was achieved, although this did rather less to 
change underlying agricultural structures. A further step towards balancing demand and supply was taken a few 
years later by taking land out of production under the land set-aside scheme. While savings on budget expenditure 
were achieved the overall efficiency of the agricultural sector was not improved. 
In view of ongoing pressures, including a preoccupation with the very variable effects of the CAP on different parts 
of the Union, a major reform was introduced in 1992 which had effects on important product sectors of EU agriculture: 
cereals, oil seeds and meats. Its main aim was to balance supply and demand by giving a greater role to the market 
mechanism. The reform also sought to break the link between support to farmers and the quantity of production. 
Payments to farmers are now based on historical yields. At the same time, compensatory payments remain linked 
to the area cultivated by each farmer, but they are limited by regional or individual ceilings. Meanwhile, accompany-
ing measures seek to reduce over-supply and improve the environment by encouraging less intensive farming, the 
afforestation of agricultural land and early retirement schemes for farmers. 
Estimates of net transfers under the Common Agricultural Policy 
The calculation of transfers associated with the CAP was undertaken by external experts.  It requires a complex 
analysis and a number of simplifying assumptions, due to the individual nature of different agricultural markets and 
the fact that for some products, there is no international reference price. 
Transfers between Member States 
Transfers from taxpayers in each country are estimated by assuming that the share of each in the EU agricultural 
budget  equals the share of its contribution to the overall Community Budget. Transfers from consumers are estimated 
by multiplying the amount of each product available for consumption in each country by the EU  'price support'. 
'Total support' is based on OECD data used to calculate PSEs (Producer Subsidy Equivalent) and CSEs (Consumer 
Subsidy Equivalent). Because these data relate to a period before the Uruguay Round Agreement, they may not 
necessarily reflect the relationship between EU prices and world prices after the agreement. This could mean that 
the scale of EU price support is over~stimated.  Since the OECD does not compute support rates for fruit, vegetables, 
wine and olive oil, these had to be estimated. 
Transfers between regions 
Food consumptiOn per head and average tax rates are assumed to be the same across all regions in each Member 
State. Both assumptions are likely to mean that the burden on  richer regions is under-estimated in relation to that 
on poorer regions, and more refined assumptions might, therefore, produce a ,greater cohesion effect. 
fll case  while  direct  payments  were  substantially 
lower.  The  BENELUX  countries  all  experienced 
positive trade effects. Agriculture in Belgium and 
Luxembourg is relatively specialised in more pro-
tected products, but this was more than offset by 
the negative effects of transactions under the ag-
ricultural budget. 
The data suggest that the position has changed over 
time. For the five Member States for which transfers 
are currently positive, all have experienced increas-
ing transfers over the period. For Spain and France, 
the effect has been to transform their position from 
one of net loss to one of net gain. For the remaining 
Member  States,  the  position  of net  loss  has  been 
maintained and only in  the UK were net losses sub-
stantially reduced, especially in the period after the 
reform. 
The position of the four weakest 
Member States 
A priori, it could be expected that the cohesion coun-
tries would benefit from the CAP if only because they 
have  proportionately  more  agricultural  producers 
than the more prosperous and more urbanised north-
ern Member States. In the past, this has been offset 
by a pattern of support under the  CAP  which was 
related to the production of certain livestock products 
and cereals. These are products of particular impon-
ance for climatic and other reasons in northern Mem-
ber States. The 1992 reforms took an important step 
away from this system and the pattern of transfers to 
which it gave rise appears to have had the expected 
effect of giving more support to poorer countries with 
more agricultural producers. In particular, it reduced 
the  burden on consumers  in  poorer Mediterranean 
countries by reducing the prevailing prices of cereals 
and of beef and veal for which they are net importers. 
Countries with higher dependence on agriculture also 
benefited from moves towards direct payments fin-
anced by taxpayers. 
As a result, and as shown above, three of the poorer 
Member States- GR, E and IRL-were net benefi-
ciaries from the CAP in  1994 compared to two,  GR 
and IRL,  beforehand.  For Greece, the  gains come 
from a combination of high direct payments (mainly 
to cotton and tobacco producers) and its  low con-
tribution to the budget. It has experienced (smaller) 
losses from trade because of lower protection rates 
for its exports (mainly fruit and vegetables) and higher 
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protection for its agricultural imports (mainly livestock 
products).  Ireland  has  gained  because of positive 
trade transfers (it exports highly protected agricultu-
ral  products),  but also  because of its relatively low 
contribution  to  the  agricultural  budget.  Spain 
benefited from direct payments after the reform, the 
main factor in turning its position from net contributor 
to  net  beneficiary,  although  it  also  has  significant 
receipts from the effects of trade. 
One  of the  four cohesion countries, Portugal, how-
ever. has remained a net loser under the CAP even 
after the reform, despite low budgetary contributions. 
Its high employment in agriculture is offset by very low 
agricultural  productivity,  which  is  combined with  a 
structure  of  production  resulting  in  a relatively  low 
level of direct payments and a pattern of exports of 
agricultural products for which the level of price pro-
tection is also low. 
Overall, it appears that in managing Europe's agricul-
tural markets, the CAP has had the effect of creating 
a system of implicit transfers which has yielded posi-
tive  transfers of income to  three of the four poorest 
Member States.  With  the  reforms of 1992, the cohe-
sion  effect  has  been  reinforced,  most  notably  by 
transforming the position of Spain to one of net benefi-
ciary.  At  the  same time,  benefits flow to two of the 
more  prosperous  Member  States,  Denmark  and 
France, which have both experienced significant im-
provements in the period after the introduction of the 
CAP, while one of the two poorest and most agrarian 
countries, Portugal, remains a net loser. Indeed, when 
the transfers are expressed in relation to a standard 
farm unit ('annual work unit' or AWU) the intensity of 
support is now highest for Denmark, one of the most 
prosperous Member States in the EU. 
It remains possible, however. that the improvement in 
terms of cohesion may become greater as the reform 
policies are  consolidated,  though this  needs to  be 
monitored as further information becomes available. 
Regional patterns 
The CAP also has a differential effect on the Union's 
regions and the areas within these where agriculture 
is  concentrated,  though  for  data  reasons  it  is  not 
possible to measure the effect on the latter. Examin-
ing the position in each Member State individually, it 
is possible to discern a positive effect of policy on the 
distribution of income between regions (Maps 13 and Chapter 4 The policies of the European Union 
14 ). Typically, the regions with net benefits are mostly · 
the lower income ones while the higher income re-
gions are  generally  among the  losers.  Again,  this 
results  from  agriculture  being  proportionally  more 
important in the poorer regions. while other economic 
activities are more concentrated in urbanised areas 
in the more prosperous regions (indeed, dependency 
on agriculture tends to be inversely related to levels 
of income).  Moreover,  the  costs  of the  CAP  price 
support to consumers in rural and poorer regions tend 
to  be  lower  than  the  benefit  accruing  to  farmers 
producing there.  As  a  result,  a  flow  of income  is 
generated from richer to poorer regions. 
This  positive effect of agricultural  price support on 
regional cohesion within Member States increased in 
the period after the 1992 reform. In fact. the switch to 
direct  income  support  financed  by  the  taxpayer 
seems to have increased the costs borne by the richer 
urbanised regions. This is considered in more detail 
below. 
Regions In the cohesion countries 
In  the  four poorest Member States,  regions outside 
the major urban centres generally benefit most from 
transfers under the CAP.  As  a result,  in  Greece, for 
example,  which  is  a  net  beneficiary  overall,  the 
metropolitan  area  of Attiki  was  a net  loser  in  1994 
because  of  its  urban,  non-agrarian  character.  In 
Portugal, a net contributor avera!:. two regions were 
net beneficiaries, Alentejo and Centro, which are also 
the  poorest regions  in  the country.  Moreover,  both 
experienced an increase in net transfers in the post-
reform period. 
lri other Member States, there are CC?"Siderable regional 
variations  in  experience.  In  Italy,  some  richer northern 
regions where agriculture is important as well as highly 
productive -such  as in Emilia Romagna and Veneto-
benefit in net terms from the price support policy, while 
poorer and very populat€9 regions in the South, such as 
Campania, deSQtte having large ilgricultural sectors,• are 
large  net  losers.  Poor  and  le~s  densely  populated 
regions, such as Abruzzo and Basilicata,  r~caive signifi-
cant net transfers per head of'po'pulation.  In Germany, 
the  position  in  the  regions  of the  former  GOA  differs 
markedly from that in the rest of the country. Since the 
former  have  a lo.v  average  income  per  head and  a 
relatively large proportion of employment in  agricu~ure, 
they have generally gained in net terms and more so since 
the reform. 
The  vast majority of regions  in  France, the  largest 
agricultural  producer in  Europe,  already  benefited 
from  the  price  support  policies  before the  reform. 
However,  the  high  concentration  of  population, 
income and consumption in the capital region, lie de 
France, has offset some of the gains accruing to the 
country as a whole. At the same time, net transfers to 
French regions generally increased after the reform. 
In the UK, the pattern of  net  transfers is highly differen-
tiated.  The  poorer  regions  (Northern  Ireland  and 
Wales) are net beneficiaries,  V1lile  the richest and 
highly urbanised South East region is a net loser. On 
the  other  hand,  the  cereal-producing  East  Anglia, 
which is among the richest regions, gains, while the 
less prosperous North England region is a loser. The 
reform  appears to  have  slightly accentuated these 
differences. 
Income transfers between social groups 
An  argument traditionally advanced in  favour of the 
CAP is  that it has a positive 'social' effect, in that it 
leads to income being transferred from richer urban 
residents to poorer people living in rural areas. This 
has,  indeed,  been  largely true  in  many  countries 
insofar as average farm incomes are lower than aver-
age non-farm incomes. The analysis above confirms 
this at territorial level, in the sense that the EU agricul-
tural price policy transfers income from richer urban 
regions to poorer rural ones. 
This Conclusion needs to be seen in the context of the 
· following  con~iderations. When internal prices are mar-
kedly higher than world market prices, and to the extent 
that these are valid reference prices,  agricultural price 
support can be regarded as the equivalent of a regressive 
tax on consumers since low income households spend a 
higher share of their budget on food.  M.. the same time, if 
agricu~ural sup~  is linked to production capacity with-
out any limttation, tt transfers income to farmers in propor-
tion  to  tt'leir  size,  so  benefiting  larger  agricultural 
enterprises  more  than  smaller ones.  Bafor& tna  1992 
reform,· when agriculture\ supp<tt Was provided essen-
ti~lly. thJoo!11 ·  prOtected  prices,  some  estimates  sug-
gested  that  80%  of transfers· went  to  the  20%  most 
profitable  farms  whose  inrome was often  higher than 
average non-farm incomes, while small farmers benefited 
less.  In  its  proposals  for  the  reform  of  the  Common 
Agricultural  Policy,  the  Commission  had  proposed 
ceilings on direct aids but these were only partially intrcr 
duced. Since the reform, the gaps have, therefore, per-
sisted even if they .have been reduced. 
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Net transfers between regions under the CAP (market policies), 1991
Net transfers per head (ECU)
EUR(15) = -34
sd = 164
UK: NUTS1 level
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Net transfers between regions under the CAP (market policies), 1994
Net transfers per head (ECU)
EUR(15) = -7
sd = 190
UK: NUTS1 level
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65Longer-run effect on competitiveness 
The  CAP  leads  to  improvements  in  farm  incomes 
through the 'rational development of agricultural pro-
duction' or structural adjustment. But the method of 
support  which  has  been  used,  income  transfers 
generated through supporting prices, could reduce 
incentives for change, encouraging labour to remain 
in  agriculture  and  impeding  improvements  in  effi-
ciency.  By  prolonging the  involvement of marginal 
producers in  agricultural production, the CAP has a 
positive influence on employment in a sector which is 
suffering a long-term decline in areas where there are 
often few alternative jobs for the workers concerned. 
On the other hand, in Member States with small sizes 
of farm,  achieving a more competitive structure is a 
necessary part of the development of agriculture and 
the economy over the longer term. 
Against this  background, the  effect of  the  1992 
reform on  competitiveness  is  a  mixed  one.  The 
market  orientation  of  prices  has  favoured  effi-
ciency and should, over the longer term,  encour-
age  structural  adjustment  towards  a  smaller 
number of viable farms capable of guaranteeing a 
sufficient income to the work force,  so reducing 
dependence on the protection traditionally offered 
by  the  CAP.  Particularly  in  the  poorer  regions. 
existing  sizes  of farm  (often  less  than  2-3 hec-
tares) are too small either for modern techniques 
to be adopted or to provide sufficient income for 
a farming family. In  general, the Commission has 
indicated that the maintenance of the current situ-
ation is not a solution and it is necessary to pursue 
the  approach  of  t11e  1992  reforms,  introducing 
improvements and extending it to other sectors. 
Fisheries policies 
The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP}, first established 
in 1970, is centred around four major areas: structural 
measures, conservation of resources, organisation of 
markets and international agreements. Most of there-
gions that  depend  heavily  on  fishing  and  related 
activities  are  coastal  and  on  the  geographical 
periphery of the  EU.  Many are relatively disadvant-
aged and have  little alternative employment. Some 
70% of fisherman  and 60% of jobs in  the  fisheries 
sector as a whole are concentrated in Greece, Spain, 
Portugal  and  southern  Italy which  have the  lowest 
levels of GOP per head in the Union. 
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Like other economic sectors, the sector suffers from 
over-capacity of production; at the  same time,  it  is 
currently over-exploiting  a  renewable  natural 
resource. Reducing the fishing effort has in the short 
run  a negative impact on the leve.l of employment in 
the regions concerned; in the medium term,  on the 
other hand. the improvement in the competitiveness 
of the sector will help to sustain the industry, arrest its 
decline and maintain jobs in less favoured regions. 
Apart  from  structural  policy  covered  by the  FIFG 
which is analysed in chapter 5, the CFP has a number 
of potential effects on cohesion: 
•  the  policy  of conserving  fish  stocks  at  sustainable 
levels and,  where required, of rebuilding them, also 
entails protecting the areas and social groups particu-
larly dependent on fisheries. Conservation measures 
have also been accompanied by special provisions 
to meet the needs of small enterprises and individuals 
located in dependent areas; 
•  the Common Organisation of Markets for fisheries 
and aquaculture products encourages producers 
to organise tnemselves efficiently, so reducing the 
risk of business failure and contributing to social 
cohesion. The  principle of 'regional coefficients', 
which makes it possible to maintain lower prices 
in the less-favoured regions furthest away from the 
major marketing centres, facilitates their access to 
markets and so helps reduce regional disparities; 
•  through fishing agreements with third countries, fish-
ermen can continue to operate in traditional remote 
fishing fields, so helping to maintain employment in 
the  less  favoured  parts  of the  Union,  in  Spain  and 
Portugal especially, but also in other countries. 
4.2 The single market and 
competitiveness policies 
One of the major preoccupations of the Community 
since its foundation has been the competitiveness of 
the  European  economy ir the  face  of  intense  and 
growing international competition. A range of policies 
has been developed at Community level in an effort 
to raise efficiency and to exploit technology and inno-
vation  more  fully.  At  the  same  time,  a  key  issue 
concerns the  distributional effects of these and the Chapter 4 The policies of the European Union 
extent to which they address the particular needs of 
weaker areas and disadvantaged social groups. 
The single market programme 
One of the most far-reaching factors for change in 
recent  years  has  been  the  single  market  pro-
gramme (SMP),  which  comprises  the  legislative 
measures  implemented over the  period  1988 to 
1993, as a follow-up to the Single European Act in 
1987. These  have  been aimed  at  achieving free 
mobility of labour,  goods,  services  and  capital, 
through: 
•  the removal of customs formalities, the opening-up 
of public  procurement  to  competition  and  the 
establishment of common technical  standards in 
production. packaging and marketing; 
•  the removal of constraints on capital flows and the 
establishment of a European labour market. 
The  SMP  was  part of a larger policy package com-
prising both the specific measures relating to mobility 
and  accompanying  policies  for  facilitating  their 
implementation, notably with  regard to  deregulation 
and the promotion of competition. 
The SMP has had more general benefits on quality of 
life - not just on economic efficiency - by guaran-
teeing freedom  of voting  and other rights,  although 
these  aspects  are  not  the  focus  of attention  in  the 
present analysis. 
It  is difficult, however, to distinguish the effect of 
the  SMP  on  cohesion  from  other  developments 
which took  place  at  the  same  time,  such as  the 
economic upturn in the second half of the 1980s, 
the entry of Spain and Portugal into the Community 
and Structural Fund  assistance in  the poorer re-
gions,  especially  after  1989.  All  that  it  is  really 
possible to  conclude  is  that this  combination of 
events led to a significant boost to growth in three 
of the four cohesion countries. 
An  examination  of trends shows  that in  the  four 
cohesion countries taken together, GOP was  9% 
higher in  1993 than it would have been had pre-
1987 growth patterns persisted. Detailed analysis 
suggests  that  the  SMP  was  one  of the  factors 
contributing  to  this  improvement,  though  the 
effects seem to have varied considerably between 
regions.  In  principle, the direct benefits from the 
SMP include one-off effects on the level of output, 
from the opening-up of markets and new oppor-
tunities for exporters and investors, as well as the 
spur to efficiency from  a more competitive envi-
ronment,  and  a longer-term improvement to  pro-
ductive  potential,  from  increased  investment  in 
plant and machinery and labour force skills. 
In the case of Ireland, the  one-off effects appear to 
have been positive with higher output in the post-1987 
SMP period from an increase in trade, improvements 
in efficiency and competitiveness in most sectors and 
greater  specialisation  in  the  export  of  high  quality 
products. Moreover, the SMP has been accompanied 
by increased investment and improved potential for 
higher long-term growth, though, of course, this is not 
to imply that the SMP alone was responsible for this. 
In  Portugal  and Spain,  the  SMP  was  associated 
with even more significant improvements in econ-
omic  performance,  though  its  effect  cannot  be 
isolated from that of accession. The  expansion of 
trade,  coupled  with  increased  competitiveness 
and  specialisation  in  both  up-market  and  lower 
quality  products,  has  improved  economic  effi-
ciency, while larger inflows of direct investment, 
particularly in  Portugal, have increased the  pace 
of technological advance. 
Only in Greece are there few signs of improvement in 
the post-SMP period. While trade and inward direct 
investment have  increased,  overall  investment and 
the skill profile of the labour force, and so underlying 
growth potential,  have  not changed much.  Indeed, 
the SMP  may  have  had negative effects on  growth 
and employment.  In Southern Italy,  both the one-oft 
effects on  efficiency and the  longer-term effects on 
growth appear to have  been mildly positive, but too 
small to  change the  pattern of development signifi-
cantly. 
Industrial competitiveness policy 
At the Union level, the aim of industrial competitive-
ness  policy  has  been  to  identify  specific  priorities 
for  strengthening  the  industrial  base which  can  be 
pursued through other measures, notably the Union's 
structural policies. Three of these priorities are worth 
highlighting in the context of this report. 
67 The  first  is  the  modernisation of public authorities, 
where a major programme concerns the Integration 
of Administrative Data  (IDA),  which should provide 
more effective services, easier access to European 
information and more effective European administra-
tion. By improving the diffusion of information to the 
less developed regions,  in  particular, it will reduce 
disparities between 'info-poor' and 'info-rich' areas. 
The  second  concerns  the  promotion  of  intangible 
investment in  relation to  both upstream (marketing, 
product design, strategic and operational manage-
ment)  and  downstream  (distribution  and  sales) 
stages of production. The effect of this on cohesion is 
uncertain. There is a risk, in particular, that the growth 
of intangible investment will reinforce the competitive 
position  of  large  metropolitan  areas  since  they 
already have an  advantage in  the  provision of ser-
vices, the  supply of highly-qualified executives and 
the efficiency of communications, as they are usually 
nodes in  major computer, telecommunication, road,  · 
rail and air transport networks. Union-financed initia-
tives under the Structural Funds have been directed 
at counteracting this  risk by trying to  bring about a 
more even regional distribution of opportunities. 
The third priority is to increase cooperation between 
firms.  The  formation  of  inter-firm  networks  could 
become an increasingly important factor for survival 
for firms in less developed parts of the Union. Current 
initiatives  include  policies  to  promote  cooperation 
with Central and Eastern European countries with the 
aim of constructing an international network of enter-
prise advisory agencies, such as chambers of com-
merce, banks and consultancies. At  present, these 
networks are used by enterprises, especially in cohe-
sion regions, which do not have support networks of 
their own.  These  are  largely SMEs,  which are more 
important in the poorer parts of the Union, rather than 
large transnational  companies.  Other initiatives are 
pursued in the context of SME policy (see below). 
Competition policy 
An essential complementary measure to the SMP has 
been  to  outlaw  other  forms  of restrictive  practice 
which could distort the market. Competition policies 
attempt  to  prevent  the  excessive  concentration  of 
market  power  in  the  hands  of  a  single  or  limited 
number of producers and unjustified State aids which 
might impede free  competition. They are,  therefore, 
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aimed at improving efficiency rather than improving 
geographical cohesion. To the extent, however, that 
market distortions are more widespread in the poorer 
Member States and regions, then their removal could 
have  an  indirect,  positive  effect .  on  efficiency and 
growth in these areas. 
More  directly,  the  allowance  given  in  special 
cases  for  subsidies  under  national  systems  of 
regional assistance, as described in the previous 
chapter, are compatible with the SMP so long as 
they contribute to economic development in  the 
weaker regions and have only a minor effect on 
competition. In addition, EU competition rules also 
cover aid for horizontal objectives, such as R&D, 
environmental  protection  and  the  support  of 
SMEs, as well as sectoral aid for sectors in crisis, 
such as steel and shipbuilding. 
During the period 199~92,  the latest period for which 
data are available for  all  Member States, 50% of all 
aids given by Member States were of a regional kind, 
some 38% of a horizontal kind and the remaining 12% 
sectoral. 
National aid for regional development 
The Community recognises two types of region that 
are eligible for regional aid: the least developed areas 
with an abnormally low standard of living or serious 
unemployment problems (so-called '92(3}a' regions) 
and those  with  other problems,  mostly of industrial 
decline (so-called '92(3)c' regions). The aim has been 
to target regional aid so as to offset the effects of lack 
of competitiveness. 
At the same time,  there  has  been pressure from 
Member States to  widen the coverage of eligible 
areas  in  some  of the  more  central  parts of the 
Community  (to  increase  '92{3)c'  coverage).  In 
practice, this has been largely resisted and, dur-
ing  recent revisions of assisted area status,  the 
share of population covered under all types of aid 
has remained broadly constant (though the cover-
age  of  least  developed  regions  has  increased 
slightly from 23.9% to 24.9% of Community popu-
lation and that of other regions has declined from 
23.6% to 22.8%- in  particular, assisted areas in 
the western part of Germany were reduced from 
24% to 16.8% of national population, but assisted 
areas in Italy (under '92(3)c') were increased from 
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The most disadvantaged regions of the Community 
are  most favoured  under this  policy. While  the four 
cohesion countries have the status of assisted areas 
either in their entirety (Portugal, Greece and Ireland) 
or mostly (76%  of Spain),  coverage  in  most other 
Member States is between 35% and 49% of popula-
tion, while in those with high levels of income per head 
and low internal disparities (Denmark, Sweden and 
the Netherlands), coverage is below 20%. 
Union policy also differentiates in terms of the scale 
of aid allowed, which is significantly larger in regions 
with an abnormally low standard of living or serious 
unemployment  problems  than  in  others  assisted. 
Overall, more than 66% of regional aid from national 
sources goes to areas classified as least developed, 
which covers the poorest areas of the Community. 
Nevertheless, the effective scale of aid allowed is 
often  much greater than the  assistance  actually 
given by Member States. This is particularly so in 
Spain and Ireland which, partly because of lack of 
resources,  only  grant assistance  of  40%  of the 
permitted  level,  whereas  in  Belgium  and  Ger-
many, the figure  is  around 60-70%. As  a result, 
the  intended advantage accruing to  the  poorest 
countries is not realised. Recognition of this prob-
lem  was one of the factors which led to regional 
aid ceilings being reduced. 
In practice, as noted in chapter 3, a large proportion 
of regional aid is granted in just two Member States, 
Germany  and  Italy,  mainly  because  of  their  large 
problem areas combined with the fact that they have 
the  resources to spend. The  poorer Member States 
depend to a greater extent on the Structural Funds to 
fund regional  assistance,  but even including ERDF 
spending, total aid per head in assisted areas in the 
cohesion countries is only between 6%  and 30% of 
Italian levels. (The interrelationship between national 
and  Community  regional  policies  is  discussed  in 
chapter 6 below.) 
Horizontal and sectoral aid 
Control of State  aid also extends  to horizontal  and 
sectoral  assistance.  Under  competition  rules,  the 
scale of aid allowed is  higher in regions eligible for 
national assistance. While, as noted above, sectoral 
aid now accounts for only  12% of all  assistance to 
manufacturing industry - because of the fall in sub-
sidies to steel, horizontal aid for R&D, SMEs, environ-
mental  protection  and  energy  saving  accounts  for 
38% of the total. 
These forms of aid, however, particularly for R&D, 
are likely to have an in-built tendency to favour the 
richer  regions  of the  Community,  where  the  re-
search centres of the major companies are con-
centrated.  Studies of the  regional distribution of 
Community R&D  aid  during the  period  1983-90 
confirm this. Such support, therefore, tends to run 
counter to cohesion objectives. Moreover, similar 
studies on the regional distribution of State aid for 
R&D in several large Member States indicate that 
this has also been concentrated in the most pros-
perous  regions.  In  addition,  government-funded 
R&D has been significantly higher relative to GOP 
in  the  richer  Member  States  than  in  the  poorer 
ones (see chapter 3 above). 
Research and Technological 
Development policy 
Since  1985, four RID framework programmes have 
been the vehicle for RTD (research and technological 
development)  measures  in  the  Union  (1985-88, 
1987-91,  1990-94,  1994-98).  It  is  a  policy  which 
involves  significant expenditure,  though  the  frame-
work programmes account for only 4% of total public 
civilian research effort in the Union. 
Although their main objective is to increase interna-
tional  competitiveness.  the  programmes  also  help 
develop RID capacity in the relatively weak parts of 
the  Union  and  strengthen  their  structural  develop-
ment.  While high unemployment in  Europe  and the 
difficulty of people to find jobs are often blamed on 
technological progress, innovation and the dissemi-
nation of know-how are key determinants of economic 
development. However, the non-introduction of new 
technologies and the 'freezing' of existing production 
structures are  not viable options, especially in  less 
developed regions, where there is a major need to 
increase the  adaptability of the work force  and the 
pace of technological change in firms. 
Given the  importance of developing RTD  in less 
favoured  regions,  the  Commission,  in  1993, 
outlined  a  first  approach  to  increasing  the 
synergy  between  RTD  and  cohesion  policies 
(COM(93)203), with the objective of strengthening 
the  RTD  capacity of such areas and  ensuring a 
69 high level of research effort right across Europe.
This approach will be developed further in a
Commission Communication on cohesion and
RTD policy in 1997.
The basic principle governing the selection of RTD
projects for support is itself a factor for cohesion
in guaranteeing participants from the most disad-
vantaged regions access to international research
in a Community-wide scientific and technological
area.
Regional imbalances in RTD in Europe
The search for a better complementarity between
RTD and structural policies confronts two basic facts.
On the one hand, there are disparities between re-
gions in terms of competitiveness, which cohesion
policy is aimed at reducing. On the other, there is a
need to ensure that regions and local areas have the
capacity to take advantage of the scientific and tech-
nological developments necessary for increasing
competitiveness, notably through the dissemination
of know-how linked to the pursuit  of excellence.
Within the Union, Germany and France have the
highest levels of public expenditure on civilian RDT.
Of the 50,311 million ECU spent by Member States in
1993, Germany and France together accounted for
30,234 million ECU, 60% of the total, while Ireland,
Portugal and Greece together spent only 672 million
ECU between them, under 11/2% of the total, and
Spain, 2,049 million ECU, just 4% of the total. The
difference in public expenditure on RTD per head of
population between Member States is 13 to 1
whereas the difference in GDP per head (in ECU
terms) is only 5 to 1.
Moreover, spending is very unequally distributed
within countries, so that at the regional level dif-
ferences are even wider. Almost half of European
research takes place in 12 ‘islands of innovation’, in
the so-called ‘Archipelago Europe’ running from
London to Milan (and including in between
Amsterdam/Rotterdam, Ile de France, the Ruhr,
Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Munich, Lyon/Grenoble and
Turin). These islands have dense networks of enter-
prises and laboratories and collaborate in the devel-
opment of new products and processes.
This imbalance between regions has tended to be
reduced since 1989, partly as a result of Structural
Fund support, 5% of total expenditure under the
Funds being devoted to measures linked to RTD.
23 Support under RTD Framework 
Programme, years 1987-90 (ECU mn)
Archipelago
EUR4
Other
24 Support under RTD Framework 
Programme, years 1991-94 (ECU mn)
Archipelago
EUR4
Other
Note: The data measure the level of expenditure in EU contracts according to the location of the contractors. They
do not, therefore, show one of the main features of RTD programmes which is to bring together, via a single contract
with the Commission, partners located in different Member States and regions. They can only be a partial guide to
the total benefit which different regions derive from EU RTD programmes, since each partner has access to all the
results of the project, or projects, in which they are involved.
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This approach will be developed further in a
Commission Communication on cohesion and
RTD policy in 1997.
The basic principle governing the selection of RTD
projects for support is itself a factor for cohesion
in guaranteeing participants from the most disad-
vantaged regions access to international research
in a Community-wide scientific and technological
area.
Regional imbalances in RTD in Europe
The search for a better complementarity between
RTD and structural policies confronts two basic facts.
On the one hand, there are disparities between re-
gions in terms of competitiveness, which cohesion
policy is aimed at reducing. On the other, there is a
need to ensure that regions and local areas have the
capacity to take advantage of the scientific and tech-
nological developments necessary for increasing
competitiveness, notably through the dissemination
of know-how linked to the pursuit  of excellence.
Within the Union, Germany and France have the
highest levels of public expenditure on civilian RDT.
Of the 50,311 million ECU spent by Member States in
1993, Germany and France together accounted for
30,234 million ECU, 60% of the total, while Ireland,
Portugal and Greece together spent only 672 million
ECU between them, under 11/2% of the total, and
Spain, 2,049 million ECU, just 4% of the total. The
difference in public expenditure on RTD per head of
population between Member States is 13 to 1
whereas the difference in GDP per head (in ECU
terms) is only 5 to 1.
Moreover, spending is very unequally distributed
within countries, so that at the regional level dif-
ferences are even wider. Almost half of European
research takes place in 12 ‘islands of innovation’, in
the so-called ‘Archipelago Europe’ running from
London to Milan (and including in between
Amsterdam/Rotterdam, Ile de France, the Ruhr,
Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Munich, Lyon/Grenoble and
Turin). These islands have dense networks of enter-
prises and laboratories and collaborate in the devel-
opment of new products and processes.
This imbalance between regions has tended to be
reduced since 1989, partly as a result of Structural
Fund support, 5% of total expenditure under the
Funds being devoted to measures linked to RTD.
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with the Commission, partners located in different Member States and regions. They can only be a partial guide to
the total benefit which different regions derive from EU RTD programmes, since each partner has access to all the
results of the project, or projects, in which they are involved.
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70This, however, has not been sufficient to close the
gap with central regions in terms of the conditions
necessary to benefit from the diffusion of best
practice.
A positive but limited 
contribution to cohesion
The growth of the cohesion countries has been
associated with a significant increase in both pub-
lic and private expenditure on RTD. Gross domes-
tic spending on R&D in Portugal went up from
0.4% of GDP in 1985 to 0.6% in 1992, in Greece,
from 0.3% in 1985 to 0.6% in 1993, in Ireland, from
0.8% to 1.2% between the same years and in
Spain from 0.5% in 1985 to 0.9% in 1994. 
Union support has helped disadvantaged regions
participate better in framework programmes,
although the data confirm the relevance of
Archipelago Europe: almost half of the total
amount of contracts under the RTD Framework
Programme goes to nine regions which together
account for only 28% of population (Graphs 23–
25). The participation of the cohesion countries in
successive programmes, however, has gradually
risen, even if slowly, and they have increasingly
developed links with partners in the North of the
Union. In 1995 alone, just over 14,000 separate
links were created in the four cohesion countries
as a result of framework programmes. Nearly half
of the partnerships under the second and third
Framework Programmes, however, were with the
UK, France and Germany.
Complementarity with structural policies should
enable the synergy to be improved, which is es-
sential to raising competitiveness in cohesion
countries and less developed regions and to
allowing firms and research centres to participate
in, and benefit more from, policies in this area (see
Box on the Fifth Framework Programme).
A complete evaluation needs to go further and
consider the quality of intervention and its relev-
ance to the industrial needs of weaker regions and
not just the financial contributions from Union RTD
policy.
Evaluation of the framework programmes provides
a number of insights into quality aspects of the
participation of the four cohesion countries:
The Fifth RTD Framework Programme
The guidelines proposed by the Commission in its
Communication ‘Inventing tomorrow’ emphasises a
number of themes among the six priorities proposed
which are particularly important for cohesion:
· the development of human potential, especially
in relation to the training and mobility of re-
searchers, whose experience under previous
programmes has shown the value of this kind of
action for less favoured regions but which re-
mains to be developed;
· a greater effort to stimulate innovation and the
dissemination of results and, in particular, to
increase the participation of SMEs, which is a
necessary condition for the structural develop-
ment of weaker regions;
· the development of the Information Society,
which raises questions about the access of
those in weaker regions to advanced services,
which is as important to them as for those in more
developed, central regions.
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71The Innovation Programme 
Under the  Fourth  Framework Programme  of 
Corrvnunity activities in RTD, a specific programme, 
the Innovation Programme, has being established to 
disseminate the results of research activities. It has 
three interdependent aims: 
•  to  help  create  an  environment  favourable  to 
innovation and the absorption of new techno-
logies by enterprises {including promoting Inno-
vation  Management  Techniques  and  the 
European Innovation Monitoring System); 
•  to encourage the development of an open area 
in  Europe for the diffusion of new  technolo~1ies 
and  know-how (including through  Technology 
Transfer Projects and Innovation Relay Centres); 
•  to  stimulate  the  supply of appropriate techno-
logies to this area (including through Technology 
Validation projects and assistance in  patenting 
and exploiting innovations). 
The programme covers regional measures on inno-
vation, such as Regional Innovation Strategies and 
Technology Transfer Projects. The purpose of all the 
measures is to help firms in Europe compete more 
effectively on world markets. As stated in the Green 
Paper on Innovation, support is best provided at the 
regional  or  local  level,  where,  for  example,  small 
'irms can be encouraged to pool resources and to 
make the  most of their comparative advantage in 
order to be able to compete with larger firms. 
The programme aims to cater for the true needs of 
firms which is essential for strengthening RTD output 
and making the most of the strong scientific base 
which exists in Europe,  but which ln the  past has 
proved less successful than that in other countries 
in converting new ideas into tangible new products 
and processes. 
•  participation is proportionately higher for research 
institutes and/or universities than for  the  private 
sector,  and industrial  participation is  largely by 
SMEs,  mainly  because  these  countries  do not 
have many large firms; 
•  certain programmes notably ESPRIT and BRITE-
EURAM seem to have attracted higher levels of 
involvement from cohesion countries and regions 
than others: 
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•  the main benefits gained from involvement are the 
acquisition of scientific knowledge and skills and 
training in the application of  this knowledge (a ma-
jority of the enterprises from these countries ident-
ified their main gain as being new products and 
processes launched within three years): 
•  as  with  the  framework  programmes  generally, 
the  rate  of  continuation  after the  end  of the 
contract is  relatively high. For example, 18% of 
Greek participants reported that they had formed 
permanent links with  EU  partners and 54% fre-
quent links. 
Smaller firms are a more important vehicle for invol-
vement in EU programmes in the cohesion countries 
than  in other countries. but they seem to have more 
difficulty in obtaining maximum benefit from the pro-
grammes, a problem which has been addressed in 
the  third  and  fourth  Framework  Programmes  -
through, for example, measures to stimulate and sim-
plify the participation process (in particular through 
the CRAFT programme), to assist with the dissemina-
tlcn  of results  and to help convert them  into  new 
products and processes. 
Oeta:led investigation shows. not only that the south-
ern countries have increased their participation in the 
framework programmes over time and have linked up 
w1th  partners in the North, if sometimes only as sub-
contractors. but also that the best institutes tend to 
club together, notably those in Portugal and Greece 
which  have  formed  close  links  with  their  northern 
equivalents. A major risk of this is  that the research 
agenda loses its relevance to the development needs 
of  the  poorer countries.  In  other words,  while  the 
benefits in terms of developing scientific knowledge, 
skills  and managerial capabilities may be real,  an 
over-emphasis on research excellence may tend to 
exaggerate  the  divide  between  academic  and 
applied  research,  the  latter  being  particularly 
important in the poorer countries. 
The  framework  programmes  have  attempted  to 
address research issues which are directly relevant 
to  the  industrial  needs  of  weaker  regions.  One 
example  is  the  textile  programme  in  the  BRITE-
EURAM Initiative which suc•~eeded,  through process 
automation,  to maintain established textile  firms  in 
Europe or even to attract back some of the production 
which had relocated to other parts of the world in 
search of low wages. This suggests that programmes Chapter 4 The policies of the European Union 
aimed at diffusing new process technology, even in. 
traditional, low tech industries, may have consider-
able pay-off. {The dissemination of RTD results has 
been reinforced in the fourth Framework Programme 
by the provision for 1% of all specific programmes to 
be  dedicated to  this  purpose - see  Box on  the 
Innovation Programme.) 
Finally,  reflecting  an  increasing  attempt to  create 
synergy  between  RTD  and  cohesion  policies,  the 
research staff of a number  of institutions, newly estab-
lished with assistance from the Structural Funds, are 
receiving  help under  the  'Training  and Mobility ,of 
Researchers'  scheme  in  the  fourth  Framework 
Programme, in  the  form of a supplementary year of 
grant when they return to their region and subsidies 
to equip their laboratories. 
SME policy 
SME policy is aimed at improving the business envi-
ronment, fostering Community information and trans-
national  cooperation  between  firms  and increasing 
access to R&D and finance. 
SMEs  are  a  significant  element  in  the  economy, 
accounting in  1992 for 67% of employment in enjer-
prises in  the  Union and 65% of turnover and being 
particularly important in distribution (89% of employ-
ment) and services generally (??1 /2%)  and less  im-
portant  in  industry (where  large  firms  account for 
401 /2% of employment and 521 /2% of turnover). Their 
particular advantage as regards cohesion is that they 
tend to be more labour and less capital intensive than 
large firms and so tend to provide more jobs per unit 
of output, while being well suited to the weaker and 
more peripheral regions where capital shortages are 
often. a problem. 
The main problems faced by SMEs  are the lack of 
start-up capital and of suitably skilled workers, espe-
cially  managers.  They  can  also  have  difficulties 
coping with a complex legal and administrative envi-
ronment and may lack access to information about 
such issues as new technological opportunities and 
potential new suppliers or customers. 
Information, inter-firm cooperation and access  to RTD 
and finance are among the most important aspects of 
Union  SME  policy.  European  Information  Centres 
(EICs)  disseminate  information  on  markets, 
EUROPARTENARIAT and INTERPRISE 
EUROPARTENARIAT  and  INTERPRISE  pro-
grammes  support  the  organisation  of  business 
meetings and  events  where  representatives  from 
SMEs can meet and discuss cooperation prospects 
with  their  counterparts  from  other  countries.  The 
former  consists  of  2  events  a  year  with  over 
2000 companies at each, while the latter comprises 
40-50 events  a year  attended  by  an  average  of 
100 companies. Both are  relati~ely concentrated in 
assisted regions. The organisation· of events to fur-
ther industrial cooperation such as round tables and 
fairs  (IBEX,  International  Buyers'  Exhibition  in 
strategic sectors) is also generally of more benefit to 
cohesion countries. 
A further policy area aims at facilitating access to 
RTD.  A pilot action  is  EUROMANAGEMENT  RTD, 
which, in 1995, funded, on a 50% basis, 47 consult-
ing organisations specialising in  research, techno-
logical  development  and  innovation  for  SMEs. 
selecting  nearly  a thousand  SMEs  and  then  im-
plemented  strategic  planning,  analysis  of  needs, 
partner search  and  assistance tor designing  RTD 
projects.  Some  26%  of  SMEs  participating  came 
from cohesion countries. 
customers,  the  potential  for  cooperation,  sub-
contracting and so on.  They also provide details of 
policy matters,  such as EU  funding, public procure-
ment  and  environmental  regulations.  The  network 
comprises 226 centres in EU countries and has links 
to 25 centres in Norway, Iceland, Central and Eastern 
European and the Mediterranean countries. There is 
a strong cohesion orientation with 160 of the centres 
(71 %) located in areas eligible for Union regional aid. 
A  quarter of the 300 thousand enquiries answered 
each year come from the four cohesion countries. 
To promote transnational and inter-firm cooperation, 
the business partner search networks such as Busi-
ness Cooperation Network (BC-NET) and the Bureau 
de Rapprochement des Entreprises (BRE) have been 
developed. Half the correspondents in BC-NET and 
54% of the correspondents in BRE were from assisted 
regions,  the  most intensive  users  being,  in  order, 
Portugal, Belgium, Italy and Ireland. 
The final policy area is access to finance and credit. 
The Seed Capital pilot scheme, for  private venture 
capital  investment  in  new  innovative  enterprises, 
73 supported the creation of 23 independent investment 
funds,  which,  between  1989  and  February  1995, 
invested 26.6 million ECU  in  228 new innovative en-
terprises.  Among the  poorer Member States,  how-
ever,  only  Spain  with  three  funds  is  an  active 
participant in the scheme. Ireland has only one fund 
and Greece and Portugal none at all. 
The SME facility for subsidising loans, introduced by 
the  1993  Copenhagen  European  Council,  was 
designed to support employment creation in SMEs. 
Take-up has  been virtually  100% in the most pros-
perous  countries,  but  only  one-fifth  of the  funds 
earmarked for Greece and Portugal have been used. 
Take-up has  been  somewhat higher in  Ireland and 
Spain (around 80%), but this underlines a major prob-
lem in  SME  policies,  in  that they are  inherently de-
mand-driven, so take-up is highest in Member States 
with the most dynamic firms (and where there is a well 
developed  service  sector).  These  Member  States 
tend to be the richer ones. 
This implies that, while all SME policies are directed 
in some degree towards improving cohesion, lack of 
take-up  makes  this  difficult to  achieve  in  practice. 
Greece,  in  particular,  seems  to  have  difficulties  in 
providing active participants for most programmes, 
while the other three countries have fewer problems. 
Trade policy 
EU  trade policy has sought to remove external  bar-
riers and to promote the orderly growth of trade on a 
global scale as the counterpart to the SMP which has 
removed internal barriers. The result of this two-track 
approach is  that the Union  has been able to avoid 
inward-looking, protectionist tendencies vis-a-vis the 
outside world,  while  exercising  its  responsibility as 
the world's largest marketplace for  goods and  ser-
vices. 
There is a wide consensus on the positive effects of 
liberalisation of world trade on  economic growth. In 
the long run,  the  increased incomes which an open 
economy helps to support provides not only stronger 
demand for the output of less favoured areas but also 
greater resources for the funding of regional develop-
ment. At the same time, the removal of trade barriers 
requires adjustments to patterns of production which 
can be unevenly distributed both geographically and 
socially.  Nevertheless.  given the positive  effects of 
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trade liberalisation in the long run, the case for main-
taining protection of weak industries, even as a short-
run  device  for  promoting  regional  cohesion,  is 
unconvincing. 
In general, current tariff (and MFA quota) protection 
is  more  important  for  the  low income  parts of the 
Community than others. High tariff industries account 
for almost half of industrial employment in  Portugal 
and Greece, but their share is less than a quarter in 
northern countries such as  Denmark and Germany. 
On  the  other  hand,  non-tariff  measures,  such  as 
voluntary export restraints tend to be concentrated 
more on the products of northern Member States. 
The Uruguay Round, successfully completed in 1993, 
resulted in agreements to reduce trade barriers sub-
stantially, to redraw the internationally-agreed trade 
rules in areas such as anti-dumping and to extend the 
scope  of  world-wide  rules  and  disciplines  to  new 
areas,  notably agriculture, services and the  protec-
tion of intellectual property rights. This is expected to 
affect  prospects  for  growth  and  employment  in  a 
number of important respects. The world-wide reduc-
tion in tariffs (from an average of 5% to about 3.5% in 
industrial  countries)  is  likely  to  stimulate  trade 
(through increasing world GOP  by an estimated 1-
2%}, providing increased export opportunities for EU 
producers and thereby adding to output and employ-
ment in the Union. 
With  respect to  services, the  new multilateral provi-
sions are expected to provide a more secure environ-
ment  fqr  trade to expand and the  basis for  further 
negotiations for  liberalisation.  Since the more  pros-
perous  regions  seem  likely  to  benefit  most  from 
greater access to world markets (all cohesion coun-
tries have trade deficits in services}, the initial impact 
may be  to widen disparities between rich  and poor 
regions.  However,  it  is  also likely to strengthen  EU 
competitiveness with favourable implications for em-
ployment and social cohesion.  The  same is  true of 
intellectual  property  rights  and  rules  on  technical 
barriers to trade. 
Nevertheless,  despite the  long-run  potential  gains, 
the immediate pressures for modernisation and ad-
justment in patterns of production in the low income 
regions should not be underestimated. Certain sec-
tors.  such  as  textiles  and  clothing,  will  be more af-
fected than others, especially in  Spain, Greece and 
Portugal. The impact, however, will be softened in two Chapter 4 The polic1es of the European Union 
ways. First, the phasing out of the MFA will take place 
over ten years with most of the changes concentrated 
at the end, in 2005, giving time to plan and implement 
adjustments. Secondly, the products to be liberalised 
in the first phase concern all Member States in a more 
or less equal way. In addition, the reduction in aver-
age tariffs (from 5 98% to 3. 73% or from 7.4% to 4.5% 
in the case of manufactured products) will be phased 
in over five years and this, plus the fact that tariffs are 
already low in the Union, will help to ease the process 
of adjustment and change. 
At the same time, the Union lies at the centre of a 
complex web of regional trade  preferences,  the 
most notable recent development in  which is  the 
negotiation  of  free  trade  arrangements  (Europe 
Agreements) with  the Central  and  Eastern  Euro-
pean countries. Trade with these countries is ex-
panding  in  both  d1rections  with  positive  effects 
overall. 
In  general, the  four  cohesion countries  are  more 
vulnerable to trade liberalisation because of weak-
nesses  in  their  exporting and  import-competing 
sectors.  All  have trade deficits in  serv1ces  which 
is  one  of  the  sectors  expected  to  expand.  The 
main  exception  is  Ireland,  where  modernisation 
over the last decade means that the economy now 
has  a  comparative  advantage  in  technology-
intensive sectors (and in  food  processing indus-
tries).  Ireland should, therefore.  benefit from  the 
growth of export markets in high-tech products as 
well  as,  with Spain and Portugal, from a possible 
increase in fore1gn direct investment, though there 
is  now more competition for  investment from,  for 
example,  the  economies  in  transition  in  Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
4.3 The network policies 
The network policies of the EU seek to remove the 
national bias in the provision of key infrastructure 
and  to  improve the  coherence  and  efficiency of 
transport,  telecommunications  and  energy  sup-
ply. They are,  therefore, relevant for the competi-
tiveness of the European economy as a whole. At 
the  same time, these pol1cies have effects on the 
geography of production and hence on cohesion, 
which has increasingly been incorporated among 
their objectives. 
Network  policies  can  be  regarded  as  a means  to 
reduce transaction costs (of transport and telecom-
munications) involved in the trade of goods or in the 
movement of factors of production from one place to 
another.  Whether  central  or  peripheral  regions  will 
gain more from such cost reductions is open toques-
tion.  This  essentially depends on  the  extent of the 
reduction which occurs. If these are relatively small, 
then it will continue to be more economic to concen-
trate production in central regions of the Union, since 
the  benefits  from  agglomeration (in  terms  of  econ-
omies  of scale,  being  close  to  suppliers  and  cus-
tomers and so on) will tend to outweigh the savings 
in labour costs from lower wages in peripheral areas. 
I  f. however, transaction costs are reduced to very low 
levels, then lower labour costs in peripheral regions 
will  become  more  important  in  location  decisions 
causing production to relocate.  Over the  long-term. 
therefore, when transaction costs are I  ikely to be more 
affected,  the  peripheral  regions  could  well  benefit 
more than the more central ones. 
Transport 
Transport has a potentially critical effect on econ-
omic and  social  cohesion.  Apart  from  its  role  1n 
production  and  distribution,  public  passenger 
transport is very important for low income groups 
and  for  women.  The  Common  Transport  Pol1cy, 
especially during the period of the implementation 
of  the  single  market  programme,  has  been 
oriented  primarily towards liberalisation - crea-
ting an  open and competitive transport market-
and increasing integration through the harmonisa-
tion  of  fiscal,  social  and  technical  conditions. 
These  measures  have  been  supplemented  by 
specific provisions - in  accordance with Treaty 
rules  - on  public  service  obligations  (PSOs) 
which  address transport needs  according to  re-
gional  or  social  factors  rather than  those  of  the 
market. The  promotion of public passenger trans-
port has also become more important. 
A  second  element  deriving  from  the  Treaty  on 
European Union has  provided for the  creation of 
trans-European  Transport  Networks  (TETNs), 
which explicitly address not only the  mismatches 
and duplication arising from  the  national  bias  in 
infrastructure  investment,  but  also  the  specific 
contribution to cohesion (Graph 26 and Table  16 
in  the  annex  show  the  division  of  expenditure 
75 between transport modes and between the cohe-
sion countries and the rest of the Union).
More recently, the notion of ‘sustainable mobility’
has become the central goal of transport policy.
Meeting the demand for mobility with significantly
less resources, reinforcing technical emission
standards, addressing the structure of the de-
mand for mobility by, for example, integrating spa-
tial planning priorities into transport infrastructure
planning and furthering intermodal transport are
now issues of considerable influence for EU trans-
port policy.
Regarding liberalisation, the achievement of an
integrated European economy requires an open
transport market free of entry barriers and dis-
criminatory practices. Transport charges do not
generally account for a significant element of busi-
ness costs, with the exception of a limited number
of bulk commodities and services, but reliable and
efficient transport systems contribute to the reduc-
tion of not just the costs but also the perception of
distance. This has potentially important effects on
competitiveness and on the geography of produc-
tion.
EU policies, liberalisation
and the cohesion countries
The cohesion countries are unlikely to be affected to
the same degree by policy developments in each of
the transport modes. Because of their history and
geographical peripherality, changes affecting road
transport, short-sea shipping and air transport are
likely to be of most consequence for them.
Road transport is likely to remain the principal mode
of transport for goods and services in the cohesion
countries (where historically other forms of transport
have been less important). With regard to passenger
transport, while private vehicle ownership is generally
lower than in non-cohesion countries, extensive net-
works of inter-city and rural bus services exist. For
freight, road haulage accounts for a significantly
larger share of inland transport in the cohesion coun-
tries than it does in the rest of the EU, while much of
this transport is own account. One result is that mar-
ket-based policies — such as road pricing — which
favour a shift away from roads need to be examined
carefully, since they may have an adverse effect on
development prospects. Differentiated approaches
to allow for different circumstances are necessary,
which has been the approach adopted in the Com-
mission’s Green Paper on fair and efficient pricing in
transport. 
Sea transport has a potentially central role in the
cohesion countries. Unfortunately, these countries
are often at a distinct disadvantage in terms of port
facilities: lower levels of efficiency (partly due to
under-investment) contribute to slower turn-round
times for cargoes resulting in relatively high freight
charges. The Community’s initiative on short-sea
shipping may yield positive benefits for ports in the
cohesion countries, especially for the Mediterranean
countries and Ireland. Given the long distances and
geographical obstacles for freight transport, the pro-
motion of short-sea shipping — and particularly the
intended coordination of efforts to introduce new
technology, the development of skills, infrastructural
support and new working practices — can potentially
reduce transport costs and times.
Efficient, affordable air transport can make a fun-
damental contribution to opening up opportunities
for the most geographically peripheral areas, not-
ably by reducing journey times for business travel-
lers. But one of the potentially more serious
implications of liberalisation is the possible aban-
donment of air routes which are less profitable and
which have been maintained by cross subsidies
from profitable markets. So far, however, this ef-
fect has not emerged in practice. At the same
time, new competition has inevitably been largely
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attracted to the busiest routes between the major 
urban centres, which tend to benefit in turn from 
the  largest reduction in  prices. For the cohesion 
countries.  this  means  that  the  benefits  tend  to 
accrue disproportionately to a limited number of 
urban centres, generally the capital cities. 
The opening up of new international regional ser-
vices was one of the earliest steps in the air trans-
port  liberalisation  process:  the  1983 directive 
permitted  the  introduction  of  services  between 
regional airports in different countries (which had 
some  initial  success).  With  the  extension of lib-
eralisation to  the  market as  a whole, concern for 
internal regional services has become uppermost 
and  provisions  allow  for  the  protection  of  such 
routes as  public service obligations. 
In  some  cases, airlines in the cohesion countries 
have been able to  benefit by exploiting the more 
open market conditions to combine services. For 
example, an  Irish airline flying Lyon to Dublin can 
now include Paris in its itinerary and carry French 
passengers flying Lyon to Paris. 
Taken  together,  the  single  aviation  market  has 
helped to facil1tate the creation of new air links to 
and from peripheral parts of Europe and between 
them,  with positive economic effects, such as the 
development  of  tourism.  In  addition,  Member 
States  have  made  extensive  use  of Ccmmunity 
public service rules in areas where market forces 
do not suffice. More than 100 air routes are oper-
ated in application of these rules. 
More generally, geographical location means that 
a basic need  for  the  cohesion countries is  inter-
modal transport. For freight transport, this gener-
ally  implies  efficient  road/sea  or  rail/sea 
connections in which the strength of the system as 
a whole  is  equal to that of its weakest link.  Inter-
modal  transport,  is  a  feature  which  has  been 
generally absent  from  transport planning at  the 
European  level  until  recently.  Its  importance  for 
the  cohesion  countries can  be  gauged from  the 
priorities  identified  in  the  context  of  the  TETN 
Initiative discussed below. TETNs in the cohesion 
countries have  a modal profile which differs from 
the  rest of the  EU,  with  the  bulk of loan  finance 
going to ports. combined transport and roads but 
only between  15% and  25% to rail (conventional 
and TGV)  and  air (airports and ATM).  Within the 
total  of TETN  grants,  cohesion  countries  ac-
counted for the bulk of EU  funding for roads. 
Trans-European transport networks 
and cohesion 
More generally, the  TETNs  have the  potential to 
open  up  the  European  territory,  generating new 
opportunities  for  the  peripheral  Member  States 
and regions. An updated assessment has recently 
examined the effects of the TETN projects in terms 
of passenger transport.  The conclusion was that 
implementation of the  existing TETN  programme 
would on average generate a 20% increase in the 
population accessible in  a daily round  trip.  This 
average conceals divergences between different 
types of city. The biggest gains would be to cities 
located near new projects where hitherto links had 
been poor (improvements of over 80% are noted 
here).  In  some  cases,  these  include  cities  in 
cohesion countries. The next most important gains 
are  to  centrally  located  medium-sized  cities 
(30-60%  increase),  followed  by  large  cities  in 
cohesion and other countries alike {between 16-
26%).  Smaller  cities  in  remote  areas  and  some 
very large cities which already enjoy good infra-
structure would show the smallest gains ( 10% and 
under). 
In  terms  of journey time,  the  evidence reveals  a 
similar picture: while cohesion countries benefit in 
absolute  terms,  they  do  not  gain  so  much  in 
relative  terms.  Expected  improvements  are 
strongest  in  the  border  regions  of  Scotland 
and  England,  southern  Italy  and  remote 
areas  with  poorer  infrastructure  in  France  and 
Germany. 
While  capital  cities  in  cohesion  countries would 
experience  an  improvement,  smaller  cities  in 
these countries would see  smaller gains, particu-
larly compared with equivalent cities close to the 
nodes of the TETNs.  One reason is the poor local 
networks:  continuing  investment  in  secondary 
routes  and  links  between  modes  is  needed  in 
cohesion countries to  enable them to connect to 
the  TETNs.  A  particular  challenge  for  transport 
policy, in combination with cohesion policies. is to 
address this risk,  in  particular with regard to the 
provision of secondary connections to the  major 
networks  which  have  not  had  priority  up  to  the 
present (see chapter 5). 
77 Another  more  general  reason  for  the  smaller 
benefits  accruing  to  cohesion  countries  and 
regions is,  however,  inherent in  their geography. 
Their peripherality means that they do not have the 
benefits of the  centre which typically has easier 
access to all  parts of the network. The periphery 
tends to have access to the centre but generally 
poorer connections to other peripheral places. At 
the same time, to skew networks in favour of tagg-
ing  areas  could  reduce  overall  efficiency  and 
growth,  at  least  in  the  short-term before the  im-
provements in the- productive potential of the pe-
ripheral  economies  take  effect.  Indeed,  this 
conflict  between  short  and  long-term objectives 
poses  an  acute  dilemma for  policy-makers who 
have to decide the relative weights to be attached 
to the two. 
Because transport provision in the cohesion coun-
tries tends to  be less profitable in the short-term 
in  purely financial  terms  than  in  the  more  pros-
perous central parts of the Union, the importance 
of adequate PSO  provisions is,  therefore, gener-
ally greater.  Indeed, PSOs  are essential in order 
to  help reconcile the  highly desirable,  but often 
long-term, effects of liberalisation and competition 
with the inevitably uncertain, and, therefore, risky, 
nature  of  investment  in  transport.  Cohesion-
oriented policies -which have a long-term time-
horizon-demand continuity and the existence of 
regular services over an  extended period of time 
which  is  not  always  guaranteed  in  low  volume, 
h:ghly  seasonal markets.  Public provision  in  the 
poorer,  less  developed  regions  can,  therefore, 
help balance the desirable effects of liberalisation 
on efficiency with the need for adequate services 
to be provided to all areas at an affordable price. 
Telecommunications 
Effective  and  affordable  telecommunications  are 
important for increasing competitiveness and growth, 
as  well  as  improving  the  quality of life of Europe's 
citizens.  These  are  the  principal  objectives  of the 
gradual liberalisation of telecommunication markets 
and networks in the Community. 
The  Union's  policy  on  telecommunications  entails 
establishing conditions and timetables for opening up 
markets as well as defining a harmonised framework 
for  the  provision  of  universal  services  and  data 
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protection. The aim is to improve the quality of service 
and choice by exposing operators to market forces 
and  to  ensure  the  interconnection  and  inter-
operability of existing networks as well as a minimum 
level of service in every part of the Community. This 
raises key issues for cohesion countries, in particular, 
about how they can share  fully in  the  benefits from 
liberalisation,  how best regulations can counter the 
potentially adverse effects of liberalisation and how 
the Information Society can develop unimpeded. 
Uberallsatlon 
The  strategy of gradual liberalisation dates back to 
the Telecoms Green Paper of 1987. Equipment mar-
kets were liberalised from  1988 on, value-added ser-
vices  in  1990  and  data  communications  in  1993. 
Other  aspects,  such  as  digital mobile communica-
tions  - the  GSM  system  - have  developed on  a 
competitive basis,  assisted in  some Member States 
by the application of the Treaty's competition rules. 
Full  liberalisation of all  telecommunication  services 
and  infrastructure  will  occur  in  1998,  with  possible 
periods of transition of up to 5 years to allow Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain to carry out the necessary 
structural adjustment, particularly in tariffs. At the time 
of writing, with the 1998 deadline less than 18 months 
away, only Greece has requested to delay fullliberali-
sation  until  2003  and  the  other  countries  intend  to 
open up their national markets by 1999-2000. 
The full effects of liberalisation are unlikely to be felt 
until well  into the next decade, though a few quanti-
tative indications of the possible effects on the cohe-
sion  countries  can  be  gained  from  experience  in 
countries where  liberalisation has already occurred 
or from  ex-ante studies carried out in those where it 
is planned. Experience elsewhere, however, will not 
necessarily be repeated  in  the  cohesion  countries 
where circumstances are different. 
There  are  reasons  for  optimism that in  the  long-
term the opening of the telecommunications mar-
ket  and  the  harmonisation  measures  will  be 
beneficial for the less densely populated, periph-
eral  regions,  though  there  might be  adverse  ef-
fects in the short-term. 
The  principal  risks  are  that  new investment will  be 
concentrated in areas of relatively high demand and 
low cost and  that chan,ges  in  tariff structures - in Chapter 4 The policies of the European Union 
particular, the rebalancing of prices to reflect the cost 
of providing service -will delay the development of 
new services in certain regions in the cohesion coun-
tries. 
In  practice,  much  depends  on  the  nature  and 
extent of tariff rebalancing that occurs and, more 
especially,  on  the  development of  offsetting  ar-
rangements to overcome the  impact of price in-
creases  for  particular groups of  user as  part of 
universal service obligations (USOs), which seek 
to maintain essential services for regional devel-
opment even if they are uneconomic. 
The elimination of cross-subsidisation will have three 
main effects: to  increase access charges relative to 
the total charge. to reduce the price of long-distance 
calls and of international calls both inside and outside 
the Union. as well  as the cost of leased lines which 
are  the  basis of business  networks  throughout the 
Union. 
The  effects  of  a  relative  increase  in  access 
charges  is  likely  to  be  unevenly  distributed 
between social groups and regions. In the UK, for 
example,  British  Telecom  is  allowed  to  levy  an 
additional connection charge for very remote cus-
tomers where substantial extra costs are involved 
(over 100 hours of labour). 
Secondly,  advances  in  transmission  and switch-
ing  technologies  have  already  dramatically  re-
duced the effect of distance on  the cost of calls 
and the move to a more cost-based tariff structure 
should further reduce this. The  effect on regional 
disparities is, however, unclear, since lower costs 
will  benefit  both  central  and  peripheral regions. 
Nevertheless, it is likely that there will be a relative 
gain  to  the  latter,  since,  although  data on  call 
patterns are  not available,  it  might be expected 
that a higher proportion of calls made in a remote 
area will be  long distance than in,  for example, a 
large city (if only  because  in  remote  areas  the 
number of subscribers within  the  local call  area 
will be much smaller.) 
The  effects  on  social  cohesion,  as  opposed  to 
regional disparities, of a reduction  in  long-distance 
call charges are ambiguous. While people with high 
incomes who make  more  calls  are  likely to benefit 
most, it is also the case that long-distance and inter-
national services will become a more realistic option 
for lower income groups, deterred at present by high 
tariffs. 
The third main aspect of tariff rebalancing concerns 
services between Member States. Mark-ups on these 
are particularly high and anomalous, and calls within 
countries  generally  cost  far  less  than  international 
calls of comparable distance. Moreover, a call from 
one Member State to another can still be double the 
cost of an identical call in the opposite direction. 
While, globally, tariff restructuring y.till  lead to lower 
prices,  it  will  not  necessarily  narrow  regional  dis-
parities,  primarily  because  of  increased  access 
charges.  The  scale of the  effect will depend on the 
extent  of  existing  cross-subsidisation  which  varies 
from country to country. To moderate the effect, there 
is a need for an active approach by national regula-
tory authorities which have an obligation to guarantee 
the  affordability  of  a  universal  service  within  the 
Community, together with an assessment of any ad-
ditional action that needs to be taken. 
Universal service obligations 
Telecommunications policy includes not only the 
liberalisation of the  sector but also the  enforce-
ment of universal service obligations (USOs). The 
responsibility  for  establishing  mechanisms  for 
these lies primarily with nat1onal governments and 
regulatory authorities. (The Commission in a Com-
munication on  Universal Service of March  1996, 
recognised that although the process of rebalanc-
ing ·remains a fundamental element of the  prep-
aration  for  a  fully  /iberalised  environment', 
attempts  are  being  made  to  alleviate  its  worst 
effects  by  proposals  for  ensuring  that  services 
remain  affordable  through  incorporating  price 
caps  and  special  targeted  tariff  schemes  in 
USOs.) A key issue is whether or not to  maintain 
a  single  uniform  national  tariff  for  the  basic 
service.  In  most Member States, a single tariff is 
likely to  be  retained  in  the  immediate  future, 
though this does not mean that it will remain in the 
longer term. 
While there is a consensus in the run-up to  1998 on 
the  present  scope  of universal  service  obligations 
(specifically, a voice service at an affordable price to 
any user  via  a line which supports the use  of data 
communications (modem and fax) and the provision 
of pay phones, directory and operator services, free 
79 access to an emergency number, touch-tone dialling,
itemised billing and the possibility of blocking calls to
particular numbers), the major issue in the future will
concern cohesion. In the absence of requirements to
provide universal geographical coverage at an affor-
dable price, the regional pattern of development of
new services and infrastructure is likely to be uneven.
Even under a public monopoly, new services tend to
be introduced initially in areas where demand is high
and cost is low.
There is a balance in this regard to be struck
between the pursuit of cohesion objectives, on the
one hand, and the free-play of market forces, and
the greater efficiency and faster innovation which
it is likely to bring, on the other. (The Commission’s
Communication on Universal Service recognised
that universal service is a dynamic and evolving
concept and should ‘combine a market-based
analysis of the demand for and widespread avai-
lability of a particular service and a political
assessment of its social and economic desirabili-
ty’.) In order for policy-makers to make best use
of any funding mechanism for universal services
(including from the Structural Funds), it is essen-
tial that they make informed choices on the scope
of these and on possible future developments,
such as providing broader access to the Informa-
tion Society to, for example, schools, hospitals
and libraries. (To assist these choices, the
Commission will begin regular monitoring of the
scope, quality and affordability of universal ser-
vices in the Community from the end of 1997.)
Liberalisation in the cohesion countries
Telecommunications are least developed in the four
cohesion countries. As noted above, after liberalisa-
tion, operators may be even less inclined than before
to invest in areas where spending on services is
relatively low (Graph 27), cost of investment is high,
in part because of low population density, and the
returns are smaller than elsewhere. Delaying
liberalisation in countries with less developed net-
works may make sense if the purpose is to allow them
to catch up. Moreover, in countries with relatively low
use of telephone services, usage-based charges and
special tariff schemes may be a sensible strategy for
rapid development of the network (subsidising
access where comparatively few people are con-
nected to the network is likely to be more efficient than
in countries where most are).
Whereas most other Member States are in the final
stages of development of their telecommunication
services and USOs are primarily for social reasons,
in the cohesion countries, where the system, and a
mass market, is still developing, USOs serve an
important economic function and low charges can
help stimulate network expansion.
By the same token, however, the cost of USOs seems
to be significantly higher in these countries than in the
rest of the Union. According to one study, while for
most Member States, USO costs in 1992 ranged from
0.5% to 3% of turnover, for Spain the figure was 5%,
for Portugal, over 7% and for Greece, over 15% (by
Analysys in 1994, though the figures should be
regarded as indicative only and could be subject to
a wide margin of error, since they depend very much
on the particular assumptions and methodology used
which are often not revealed).
As well as USOs, accompanying measures may be
required to help accelerate the development of the
networks in the cohesion countries, possibly using
resources from the Structural Funds, and avoid signi-
ficantly adverse effects from liberalisation (as
acknowledged in the Commission’s 1995 Green
Paper on infrastructure). 
Trans-European networks, the
Information Society and cohesion
The development of telecommunications on a
Community-wide scale is a potentially important force
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for  European  growth  and  closer  integration,  espe-
cially given the dramatic increase in the possibilities 
for the electronic transfer of information. The present 
focus of policy is on the convergence of technology 
to  create  a  'common  information  area'  in  Europe 
through the trans-European networks telecommuni-
cation  action  (TEN-Telecoms).  This  action,  unlike 
those for energy and transport, relates to advanced 
applications  and  services  of public  interest rather 
than  to  infrastructure,  including  a  network  of  city 
information highways, a tete-medicine application, a 
distance education and training scheme, access to 
cultural heritage,  generic services, teleworking and 
electronic commerce for SMEs. 
The  basic  bottleneck  addressed  by  TEN-
Telecoms  is  not  so  much  'missing  links'  in  the 
network, but the lack of availability of applications 
and services matching the needs of business and 
people. In this regard, uncertainty about commer-
cial viability, because of the innovative nature of 
the application or service in  question or the diffi-
culty of organisation, can deter private initiative. 
Union intervention is directed at reducing uncer-
tainty  and  the  financial  risk  involved and at  en-
couraging  services  of  public  interest  to  be 
launched on a trans-European basis under public-
private  partnership.  Development of TEN-
Telecoms  is  demand-driven,  projects  being 
specified through open calls for proposals, on the 
basis  of a  given  set  of  criteria  which  include 
strengthening social and economic cohesion. 
In summary, there is some risk that without interven-
tion in certain areas, the modernisation of the Public 
Switched Telephone Network (PSTN), and the devel-
opment of broadband networks, in particular, will not 
occur at  the  desired rate  and that,  as  a result,  the 
system will  be  incapable of carrying  important ser-
vices such as the  Internet to certain regions. Since 
many services are revenue-generating, loans and/or 
private capital can be expected to fund some of the 
new developments.  Given the  sums  involved, how-
ever, there is a role for intervention under the Structu-
ral  Funds to  finance at least part of the  costs (see 
chapters 5 and 6). 
Energy 
Energy is a key element in regional development. 
The  sector  is  important  in  its  own  right,  value-
added amounting to just under 5% of Community 
GOP  and  accounting for  around  2%  of employ-
ment and significantly more in energy-producing 
regions. 
The poorer Member States are particularly vulner-
able  to  energy  developments,  since,  because 
they import more and employ more  in their dis-
tribution networks, these have a greater potential 
effect on costs. 
Much of energy policy is the responsibility of Member 
States. As with the other network policies discussed 
above,  the  main initiative  at Union level which has 
implications for cohesion is liberalisation, identified in 
the 1995 White Paper in terms of the need to complete 
the  internal  energy  market.  The  White  Paper  also 
proposed measures to guarantee security of supply 
and protect the environment. 
Llberallsatlon 
Liberalisation is likely to lead to a range of efficiency 
improvements because of increased competition and 
the better use of infrastructure which it will encourage. 
According  to  a  recent  study  for  the  Commission, 
annual cost reductions are likely in electricity alone of 
between 4-6 billion by 2000 and  1~12  billion ECU 
by 2010 and  in  energy supply overall of 6-8 billion 
ECU by 2000 and 14-19 billion ECU by 2010, figures 
equivalent to 0.15-0.5% of GOP. Since the cohesion 
countries have relatively little indigenous energy sup-
ply and so fewer constraints in using the lowest cost 
source, it is arguable that they will benefit most from 
these  reductions.  However,  experience  in  the  UK, 
where the market was liberalised first, suggests that 
though large savings are  possible, these  may take 
some time to be passed on to users. 
As  UK experience also underlines, existing pric-
ing structures generally entail substantial cross-
subsidisation, a fixed price being charged per unit 
of consumption, despite unit cost being higher for 
small  consumers  and  in  rural  areas.  In  the  ab-
sence of the intervention of public authorities or a 
regulatory  body,  a  system  based  more  on  the 
actual costs of supply is likely to lead to higher 
relative  charges in both cases. However,  in  the 
UK,  electricity  prices  for  small  and  rural  con-
sumers have also fallen in real terms after liberali-
sation. On the other hand, some estimates of the 
effects  of full  l,iberalisation  of the  British  gas 
81 market indicate that the smallest consumers
(generally the poor and elderly) could experience
relative price increases of 80% if full-cost pricing
were introduced, though this might not mean
prices rising in absolute terms if energy prices
overall were reduced substantially as a result of
increased competition. In some parts of the UK,
the market for gas has been opened for captive
sectors (SMEs and households). This experience
will be monitored closely elsewhere in the Union.
Community financial involvement in energy outside
the structural policies tends to be limited; neverthe-
less, it attempts in general to take cohesion objectives
into account. Thus, more than half of trans-European
energy network funding for feasibility studies has
gone to cohesion countries, while they accounted for
a significant share of EIB loans (Graph 28 and Table
19). Under the network policy and the regional energy
planning initiative, peripheral regions are likely to gain
from increased choice and security of supply. En-
ergy/environmental programmes such as ALTENER
(for the development of renewable sources of energy)
and SAVE (for promoting the rational use of energy)
have also in some degree incorporated cohesion
objectives in their wider aims. Programmes, such as
THERMIE, which help to promote energy diversifica-
tion, also benefit regions in the cohesion countries
with their high dependence on oil.
The long-term trend in the industry, as elsewhere
in the economy, is towards increased capital
intensity and a smaller work force, particularly in
solid fuels. Liberalisation is likely to accelerate
this trend. For example, a coal-fired power station
employs 1,000–2,000 people while an equivalent
gas-fired power station employs 300–600.
Changes in subsidy and preferential purchasing
arrangements in Member States may, therefore,
lead to significant rationalisation in the mining
industry and to substantial job losses in regions
where coal production is important.
4.4 Quality of life policies
Although many of the policies which have been
reviewed so far address social considerations,
they generally do so through a primary preoccu-
pation with economic, or more specifically effi-
ciency, matters. But Union policies also take into
account human and social aspects reflecting a
broader concept of quality of life, including the
important issue of the sustainability of the Com-
munity’s economic development in terms of envi-
ronmental protection and resource use.
Social policy
Social policies directly address, by their nature, the
issue of integration and cohesion. They, therefore,
play an important role in promoting European cohe-
sion, between social groups and regions. They cover
three broad types of activity.
First, there are significant interactions between the
single market (and more broadly, European econ-
omic integration) and social policy. Indeed, it has
generally been recognised that social policy, and
systems of social protection, in particular, has to be
developed in parallel with a single market in order to
support competition and the efficient operation of
market forces and to ensure that the necessary — and
continuous — restructuring of economic activity and
employment can take place without it generating
unacceptable social problems. Indeed, closer econ-
omic integration in Europe is unlikely to be possible
without adequate social provisions.
Right from the beginning, initiatives in the social field
have played an accompanying role in the completion
of the single market. By guaranteeing a number of
specific rights to the individual — mainly workers
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
B DK D I UK GR E IRL P
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
Other sources
SF+Other
EIB+EIF
ECU mn
28 Funding for TENs energy projects
Chapter 4 The policies of the European Union
82Chapter 4 The pc,licies of the European Union 
during the first phase - protecting them and forbid-
ding competition between firms  on certain grounds, 
the  initiatives  have  offered  new opportunities  for 
certain groups in  the  labour market while discoura-
ging  activities  which  adversely  affect  workers,  so 
contributing to social cohesion. These initiatives were 
aimed.  in  the  first  instance,  at  bringing  about  free 
movement of  workers (implying the abolition of dis-
crimination based on nationality, the safeguarding of 
social security provisions for migrant workers and the 
mutual recognitiOn in different countries of qualifica-
tions and professional diplomas), equal treatment of 
men  and  women  (including  equal  pay for  work  of 
equal  value)  and  acceptable  levels  of  health  and 
safety at work. 
With regard to the latter, measures taken at Euro-
pean level have enabled less advanced countries 
to  make  substantial  progress  in  adopting  mini-
mum standards in  a short space of time.  In addi-
tion, the  provision of Community-wide information 
on  employment opportunities and labour market 
conditions {through H1e EURES system) has made 
it  easier for workers  to  move  between countries. 
At  the  same  !1me,  ever closer economic integra-
tion has led to the need for  further action at Euro-
pean level, in the form, fc,r example, of introducing 
information and consultation procedures in trans-
national firn-,s. 
Secondly, soc1al  poi1C1es are not limited to legislative 
provisions. They also can take the  form  of incent1ve 
measures,  encouraging  cooperation  between  the 
groups  involved  to  tackle  common  problems  on  a 
transnational  basis,  improve  common  knowledge, 
develop exchange of information and good practice 
and promote  innovation.  Many  action  programmes 
have been implemented in areas such as education 
and training, equal opportunities for men and women, 
poverty and the fight against exclusion, health policy 
and  rights  for  the  disabled.  In  these  areas,  the 
Community has acted as a catalyst for policy change 
and an instrument for cohesion at the European level. 
The  role  of the  Community in  promoting such initia-
tives  and  establishing  standards  should  be  further 
developed in the future. 
Thirdly, European social policy is also more generally 
about the promotion of fundamental social rights and 
the development of a European social model based 
on a common set of values. A significant step in this 
direction was  ta~en by the  adoption  in  1989 of the 
Community Charter on the Fundamental Social Rights 
of Workers  (though one Member State  has  not en-
dorsed it).  In addition, dialogue between the  social 
partners has also developed at European level over 
the  past  decade  - the  importance  of  this  been 
enshrined in the Maastricht Social Protocol- and a 
directive on European Works Councils was adopted 
in  1994 to promote this in transnational firms. 
European social policy is increasingly centred on jobs 
and  under  the  European  employment  strategy 
(described above) a framework has been established 
for  trying  to  ensure  that  all  relevant  policies 
- macroeconomic as well as structural -contribute 
and reinforce each other in  the  fight against unem-
ployment. A monitoring procedure has also been set 
up  to  review  the  effectiveness  of  different  policy 
measures and approaches. The three goals are  the 
integration  of  young  people  into  working  life,  the 
prevention  of  long-term  unemployment  and 
increased equality of opportunity for men and women 
in the world of work. By tackling these problems, the 
strategy  is  intended  to  improve  the  efficiency  of 
European labour markets. 
The strengthening of employment and social poi1C1es 
at  European  level  in  the  future  w1ll  help to  reinforce 
their impact on cohesion as well as the cred1b1lity of 
tt1e  Union, which very much  depends on  achieving 
acceptable levels of employment and opportun1ty for 
all European citizens- a 'Europe for all'. At the same 
time,  social  policy needs also to  be  regarded as  a 
productive  factor,  with  the  potential  for  increasing 
competitiveness  and growth  through  providing  es-
sential support for those at risk from restructuring and 
economic change as  well as  contributing to  labour 
market flexibility. This means defining a new balance 
where economic and social policy are mutually rein-
forcing,  where  the  pursuit  of  social  cohesion 
strengthens  rather  than  weakens  economic  perfor-
mance  and  where  social  rights,  which  are  closely 
related to basic civil and political rights, are assured 
as an essential component of EU citizenship. 
Environment 
The environmental policies of the EU reflect a concern 
with  a  basic  component  of  the  quality  of  life  for 
European citizens. Today, the aims of these policies 
are increasingly set in terms of sustainable develop-
ment (see chapter 2). 
83 EU environmental policies have traditionally been
implemented by legislative measures, but there is
also a number of other types of instrument, such as
international agreements to which the Community is
a party, informational measures, voluntary agree-
ments as well as direct support for projects via the
LIFE programme. 
EU environmental policies have generated a substan-
tial body (amounting to over 200 items) of legislation.
This has mostly been in the form of directives, defining
minimum environmental quality standards, emission
levels or specifications for products traded within the
European single market. Naturally, the legislation has
a compliance cost, although this can be offset by the
benefits of environmental protection.
The balance between benefits and costs is not
necessarily uniform across the Community in terms of
both their extent and their timing. Thus the effect on
Member States and regions depends upon the extent
to which the legislation is suited to their requirements
and on the magnitude of compliance costs in their
particular circumstances. 
Environment policy and
the cohesion countries
The impact of environmental rules on the least
developed parts of the EU depends on three
aspects:
· the quality of the environment prior to implemen-
tation of the legislation in question;
· the availability of infrastructure for the manage-
ment of water resources, waste management, etc.;
· the relative importance of economic activities
affected by environmental legislation.
As regards environmental quality, the cohesion coun-
tries are distinguished from the rest of the Union in
terms of geography and resource endowment as well
as their economic development. Along with certain
other peripheral areas in the North of the EU, regions
in the cohesion countries have an exceptional coastal
endowment. In Ireland, there still exist semi-wild land-
scapes and undisturbed ecosystems, while in Spain,
Portugal and Greece, there is an unusually large
number of indigenous species. This does not mean
that they have no problems: Spain, for example,
suffers from a high degree of soil degradation and
erosion and in Ireland the eutrophication of surface
water is an increasing problem. Problems of water
supply and waste disposal are also becoming
increasingly serious in the southern countries.
At the same time, pollution in the cohesion countries
is less in relation to both population and GDP than in
the richer EU Member States. Their starting position
is, therefore, generally more favourable in terms of
environmental quality than in most other parts of the
Union. Efforts to promote faster growth and conver-
gence of productive capacity and real income levels,
however, create inevitable risks for the environment.
Although a high quality environment can be a factor
for growth in sectors such as tourism, some food
processing and high-tech industries, where mobile
labour is attracted by the quality of life, growth in GDP
is likely to be associated with increased problems of
pollution and environmental degradation unless de-
liberate measures are taken to prevent this.
Research studies (by, for example, ERECO in 1993)
show that expenditure on environmental protection,
including on infrastructure, is lower in almost all the
cohesion countries than elsewhere in the Union, both
in absolute terms and relative to GDP (Graph 29 and
Table 20). Only in Spain is spending close to the EU
average. The cohesion countries have substantial
requirements for investment in waste water treatment
facilities (broad estimates are shown in Table 21).
Constructing and upgrading these is, in many cases,
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necessary for compliance with Union environmental 
regulations.  such  as  those  on  urban  waste  water 
(Directive 91/271).  The cohesion countries also lag 
behind in the development of waste recovery facilities 
and have a long way to go before complying with the 
rules recently introduced on  packaging and packa-
ging waste. 
The key issue concerns the effect of EU environmen-
tal policies on growth, competitiveness and employ-
ment in the cohesion countries. To assess this is by 
no means straightforward. Though growth tends to be 
accompanied by increased demand for energy and 
natural resources and higher levels of emissions and 
industrial  waste  from  increased  production  and 
greater use of transport, there is no inevitability about 
this.  More  efficient  and  less  polluting  methods  of 
production can be introduced to save on energy as 
well  as  safeguard  the  environment.  Moreover,  as 
real  incomes increase,  people tend to attach more 
importance to cleaner water, better air quality, a more 
dttractive environment and so on. 
To  trdnslate  this  preference  into  reality  and  to 
ensure  that  cleaner  and  more  energy-efficient 
techniques  are  aciopted  in  the  production  pro-
cess.  however,  requires deliberate policy action 
in  the form of controls, fiscal incentives (taxes on 
polluting  activities.  for  example)  and  public 
expenditure.  It  cannot be  pretended that  this  is 
costless. that the necessary change in production 
methods  and  the  shift  of  resources  into  more 
environmentally-friendly  activities  can  be 
achieved instantaneously without adverse effects, 
even  if  temporary,  on  employment  and  growth 
potential.  In  the  longer  term,  however,  such 
changes are  essential if the  development of the 
European economies,  including that of the cohe-
sion countries, is  to be sustainable. In  the longer 
run,  moreover,  these  changes  are  likely  to 
enhance growth potential and job creation rather 
than damage them. 
According to  a 1994 study,  if all  the  environmental 
policy  measures  now  under  consideration  in  the 
Union-such as a carbon/energy tax and legislation 
to raise fuel quality standards and lower vehicle and 
other  emissions,  measures to  increase  the  use  of 
renewable energy and directives on  nitrates, water 
and sewage-were to be implemented, there would 
be  significant  environmental  gains.  Any  possible 
adverse effect on GOP, moreover, could be avoided 
by a suitably-designed, combined package of fiscal 
measures and charges, aimed at imposing the social 
costs  of pollution  and  environmental  damage  on 
those responsible for these, together with changes in 
producer  and  consumer. behaviour  as  a  conse-
quence of the changes in the structure of prices and 
better information. Indeed, if all the changes required 
actually occurred, both GOP and employment could 
be increased over the long-term. 
The effect on individual Member States depends on 
their  prevailing  structure  of  economic activity  and 
their competitiveness  in  producing  the  goods  and 
services which stand to  benefit from the  measures 
taken.  In the case of the cohesion countries -such 
as  Spain, which is the only one explicitly covered in 
the study - a slight decrease in  GOP  could result 
because of their dependence on agriculture and road 
transport,  both  of which  would  experience a  steep 
increase  in  costs,  the  growin·g  importance  o~ their 
manufacture of  cars (Spain,  in  particular) and  their 
relative unim~rtance  as producers of monitoring and 
emission-control equipment and of 'green products' 
generally. Moreover. because they tend to lag behind 
in terms of meeting environmental standards in  cer-
tain  areas  - especially  waste  disposal  and  water 
supply, as noted above-some compliance cost can 
be  expected. On the other hand, these adverse ef-
fects on GOP could be offset by the energy savings 
induced by higher taxes. 
The extent of environmental degradation in the cohe-
sion countries tends for the most part to be less than 
elsewhere in the Union, which not only means that the 
costs of clean-up are  lower but it  could also further 
increase their attractiveness as  a business location 
as more weight is attached to the quality of the envi-
ronment in locational decisions. 
Although the results of the study are based on purely 
hypothetical  scenarios,  they  illustrate the  particular 
problems facing cohesion countries in trying to pur-
sue  a development strategy  aimed  at  raising  GOP 
and  productive potential  towards  the  level  in  other 
parts of the Union without unduly damaging the envi-
ronment.  These  problems  need  to  be  taken  into 
explicit account both  in  the  design of  the  Union's 
environmental  policies, which  need to  allow for  the 
uneven  impact of measures  in  different regions  as 
well as the different starting-point, and in the design 
of  cohesion  policies,  which  can  help  the  poorer 
Member States and regions meet the cost of environ-
85 mental  protection - even  if this may only be  short-
term - and ensure that their development path  is a 
sustainable one. 
Education and vocational training 
Community  action  programmes  in  education  and 
training were set up to  bring improvements through 
innovative and transnational actions. They are aimed 
at supporting the successful completion of the single 
market (free movement of people) and raising com-
petitiveness, as well as enhancing opportunities and 
the quality of life of individuals. They, therefore, have 
direct implications for  (mostly soc1al)  cohes1on.  The 
main Community funding  for  education and training 
comes from the Structural Funds (discussed in chap-
ter 5).  Other programmes in  th1s  area  are compara-
tively modest in scope,  amounting to around 1 /2%  of 
the Community Budget. 
Leverage is important for max1murn success. and tr·1e 
programmes  are  intended  to  act  as  catalysts  for 
innovation on a European scale through exchange of 
information and experience between Member St<Jtes 
There  are  many  programmes  - ERASMUS  and 
LINGUA in  the  field  of  education,  PETRA.  FORCF, 
EUROTECNET  and COMETI in  vocat1onal  traininq 
They  cover  areas  such  as  cooperation  between 
universities  and  industry,  expert  and  student  ex-
change, training for young people. women and other 
disadvantaged  groups  in  the  labour  market  and 
foreign  language  tuition  Two  of  the  largest  pro-
grammes  - PETRA  and  ERASMUS  - serve  as 
examples. 
PETRA is targeted on young people, providing sup-
port for training and work experience in other Member 
States, developing networks of trainers and suppor-
ting  the  exchange  of good practice.  ERASMUS  1s 
aimed  at  promoting  cooperation  between  univer-
sities, the interchange of students and teachers and 
the mutual recognition of degrees. 
Of the training institutions participating in partner-
ships under PETRA, about 30% comes from cohe-
sion countries, nearly double their share of Union 
population.  Moreover,  the  benefit  to  cohesion 
countries is greater than this proportion suggests, 
since training systems  there tend to  be the  least 
developed. On the other hand, most of the training 
material produced so  far has not transferred well 
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from  one  country  to  another.  Cross-fertilisation 
schemes  under ERASMUS  also favour cohesion 
countries, but the overall scale in budgetary terms 
is very small. 
The  main direct effect of the programmes was in 
terms  of  exchange  (with  indirect  effects on  co-
operation and development from transnational re-
search and pilot projects). PETRA is small relative 
to  the  target  population  (37 ,000  young  people 
participating  in  the  exchange  scheme  between 
1992  and  1994),  with  a  bias  towards  cohesion 
countries  (23%  coming  from  these).  Evaluation 
suggests  that  the  programme  had  a  significant 
effect on  participants in  terms of language learn-
ing,  broadening of t1orizons.  self-confidence and 
ability to adapt to different circumstances- all of 
which are  important assets in  the labour market. 
ERASMUS is  much larger 1n  relation to the  target 
population,  106,000  students  in  the  academic 
year  1994/95 participating in  the scheme, or  1% 
of those in  higher education (implying that 3-4% 
of the target population are l1kely to participate at 
some point in  their univers•ty careers,  10% bemg 
the  long-term  target).  Students  from  cohes1on 
countries  are  over-represented,  accounting  for 
22% of participants. 
As with PETRA. surveys of students 1nd1cate that they 
tend to  gain considerably from  the  experience.  For 
the  universities, the  range ot benef1ts  include raised 
teach1ng  standards through the  pool1ng of expertise 
and  experience,  improved  teaching of  foreign  lan-
guages, more effective dissemination of information, 
improved academic recognition  and  better  internal 
administrative  procedures. New or  intensified colla-
boration in the field of research has also been shown 
to result from academic contacts established. 
4.5 Concluding remarks 
The  above  analysis  suggests  that.  where  Union 
policies  have  a  significant  expenditure  dimension 
-the  CAP and RTD-at least some if not the majority 
of cohesion countries  have been  among the  major 
beneficiaries.  Other  policies  which create  a frame-
work for change- perhaps most notably with regard 
to competitiveness and li beralisation of telecommuni-
cations  or  transport - will  not necessarily have an 
even distribution of the benefits, both geograph1cally Chapter 4 The policies of the European Union 
and socially. In general, such policies seem not to be 
to the absolute disadvantage of less favoured regions 
or social groups, but they tend to benefit them less 
relative to central regions or more favoured groups. 
In  these  circumstances,  a  primary obligation  is  to 
ensure that efforts are made to maximise the cohesion 
effects of these policies in the context of the pursuit 
of their other objectives. Possible avenues to be in-
vestigated in this regard are discussed in the conclu-
sions  to  this  report.  But  it  has  to  be  clearly 
acknowledged that it is neither possible nor desirable 
for other policies to pursue cohesion objectives where 
this  involves  considerable  efficiency  losses  to the 
Union as  a whole.  In  these circumstances, national 
and Union structural policies perform an essential role 
in  creating  the  conditions  for  regions  and  social 
groups to share the benefits of a more efficient and 
productive European economy. 
87 Chapter 5 
Community structural policies and cohesion: 
a shared responsibility 
5.1  Introduction 
The  role of the Europe Union in  promoting econ-
omic and social cohesion is reflected in two maior 
Treaty changes over the past decade: the Single 
European Act ( 1987) and the Treaty on European 
Union ( 1993). The chapter on economic and social 
cohesion  in  the  Single  Act  provided  the  Treaty 
basis for the  fundamental reform of the Structural 
Funds  in  1988.  The  Treaty  on  European  Union 
(Article B) went a step further, the strengthening 
of economic and social cohesion becoming one of 
the three priorities of the Union alongside its econ-
omic objectives of the Single  Market  and  EMU. 
The  Treaty  also  created  the  Cohesion  Fund  for 
less prosperous Member States and amended the 
European Social Fund to accommodate new forms 
of intervention (see Objective 4 below). 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the results 
of EU  structural, or cohesion, policies which have 
been in operation, in  their current form,  for some 
seven years since 1989. The review is divided into 
three sections.  Section 5.2 describes the  nature 
and purpose of  structural policies for  cohesion. 
Section 5.3  assesses the  results,  indicating the 
extent to which the policies have yielded signifi-
cant  benefits  in  terms  of  generating  economic 
activity and employment for Europe's more disad-
vantaged regions and social groups. Section 5.4 
examines the delivery system developed  by  the 
EU. 
5.2 The nature and purpose 
of community assistance 
Community intervention  in  support of  cohesion has 
taken  on  a significant financial  dimension over the 
past decade. Together, the Structural Funds and the 
Cohesion Fund  account for  around one-third of the 
budget  for  Community  policies  (Table  23}  and 
amount to nearly 0.5% of annual Union GOP (Table 
24}. 
The  implementation  of  Community  cohesion 
policies is supported by six major financial instru-
ments.  The  Cohesion  Fund  and the  loans of the 
European  Investment Bank are  based on  a  pro-
ject-financing  approach  and  governed  by  their 
own specific rules, while the four Structural Funds 
operate  within  a  single  Community-wide  frame-
work according to common principles: concentra-
tion.  programming,  partnership and  additionality 
-see section 5.4 below. 
The Structural Funds 
The  evolution  of  European  Union  cohesion 
policies has led to the creation of four Structural 
Funds: the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF},  the  European  Social  Fund  (ESF},  the 
Guidance Section of the agricultural fund, EAGGF 
and  the  Financial  Instrument  for  Fisheries 
Guidance (FIFG). 
89 The ERDF established in 1975, is aimed at streng-
thening economic potential in the assisted regions,
supporting structural adjustment and helping to pro-
mote growth and lasting employment. To attain these
objectives, it supports productive investment, infra-
structure projects and actions for developing the
indigenous economic potential of regions through
co-financing operational programmes, assistance to
large projects, global grants, technical assistance
and preparatory studies. It also encourages trans-
border cooperation and exchanges of experience
between Member States.
The resources of the ERDF amount to 80.5 billion ECU
in the current programming period, 1994–99, as
against 35.4 billion ECU in the period 1989–93. This
represents 45% of total Community structural inter-
vention in the two periods (if the Cohesion Fund is
excluded from the total, the ERDF is 48% of the four
Structural Funds). Spain (24.1% of ERDF resources),
Italy (15.2%), Greece (12.4%), Portugal (12.4%) and
Germany (12.2%) are currently the largest benefi-
ciaries, as they also were — with the exception of
Germany — in the 1989–93 period.
The European Social Fund (ESF) was established by
the Treaty of Rome. Since the 1988 reform, it has had
the objective of combating long-term unemployment
and improving the employability of young people and,
since 1993, of promoting adaptation to industrial
change. It contributes to the financing of vocational
training and employment support measures and to
improvements in education systems. It aims to inte-
grate those excluded from the labour market, promot-
ing the principle of equal opportunities and the fight
against social exclusion. It also finances accom-
panying measures such as the development of certi-
fication systems, the training of trainers and public
officials, technical assistance and innovative actions.
The ESF accounts for 30% of Community intervention
in the current period, as against 31% in the former
one. Spain (20%) and Germany (15.9%) are the lar-
gest beneficiaries.
The Guidance section of the European Agricultural
Guidance and Guarantee Fund was established in
1962 as part of the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP). It is intended to promote structural adjustment
in agriculture, which has been increasingly under-
taken in the context of the overall reform of the CAP,
through measures to modernise production and de-
velop rural areas. The Fund accounts for 23.7 billion
ECU, or 15.4% of Community funds, in the current
period as opposed to about 12 billion ECU between
1989 and 1993 (17.6% of Community funds).
The Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance
(FIFG), a specific fund established in 1994 to replace
a number of separate financial instruments operating
since 1976, was granted 2.9 billion ECU (1.9% of total
Community funding). Spain, Italy, France and
Portugal are the principal beneficiaries, sharing 69%
of the available finance.
Acting together, the Structural Funds are today
focused on:
· four regional Objectives which absorb 85% of the
funding (Table 25): 
Objective 1 — for the development and structural
adjustment of regions where development is lagg-
ing behind, including rural areas. This constitutes
the major priority of Community structural policies.
About 26.6% of the Community population live in
regions covered by this Objective and it accounts
for more than two-thirds of the funding (Graph 30);
Objective 2 — for the conversion of areas affected
by the decline of traditional industries. This is the
second regional policy priority. 11% of the total
financial means are reserved for this Objective
which covers about 16.4% of the Community
population;
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Objective 5b-for the development and structural 
adjustment of rural areas. 5%  of total  funding is 
earmarked for this Objective which covers 8.8% of 
Community population; 
Objective 6 - for the  problems of very sparsely 
populated  areas.  This  covers  0.4%  of  the 
Community population and accounts for 0.5% of 
total financial resources; 
•  three  Community-wide Objectives which absorb 
15% of total financial resources: 
Objective 3 - facilitates the integration of young 
people  and  the  long-term  unemployed into  the 
labour market, while reducing the effeLts of social 
exclusion.  9.4%  of  total  resources  are  devoted 
to  this  Objective.  Young  people  unemployed 
and the long-term unemployed represent, respec-
tively,  1.3%  and  2.4%  of  the  total  Community 
population; 
Objective  4  - is  an  ant1cipatory  or  preventive 
measure  to  assist  the  adaptation  of  workers  to 
industrial  change.  1.6%  of  total  resources  are 
earmarked for this Objective; 
Objective 5a- helps to promote the adjustment 
of the  agricultural and fisheries  sectors. 4.4% of 
total resources are devoted to this Objective, out-
side the Objective 1 areas, with 3.8% for the larger 
agricultural sector and 0.6% for the fisheries sec-
tor. The number employed in the primary sector in 
the EU  is currently over 8 million or 2% of the total 
Community population. 
In addition, 9% of the Structural Funds are reserved 
for  Community Initiatives. These are decided by the 
Commission  in  partnership with  the Member States 
and follow a thematic approach to add emphasis or 
explore  innovative  possibilities.  The  main  themes 
applying to the current set of Initiatives are: 
•  trans-border  and  interregional  cooperation 
(INTERREG,  REGEN); 
•  the promotion of innovative capacity and help for 
the  development  of  small  and  medium-sized 
enterprises  (STRIDE,  TELEMA TIOUE,  PRISMA. 
SME),  as  well  as  for  local  development  in  rural 
areas (LEADER) and areas dependent on fishing 
(PESCA); 
•  experimental  policies  for  the  environment 
(ENVIREG) and to tackle the crisis in parts of major 
urban areas (URBAN); 
•  reinforcement of national policies on specific issues: 
adaptation  to  the  anticipated  effects  of  industrial 
change (AOAP1),  the acceleratioo of adjustment in 
areas dependent on  activ~ies undergoing restructur-
ing:  steel,  shipbuilding,  coal  mining,  textiles  and 
defence  (respectively,  RESIDER,  RENAVAL, 
RECHAR,  RETEX,  KONVER)  and  a  strengthening 
of  efforts  to  improve  the  ability  of specific  groups 
to  participate  to  the  full  in  the  labour  market 
(EMPLOYMENT, NOW, HORIZON); 
•  a Special Support Programme, agreed in 1995, to 
assist the  process of peace and reconciliation in 
Northern Ireland. 
Finally, some 1% of the total finance for the Structural 
Funds is reserved for technical assistance and inno-
vative measures.  A large part of expenditure on the 
latter is decided by the Commission on the basis of 
calls  for  tender  requesting  proposals  for  proJects 
under pre-defined themes.  Currently these  concern 
internal and external interregional cooperation, urban 
policy, spatial planning, technological developments 
(including the  Information Society) and endogenous 
development (including cultural activities). 
The Cohesion Fund 
The Cohesion Fund was established in the Maastricht 
Treaty  and  came  into  operation  only in  1  993.  The 
purptJse  of the  Cohesion  Fund  is  to  help the  less 
prosperous Member States-as opposed to regions 
- prepare for  EMU,  and the  budgetary disciplines 
which that implies, while  maintaining efforts  to  pro-
mote catching up. The Fund can thus be seen as a 
form of compensation for the weakest Member States 
for taking on substantial spending commitments while 
seeking to control their budget deficits. 
Four Member States benefit from the Cohesion Fund 
at present: Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal. It has 
been allocated 14.5 billion ECU for the period 1994-
99,  resources which come on  top of the allocations 
under the Structural Funds. The Fund finances trans-
port  infrastructure  projects which contribute to  the 
development of trans-European  networks and envi-
ronmental projects which meet the objectives of the 
Community's environmental policies. 
91 The European Investment Bank
The European Investment Bank contributes to regional
development, with more than two-thirds of its lending
activity — about 44 billion ECU from 1991 to 1995 —
devoted to eligible areas (Table 26). More than half of the
Bank’s loans have gone to Objective 1 regions, while in
recent years, the EIB has stepped up its lending activity
in Objective 2 and 5b areas, which now account for 43%
of its financing for regional development. Most of the
financial resources have been allocated to infrastructure
projects, many of which help to complete European
transport and energy networks or protect and improve the
environment.
The scale of intervention
One comparison for the appreciation of the scale of
assistance under EU cohesion policies is that of the
Marshall Plan, the archetypal structural aid pro-
gramme for the reconstruction of post-war Europe,
which was equivalent to 1% of US GDP and con-
tributed on average about 2% of the European annual
GDP over the period 1948–51. The Community’s effort
is some 0.5% of Union GDP per year but it is a
longer-term commitment which will have amounted
cumulatively to 6.5% of Union GDP over the decade
1989–99, compared to 4% of US GDP committed by
the US between 1948 and 1951. 
Areas of intervention
Three broad areas of intervention are covered by
policies under the Structural Funds and Cohesion
Fund (Tables 28 to 31 and Graphs 31 to 33): infra-
structure, human resources and productive invest-
ment. For Objective 1 areas — the priority in political
and financial terms — there is a fairly even balance
between these three priorities, although amounts
devoted to infrastructure under the Structural Funds
have been falling over time in favour of investment in
physical and human capital directly linked to compe-
titiveness and production. In the old industrial regions
or agricultural regions situated in mature economies,
infrastructure is typically more developed requiring
less financial support at the EU level.
Current expenditure in the Objective 1 areas is split
as follows:
· Infrastructure: 30% of the Structural Funds are
spent on this. Investment is eligible for support
in transport, telecommunications and energy
networks as well as in water supply and envi-
ronmental protection. Since it is intended to
reduce infrastructure gaps, expenditure is hea-
viest in the four poorest Member States. Basic
communications investment is a priority to im-
prove accessibility while other investment
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has been to support the achievement of trans-
European networks. Important trans-European
transport networks are located in the poorest
countries of the Union. The resources of the
Cohesion Fund are used exclusively for invest-
ments in major infrastructure projects in trans-
port and the environment.
· Human resources: 30% of the Structural Funds are
devoted to strengthening education and training
systems and supporting labour market policies.
The main measures eligible include support for
mainstream education and R&D, vocational
training, equal opportunities, employment and
self-employment and measures aimed at the inte-
gration of those most excluded from the labour
market. As indicated above, the addition of new
forms of intervention regarding the prevention of
unemployment and adaptation to industrial
change have widened the scope of human re-
source policy.
· Productive environment: with 40% of the Structural
Funds this is now the dominant intervention area
in Objective 1 regions. It is largely concerned with
building a dynamic business environment through
support for national investment aid schemes for
industry, with particular emphasis on building an
internationally-competitive small and medium-
sized enterprise sector. In addition, many other
ancillary activities are eligible, notably the promo-
tion of research and technological development,
the development of new activities including ser-
vices such as tourism, the reclamation of derelict
industrial sites, the improvement of agricultural
and fisheries structures and local initiatives.
5.3. A decade of achievement
The task of evaluation
In this section, the results of the interventions under
EU cohesion policies are reviewed. These include a
broad range of concrete improvements to the
situation of the Union’s more marginalised regions,
localities and social groups, which have opened
doors to new opportunities on a wider European
scale. In addition, other outcomes arising from cohe-
sion policies are discussed, especially the role they
have played as a force for change and innovation, for
the empowerment of the grassroots and in making a
contribution to the wider process of European integra-
tion.
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by attaching numbers, or quantifying, the extent of the
changes which have occurred. A considerable effort
has been made to describe and analyse the results
in this way, but as past experience in Member States
has demonstrated, quantifying the impact of policies
is complicated. 
First, the evaluation methodology itself is subject to
ongoing development and, at present, different
experts adopt different approaches. Secondly, the
impact of EU policies is difficult to distinguish from the
effects of other factors such as Member State econ-
omic policies or the business cycle (indeed, in some
cases the impact of cohesion policies seems to have
been to mitigate some of the effects of recession).
Thirdly, even if the regulations stipulate that
Community assistance should be additional to
national efforts, this is hard to verify and levels of
investment which would have been undertaken in the
absence of the Structural Funds cannot be known.
Fourthly, some of the results are based on estimates
from the Member States (eg the number of jobs
created or maintained) and these are often not
directly comparable or easy to verify. 
In any case, the temptation to consider only those
benefits which can be quantified should be resisted,
because to do so would be to ignore the full depth
and breadth of the effects of EU cohesion policies
and, in particular, how they have contributed to
European solidarity and cohesion. A concern with
quantified results can only ever be part of the ana-
lysis; qualitative elements need to be given due con-
sideration.
So far as the quantification of results is concerned, an
attempt has been made to evaluate the impact of
structural policies in the 15 Member States and their
eligible regions for this report, involving detailed
macro- and microeconomic assessments by the
Commission assisted by outside experts. Two types
of macroeconomic assessment have been under-
taken (see below).
First, the redistributive effects of EU finance have
been assessed, in terms of the extent to which they
have been successfully targeted on the weaker parts
of the Community. While this does not indicate the
degree of efficiency in the use of the resources, it
provides essential information on the way resources
have been deployed to help the weaker parts of the
Union.
Secondly, at the most aggregate level, macro-
economic models have been used to quantify the
effects of structural intervention. Here the focus is on
the four largest recipient countries where the scale of
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94transfers is large enough to have a discernible impact
at the macroeconomic level.
The microeconomic assessments (see below)
consider the extent to which the goals defined
under the different Objectives of the Structural
Funds have been attained. Since EU policies are
largely directed at improving efficiency — ‘the
supply-side’ — it is important to examine the ef-
fect of intervention on factors such as infrastruc-
ture or human resource endowment in the
recipient countries or regions.
Finally, the unique features of the EU delivery
system for cohesion policies are underlined, given
their particular contribution to European integra-
tion (section 5.4).
Global results
Trend analysis
Analysis of the trends in the regions eligible for the
three regional Objectives of the first programming
period reveal some encouraging performances
(see Table 29).
Objective 1 regions as a group experienced con-
vergence in terms of GDP per head, closing
the gap with the rest of the EU by nearly 3 percent-
age points over the 5-year period 1989–93. On the
other hand, their unemployment rate deterior-
ated markedly affecting one in six of the
work force in 1993 compared to one in seven in
1989.
High unemployment is the major defining charac-
teristic of Objective 2 regions. While unemployment
rose on average in these regions between 1989 and
1993, reflecting the recession of the early 1990s, the
rate of increase was less than for the Union as a
whole. Average income per head in these regions
appears to have fallen relative to the rest of the Union
over this period.
Objective 5b regions also converged towards the rest
of the Union during the period 1989–93, notably with
regard to unemployment, but also in relation to levels
of GDP per head.
Redistributive effects
Community structural policies have the effect of trans-
ferring resources from the richer Member States to the
poorer ones. The scale of aid to the cohesion coun-
tries, in both the previous and present programming
periods, has been many times larger than expendi-
ture in the rest of the Union (Graphs 34 and 35). The
concentration of expenditure in these countries can
be illustrated by means of Lorenz curves which show
the distribution of EU transfers in relation to the levels
of income or GDP in Member States or regions (more
specifically, the percentage of transfers going to
countries or regions which account for a given per-
centage of Union GDP). Redistribution from rich to
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95poor is indicated by a concave curve. The more
concave the curve, the greater this redistributive ef-
fect. A convex curve, on the other hand, would
suggest that resources are transferred from poor to
rich.
A number of curves have been constructed in order
to illustrate the redistributive effects of the Structural
Funds:
· for structural transfers to Member States (Structu-
ral and Cohesion Funds);
· for structural transfers plus EIB loans to Member
States;
· for structural transfers to Objective 1 regions
(NUTS II);
· for structural transfers to Objective 2 regions
(NUTS III).
Redistribution between Member States
The distribution of all structural transfers (Structu-
ral Funds and, from 1993, the Cohesion Fund) is
set out in relation to GDP per head in Member
States for the three periods 1986–88 (before the
reform), 1989–93 and 1994–99 (Graph 36).
A comparison of the three curves shows that the
1988 reform of the Structural Funds significantly
increased the redistribution of transfers to the less
prosperous Member States, which was achieved
through the creation of Objective 1 which ensured
that resources were concentrated on the econ-
omies with the lowest levels of GDP per head.
Transfers in the period 1994–99 seem to be less
concentrated despite the creation of the Cohesion
Fund for the least prosperous Member States. This is
essentially explained by the wider coverage of
eligible areas in the more prosperous Member States,
notably under Objective 1 (adding the new German
Länder and other regions in the North of the Union)
and by the fact that the curve for the period 1994–99
includes the three new Member States.
For the period 1989–93, it is also possible to com-
pare the redistributive effects of Structural and
Cohesion Funds, on the one hand, and EIB loans,
on the other (Graph 37). The redistribution effect
of EIB actions is less than that of the Structural and
Cohesion Funds. This is partly explained by the
working of the market for capital and its response
to the budgetary constraints in poorer countries.
The ability of the least prosperous Member States
to borrow despite the advantageous terms of EIB
loans tends to be more limited.
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96Objective 1 regions
For the group of Objective 1 regions, the Lorenz
curve confirms the progressive incidence of the
distribution of the Funds, which is more marked in
the present period than in the period 1989–1993
(Graph 38). For the previous programming period,
there was a particular absence of a progressive
response to different levels of prosperity among
the weakest regions (those with the lowest GDP on
the left side of the graph). This is explained in part
by the fact that the new German Länder had not
been fully incorporated into Objective 1 at this
time but received interim assistance, under a
special programme, at lower rates than main-
stream Objective 1 regions.
Objective 2 regions
For these regions, the Lorenz curve has been con-
structed on the basis of a cumulative distribution of
the three basic criteria for eligibility for Objective 2
assistance (unemployment rate, share of industrial
employment in the total and the loss of jobs in indus-
try). To do this, the three criteria have been combined
into a synthetic index constructed as follows for each
region:
SI = (Ind - Ch + Un)/3
where
SI = synthetic index for the region;
Ind = the share of employment in industry in the
region;
Un = the harmonised rate of unemployment in the
region;
Ch = the change in employment in industry in the
region.
Each variable has been adjusted to give them equal
weight in the construction of the index. The indicators
included in the index are those which were calculated
for the programming period 1994–99.
The two curves (Graph 39) indicate that, though a
redistribution effect is apparent for the first period, it
is almost completely absent for the second period.
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This implies that for this second period the gravity of 
the problems, as measured by the three Community 
criteria,  were  taken  into  account to  only a  limited 
extent in the allocation of regional assistance and/or 
in the selection of regions. This reflects adjustments 
to the method of determining eligibility contai11ed  in 
the revised  regulations of 1993, where  less weight 
was given to the three basic criteria in the choice of 
areas eligible for Objective 2 and more to the priorities 
of Member .=:tates. 
In effect, structural policies with 0.3% of EU GOP for 
1989-93, achieved an income equalisation (in terms 
of GOP per head) of 3%. For 1994-99, 0.45% of EU 
GOP results in an equalisation of 5%. This equalisa-
tion effect of about  10 times the original volume of 
public finance is of the same order of magnitude as 
estimates for explicit redistributive mechanisms be-
tween Lander in Germany in 1990 and between the 
different territories of Canada and Australia (see Eu-
ropean  Commission  ( 1993):  Stable  money,  sound 
finances).  It  is  also considerably higher than the ef-
fects achieved in federations, such as the US, which 
make extensive use of grants (to states) for pre-deter-
mined purposes (e.g.  education}, where the equali-
sation  effect  is  1 to 5  times  the  financing  volume 
(though,  because of the  much larger volume of re-
sources transferred, the global impact is much larger 
in these countries). 
The results of the macroeconomic models 
In analysing the effect of policy, it is important to draw a 
distinction  between  the  four  poorest  Member  States, 
wholly  (Greece,  Ireland,  Portugal)  or  largely  (Spain) 
eligible as Objective 1 areas. and Objective 1 regions in 
more developed and prosperous Member States. Effects 
in  the latter are more difficult to quantify both because 
they are  on  a smaller scale and because they tend to 
receive large amounts of aid from national, regional and 
other redistributive policies. 
In  theory,  the  investment  carried  out  under  EU 
cohesion policies has two main effects: 
•  it  adds  to  total  demand,  so  stimulating  output 
and employment, through Keynesian-type mech-
anisms; 
•  it  improves  so-called  supply-side efficiency, 
strengthening production structures and competi-
tiveness. 
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The scale of these can only be satisfactorily assessed 
by using an economic model. But it should be empha-
sised that there is no definitive, universally accepted 
model available for this purpose, given the diversity 
of expert opinion  about  how precisely economies 
work. A key controversy concerns the extent to which 
public  intervention  genuinely  adds  to  economic 
activity, rather than displacing, at least partly, private 
activity. There is,  accordingly, a range of models to 
choose  from,  each  incorporating  slightly  different 
mechanisms  and  beh~vioural  assumptions  and 
focusing on different aspects of economies. 
The results obtained from these models will inevitably 
differ. Nevertheless, important insights can be gained 
into the effects of policies through the use of models. 
In  particular, the  processes through which policies 
affect output, real  income and employment can be 
clarified  and  some  quan•itative  impression can  be 
obtained of the response of these to  the measures 
taken. Two different model-types are presented here. 
The  first  is  a so-called  input-output model (the  Beutel 
model), which attempts to capture the technical relation-
ships  between  sectors  of  production,  as  well  as  the 
processes  through  which  changes  in  demand  affect 
supply,  and  to  trace  the  repercussions  of  changes 
affecting one sector on others parts of the economy. The 
second model-type examines demand and output in a 
less disaggregated way and focuses on global patterns 
of consumption and investment behaviour and the way in 
which they respond and adjust after policy intervention. 
Resu~s from  two different versions of the  second type 
have been used in the present analysis (the 'Ouest' and 
'Hermin' models). 
Both  types  of  model  illustrate  the  way  in  which 
Community structural  policies have affected output 
and employment in the countries to which assistance 
has been predominantly directed and give an indica-
tion of the scale of these effects. 
According to the input-output model, in the absence 
of  Structural  and  Cohesion  Funds  support.  GOP 
growth  in  the  four  cohesion  countries  would  have 
been, on average, almost 1 /2% a year lower during the 
1989-93 programming  period  than  it  actually was 
(1.7%  as against the  2.2%  growth achieved). The 
beneficial effect varies between the countries princi-
pally according to the  scale of transfers relative  to 
GOP,  which was larger in  Portugal, Greece and Ire-
land than in Spain. Whereas GOP growth in the latter Chapter 5 Community structural policies and cohesion: a shared responsibility 
is estimated tc have been boosted by almost 1 /2%  a 
year, in Portugal and Greece, it was raised by almost 
1% a year and in Ireland by only slightly less. Given 
the increase in the scale of assistance in the present 
period, 1994-99. the increase to GOP growth is likely 
to  be  somewhat greater (just over  1/z%  a  year on 
average). 
Much of the significance of structural assistance for 
growth comes from the fact that it tends to be concen-
trated on investment,  in  human as well as physical 
capital.  Between  1989 and 1993,  fixed  investment 
associated with Structural and Cohesion Funds ex-
penditure in the four cohesion countries amounted to 
more than 8% of the total capital formation in  these 
countries. Though the proportion was only around 5% 
in Spain, it is estimated to have been as high as 131 /2% 
in Portugal,  16% in Greece and 1?1 /2%  in  Ireland. In 
the present programming period, average support for 
investment could reach  14% of the total in the  four 
countries together. 
The  boost  to  growth  from  Community-supported 
investment also helped to create or safeguard jobs. 
.A.ccording to the model estimates. the number of jobs 
dependent on structural assistance over the previous 
programming period was an average of 2
1/z%  of the 
total labour force in the four countries or over 600,000. 
In Spain, as would be expected given the proportion-
ately smaller scale of support, the figure was lower at 
just under 11/2%,  but in Por.ugal, the boost to jobs is 
estimated at  just under 41 /2%  of the  total  (3.3%  in 
Ireland and 3% in Greece). 
Higher grcwth also means higher imports from other 
Community countries and increased trade. Overall it 
is estimated that more than a quarter of the amount 
transferred to the  four  countries  through  structural 
assistance returned to the other Member States con-
cerned in the form of imports and that by 1999, this 
figure could rise to an average of almost 35%. 
A key feature of the Quest macroeconomic model is 
that it incorporates explicit assumptions about how 
companies and individuals react both to present pol-
icy as well as their expectations about future policy. 
In  the  model,  the  positive  effects  stemming  from 
increased  structural  intervention  can  temporarily 
wear  off ·in  the  medium term  as  private  investors 
anticipate  upward  pressure  on  real  interest  and 
exchange rates as a result of increased demand and 
thus reduce their own investment. Meanwhile, since 
the improvements in the supply-side of the economy, 
from investment in infrastructure, productive capacity 
and labour force skills, tend to take a number of years 
to materialise, they bring long-term gains to the poten-
tial for growth. 
The estimates from this rrodel suggest tl1at the beneficial 
effects  on output and employment over  the  first  pro-
gramming period are lower than from the previous model 
because of the above features. The boost to GOP growth 
in the cohesion countries is, therefore, estimated to have 
been about a third lower in each case than suggested by 
the first model. As the longer  -term effects from investment 
materialise, however, GOP is estimated to be increased 
by just aver  1% in  Spain and  2-3% in  the  other three 
countries by the end of the decade over and above W"lat 
it otherwise would have been. More importantly, the rate 
of growth 'o'klich all of the countries can sustain over the 
long-term is higher and, in consequence, unemployment 
lower as a result of Cc.11munity support. 
The  Hermin  model  similarly  stresses  the  long-term 
impetus  to  growth  which  results  from  supply-side 
improvements, notably through investment in educa-
tion  and training  systems while it  is  more  sanguine 
about the  demand effects. Thus,  by the end of the 
decade, the  combined contnbution of demand and 
supply-side effects is  expected to  lead to  levels of 
GOP which are 9% higher than they would otherwise 
have  been  in  Ireland  and  Portugal  and  nearly  4% 
higher in Spain. 
Overall, the  estimates produced by the  models are 
varied but positive about the role of structural assist-
ance as  a significant factor underlying the  conver-
gence of  the cohesion economies towards output and 
real income levels in the rest of the Community, with 
the expectation that this process is likely to continue 
in  the  future.  The  results  illustrate,  moreover,  how 
cohesion policies, by raising  investment and econ-
omic capacity in  the weakest regions, contribute to 
raising  the  economic  potential  of the  Union  as  a 
whole. 
Results by Objective 
The global effects discussed in the previous section 
are reflected in a vast range of projects on the ground 
which have changed - sometimes fundamentally -
lives and opportunities in the regions which they have 
touched. Perhaps most important of all, the  projects 
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themselves were generally selected by people on the 
ground; this involvement and empowerment of local 
people and organisations is one of the most important 
achievements of EU structural policies since 1989, as 
discussed below. 
It is not possible to describe in detail what has been 
achieved in  every region and locality. The following 
attempts to  summarise  some of the more important 
specific effects on the regions receiving assistance, 
differentiating by Objective. It draws on evaluations 
carried out by the Commission since 1989. 
Objective 1: 
modernising the regional economy 
In  view of the  volume  of resources targeted on the 
priority Objective  1 regions (currently some 70% of 
· the  total),  these  are  the  obvious  starting  point  for 
analysis. Community strategies in these i egions were 
designed to  tackle  basic  structural  problems rather 
than to redistribute income and hence to accelerate 
growth and create durable jobs. 
For purposes of analysis, three groups of regions 
can be identified: the four cohesion countries dis-
cussed in the previous section, the two large Ob-
jective 1 regions in other countries (Southern Italy, 
Eastern  Germany) and  the  small  Objective  1 re-
gions in the UK, France. Belgium and the Nether-
lands. 
The cohesion countries 
The  four  cohesion  countries  are  the  least 
developed in the Union and include, especially in 
Spain and Ireland, areas with some of the highest 
levels of unemployment. Community aid has con-
tributed  to  strategic  solutions  to  the  problems. 
supporting  investment  for  growth  and  competi-
tiveness. 
The Community Support Frameworks (CSFs) in these 
countries have mostly operated in  the framework of 
national  policies  where  priorities  were  defined  in 
terms of sectoral considerations,  as  for the CSFs  in 
Ireland and Portugal, by regional and spatial planning 
considerations, as  in Spain. or a mixture of both, as 
in Greece. Hence in  Ireland and Portugal, the CSFs 
were aimed at supporting the economic base while in 
Spain,  they were  directed  more  broadly at  spatial 
restructuring through major infrastructure investment. 
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In Greece, pol icy tended to encompass both of these 
aims. 
The most visible impact of CSFs is on basic infrastruc-
ture, where there has been notable progress in reduc-
ing disparities with the rest of the Union: 
•  a major effort was made in the period 1989-93 
to improve port and airport facilities in order to 
reduce  barriers  to  trade  within  the  Single 
Market,  although  some  key projects, such as 
Spata airport in Greece, have only just begun. 
In  Spain  the  development  of  Andalucia  and 
Canarias.  in  particular,  has  benefited  from 
such investment; 
•  substantial effort is continuing to assist the devel-
opment  of  the  strategic  road  networks  in  the 
cohesion  countries - for  example,  through the 
improvement of four key road corridors in Ireland 
and the  completion of the  Corinth -Tripoli -
Kalamata motorway in Greece. The length of major 
roads scheduled to  be  constructed or improved 
under the  two CSF  periods together amounts to 
900 km in Greece, 400 km in Ireland, 1  ,960 km in 
Portugal and 14,000 km in Spain; 
•  an  index measuring  motorway  provision  for  the 
four countries rose from 43.3% of the EU average 
in 1988 to 53.1% in 1991, whilst that for other roads 
rose from 69.6% to 72.8%. This, however, under-
states  the  strategic  significance of the  projects 
under way.  In  Greece,  60%  of the  major TENs-
related projects are  scheduled to  be completed 
by 1999.  In  Portugal,  interregional journey times 
have already been reduced by around 30%, whilst 
in Spain a standardised index of accident victims 
was halved between 1988 and 1994. But, in some 
cases, realising the wider development benefits of 
the investment will depend in part on an upgrading 
of  the  secondary  road  network  which  often 
remains poor; 
•  major  investment  is  going  into  upgrading  the 
quality of heavy rail systems, particularly installing 
double-track  lines,  electrification  and  other 
measures to improve operating speeds. However, 
the priority being given to rail investment in most 
northern Member States means that no improve-
ment  in  disparities  is  evident:  the  increase  in 
double-track lines  in  the  four cohesion countries 
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an  average  increase of 16%  in  the other Union 
countries; similarly there was an increase of 2% in 
the networks electrified over the  same period in 
the cohesion countries as against 4% elsewhere. 
Nevertheless.  investment is  tending to increase 
the use of the system, reversing a pattern of long-
term decline. Between  1988 and 1991, rail  pas-
senger kilometres in  the four cohesion countries 
increased  by over  10%.  In  Athens  and Dublin, 
moreover, investment is now going into metro/light 
rail systems to reduce problems of urban conges-
tion; 
•  in  all  regions,  major  1nvestment  has  gone  into 
telecommun 1cation  systems,  insta  II ing  digital 
exchanges and fibre optic links and this is reduc-
ing disparities in  provision significantly. By 1999, 
the  number  of  lines  per  100  inhabitants  is 
expected to rise to 56 in Greece (from 33 in 1987), 
38  in  Spain  (25)  and  47  in  Portugal  (16).  The 
proportion  of  main  lines  connected  to  digital 
exchanges is being increased and it is projected 
that  by  1999,  rates  of  digitalisation  will  have 
reached 80%  in  Greece, 65% in  Spain,  100%  in 
Ireland and  75% in  Portugal. Substantial reduc-
tions in call failure rates. repair times and waiting 
lists are occurring as a result. In Greece, waiting 
times  for  new connections  have  been  reduced 
from 700 days in  1988 to 330 days in  1993 and in 
Portugal  from  330  to  120  days.  By  1999,  they 
should fall to only 7 and 30 days, respectively. By 
1999,  a  substantial  proportion of the  regions  in 
these  countries  will  have  efficient  systems. 
although  organisational  improvements  may  be 
needed to ensure that the  benefits of the invest-
ment  feed  through  into  more  competitive  call 
charges; 
•  progress  in  energy  diversification,  notably  by 
reducing  oil  dependence, has  been  made,  but 
more needs to be done in this area. Deliveries from 
the  new natural  gas  distribution  system  should 
begin in  Greece in  1997 and,  by 1999,  12% of 
electricity might already be generated from this 
source. In Portugal 600 kilometres of gas pipeline 
will have been laid by 1999 and gas will account 
for 7.5% of total energy consumption. Investment 
has also gone into modest development of renew-
abies and, in Ireland, the current CSF may help to 
finance a new peat-fired power station.  Greece, 
Spain and Ireland have all seen both absolute and 
relative reductions in  their energy use relative to 
GOP in recent years  (from  165.4%, 103.8% and 
126.9% of the Union average respectively in 1988 
to  158.3%, 87.5% and 120.8% of the average in 
1991); 
•  as regards the environment, key support has been 
provided  in  improving  systems of water  supply 
and  in  increasing  the  capacity of waste  water 
treatment  facilities.  In  Greece,  the  number  of 
towns  with  waste  water  treatment  systems  will 
more  than  double between  1993  and  1999,  by 
which time 71% of the population will be covered; 
in  Ireland,  the  proportion of  urban  waste  water 
treated in accordance with EU  standards will rise 
from 20% in 1993 to 80% in 1999. in Portugal, the 
proportion  of  the  population  connected  to  a 
potable water supply system will rise from 61% in 
1989 to 95%  in  1999 and  the  population  con-
nected to the sewerage network will rise from 55% 
in 1990 to 90% in 1999. 
Human  resource  constraints  represent  a  major 
obstacle to convergence in the four cohesion coun-
tries. As indicated in chapter 2, the Portuguese labour 
force  is  characterised  by  low  productivity and low 
educational attainment levels. There are similar prob-
lems of low productivity in Greece,  while in  Ireland 
and Spain, labour markets are characterised by high 
unemployment. 
These problems were actively addressed in the CSFs 
where  great importance  was  attached  to  improve-
ments in  human capital and better labour utilisation. 
The effects of policy carried out jointly with Member 
States are evident in: 
•  the significant increase in the rate of participation 
in education among the young in the period 1989-
92. By 1999, it is estimated that, with the exception 
of Portugal, the rate of participation of 15 to 24 year 
olds will  approach the  EU  average.  Substantial 
progress  has  already  been  made  in  Portugal, 
where  participation  increased  by 41%  in  post-
compulsory secondary education and by 34% in 
third  level  education  during  the  previous  pro-
gramming period; 
•  particular  emphasis  has  been  placed  on  the 
strengthening of education and training systems, 
which has reduced disparities in access. particu-
larly in Portugal (where capacity has increased by 
around 20% a11d 40% of schools have been mod-
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ernised) and Greece {where around 22,000 new 
training places were established, a large propor-
tion in the peripheral areas). The Structural Funds 
have also supported the development of improved 
links between school and work. In particular, there 
has been an improvement of the apprenticeship 
system  in  Portugal  and  Ireland  (the  number  of 
people receiving Community assistance amount-
ing,  respectively,  to  12%  and  50%  of the  total 
number of students in post-ccmpulsory secondary 
education}, of workshop-schools in Spain and the 
establishment of a network of Institutes for techni-
cal and professional education in Greece; 
•  the  Structural  Funds  have  also  supported  adult 
training and other active labour market measures 
in order to help the workforce adapt to the specific 
skill  requirements  of the  various  sectors  under-
going change, workers threatened with unemploy-
ment being the main beneficiaries in Greece and 
Portugal. In addition, they have been concerned 
with  improving  qualifications  and  helping  the 
unemployed and the  most vulnerable groups  in 
the labour market into work, particularly in Ireland 
and Spain, where a large proportion of the unem-
ployed have benefited from measures alternating 
periods of training  with  periods  of  employment. 
The increase in active labour market measures in 
the four cohesion countries will enable a s1zeable 
proportion of the work force to benefit from training 
and subsidies (between 4 and  7%  in  the  period 
1989-99); 
•  Community policy has, in addition, led to a rise in 
the share of R&D in GOP, from an estimated 0.7% 
in  1989 to  1.2% in  Spain,  from  0.4%  to  0. 7%  in 
Greece and from 0.5% to 0.8% in  Portugal.  The 
number of people employed in research and tech-
nical professions has increased correspondingly. 
So far as the productive sector is concerned, structu-
ral  assistance has  been  directed at  improving  the 
conditions  for  existing  firms  and encouraging  new 
enterprises,  especially  SMEs.  Strategies  to  attract 
foreign investment have also been important, notably 
in Ireland, partly as a means of encouraging techno-
logical transfer, but also in Spain and Greece, where 
existing  aid  schemes  have  been  supported.  In 
Portugal, where manufacturing has been historically 
highly dependent on traditional sectors, while a great 
deal of employment is  still  in  agriculture, promoting 
industrial  restructuring  has  been  a priority under a 
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coordinated programme (PEDIP).  This funded more 
than 7,000 industrial projects, involving investment of 
3.8 billion ECU. Firms assisted under this programme 
achieved productivity increases of around 5% a year 
and employment growth of 21 /2% a year. 
Progress in  eliminating disparities in  productivity 
and  in  adapting the  industrial  structure in  cohe-
sion  countries towards higher added value  acti-
vities has been achieved and further improvement 
can  be expected in  the  future.  Changes in  GOP 
per  head  in  these  countries  are  linked  to  their 
different  rates  of  productivity  growth.  This  was 
particularly high  in  Ireland  in  the  large  foreign-
owned  sector,  which  generates  over  half  the 
manufacturing  value-added.  In  Spain,  some  re-
gions  experienced  productivity  growth  while  in 
regions where employment in services grew more 
rapidly, average productivity actually declined. In 
Greece,  macroeconomic problems - high infla-
tion  and  a large  public sector deficit - seem to 
have unfavourably affected investment. 
For rural development includ1ng agriculture, the thrust 
of related measures was the same in all four countries, 
a1med at redlrect1ng production towards products 1n 
demand, improving product quality, increasing farm 
productivity, modernising agricultural structures and 
improving the conditions for the processing and mar-
keting of agricultural products. The proportion of em-
ployment in agriculture in rural parts of the cohesion 
countries  is  still  twice  as  large  as  the  Community 
average (four times in Greece). 
In Greece, the CSF was aimed at encouraging more 
young people to  enter farming.  In  Ireland,  the  CSF 
encouraged  diversification  into  alternative  crops, 
land  use  and  forestry.  Rural  development  pro-
grammes complemented the specifically agricultural 
measures. The CSF in Ireland enabled peat produc-
tion to be developed, improving the domestic energy 
balance  as  well  as  increasing  job  creation.  In 
Portugal,  the  CSF  supported  the  establishment  of 
Development Centres  in  rural  areas,  while  in  Spain 
measures were directed against rural-urban  drift by 
encouraging  the  development of  viable  economic 
activities in rural areas. 
In the period 1989-93, substantial progress was also 
made in all four countries in modernising basic infra-
structure in  rural areas, notably sewerage and water 
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In  the  fisheries  sector,  significant  reductions  in 
fleet capacity in the cohesion countries have been 
accompanied by measures targeted at improving 
fish processing and marketing activities (notably 
in  Spain,  Portugal  and  Ireland),  fishing  port  fa-
cilities (particularly in  Portugal) and aquaculture 
investment (especially in  Greece and Ireland). 
Objective 1 regions In Italy and Germany 
Both Italy and Germany have traditionally had an 
active  regional  policy,  which  in  the  former  has 
always  been  directed  towards the South - the 
Mezzogiorno- while in the latter, since 1990, the 
focus has been on the new Lander. 
Economic conditions in the  Metzogiorno bear a 
closer resemblance to the four cohesion countries 
than  to  the  rest  of Italy.  The  area  faces  severe 
barriers  to  business  development  from  socio-
cultural factors and has a particularly weak manu-
facturing  sector which  has  depended on  direct 
transfers from the North. 
Here,  the  emphasis  in  Community  policies  has 
been  on  infrastructure  investment,  in  particular, 
the development of a natural gas distribution net-
work  and  the  upgrading  of  telecommunications 
which have directly improved the quality of life of 
the populaticn as well as conditions for business. 
Aid to industry under CSF programmes accounted 
for more than 20% of total expenditure and pro-
vided assistance to about 2,200 SMEs, generating 
around 10,000 new jobs. A notable example is the 
special  aid  scheme  for  young  entrepreneurs 
(known as Legge 44/86) which has supported the 
creation  of  more  than  400  SMEs  and  which  is 
aimed at helping to establish a more entrepreneu-
rial culture in the Mezzogiorno. 
Community aid has also been used to help young 
people  and  the  long-term  unemployed  obtain 
qJalifications  in  agriculture,  crafts,  tourism and 
services  and  for  training  initiatives  and  to  pro-
mote the development of rural communities in the 
worst affected regions, such as Calabria and Ba-
silicata. 
Programmes,  however,  have  been  subject  to 
considerable  delay  in  implementation,  partly 
because of administrative inefficiency and institu-
tional constraints. 
In the new Lander, the main aim of CSF assistance 
has  been  to  improve the  basic conditions for  self-
sustaining growth and to  help rebuild the economy 
taking  account  of  the  need  for  environmental  im-
provement. 
Community measures have emphasised job creation, 
partly offsetting the  negative consequences of the 
restructurir.g process (which led to the loss of some 
3'12  million jobs between  1990 and 1995). Between 
1991 and 1993, 224 thousands jobs are estimated to 
have been created or maintained. 
Within the  human resources programme, measures 
have mainly been directed at the problem of unem-
ployed women who accounted for 86% of total unem-
ployment  at  the  end  of  1995.  Women  represented 
77%  of  Objective  1  beneficiaries,  young  women 
being  particularly  targeted  alongside  older  men. 
Though this should have facilitated the integration of 
women, measures have been relatively more effective 
in improving the situation of men in the labour market. 
In fact, for male beneficiaries, participation provided 
greater access not only to jobs in general, but also to 
durable, more highly qualif1ed employment 
In  both Italy and  Germany,  a considerable effort of 
adjustment has been required in the less developed 
regions.  For  Italy,  in  particular, this  demands more 
eff1cient management of the finance received from the 
Structural Funds, a taster rate of absorption and more 
transparency  to  demonstrate  that  the  principle  of 
additionality is respected in practice. 
Smaller Objective 1 regions 
Objective  1 regions in the  rest of the Union differ in 
terms of econom.'c structure and the problems they 
face: extreme  p~ripherality in the case of the French 
DOM  (and  underdevelopment),  peripherality  and, 
occasionally,  difficulties in  regard to accessibility in 
the  case  of Corsica (FA),  Burgenland  (A)  and the 
Highlands  and  Islands  and Northern  Ireland (UK), 
advanced  industrial  decline  in  Hainaut (BE),  Nord 
(FR) and Merseyside (UK) and an  absence of local 
economic opportunities in Flevoland (NL). 
The  diversity of these regions needs to be  empha-
sised. Some clearly are not underdeveloped regions 
in the classical sense or similar in this regard to other 
Objective 1 areas. Hainaut (BE), Nord-Pas de Calais 
(FR),  Northern  lr~land and Merseyside (UK) are ma-
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ture regions in an economic sense which have experi-
enced acute decline in  an  industrial  base typically 
established in the last century. Unemployment rates 
are well above the EU average in all these cases. On 
the  other  hand,  infrastructure  endowment  in  these 
regions is not a constraint on economic development. 
Corsica  (FR),  Burgenland  (A)  and  Highlands  and 
Islands  (UK)  are  smaller,  less  densely populated 
regions with a high dependence on agriculture and a 
small, undynamic manufacturing sector. 
Only in the DOM  is the  pattern of economic activity 
more typical of less developed regions. These areas 
suffer multiple handicaps: dependence on traditional 
agriculture, a limited manufacturing base, high unem-
ployment and,  perhaps above all, extreme remote-
ness from the markets of the rest of the EU. 
Community  programmes  are  adapted  to  circum-
stances but are focused mostly on generating alter-
native  opportunities  in  the  local  economy  (rural 
tourism,  for  example,  has  been  a  major  area  of 
economic diversification and job creation in Corsica). 
As a consequence of high unemployment in many of 
these  areas,  or the  absence of qualified labour,  a 
significant  effort  has  been  directed  at  combating 
social exclusion and marginalisation of young people 
and the long-term unemployed. 
In view of the satisfactory level of endowment in 
general,  there  are  fewer  strategic  infrastructure 
projects.  Because  they  are  different  from  the 
others, the DOM are an  exception in this respect 
and  the  construction  of  ports  and  airports  has 
been  necessary to improve accessibility. These 
have helped alleviate some of the distance costs 
suffered by  local manufacturing enterprises and 
primary producers. 
Objective 2: promoting the business culture 
Given their dependence on old, declining industries, 
such as textiles and clothing or coal-mining and steel 
production, the  Objective  2 regions face  particular 
difficulties in meeting the challenges of international 
competition  and  in  sharing  in  the  Union's  general 
prosperity including the opportunities created by the 
single  market.  While  unemployment,  and  hence 
labour availability, is generally substantially above the 
EU  average,  skills are often mismatched to the  de-
mands  of  the  modern  economy.  Meanwhile, 
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dependence in  a previous era on a few major em-
ployers  has  limited  the  development of an  active 
entrepreneurial culture based on small businesses. 
The immediate priority for Community assistance has 
been  to  help to  put  economic development policy 
more firmly on the political agenda in these areas. In 
view of the need to reduce dependence on outmoded 
activities,  the  emphasis  has  been on restructuring 
and  diversification.  The  rneans  a<jopted  have  fo-
cused on the need for self-help by underpinning the 
conditions for the development of  an indigenous busi-
ness culture. This has been tackled on a number of 
fronts. 
First,  Community-funded  aid schemes for  business 
have enabled the  number of firms  benefiting to be 
increased significantly. In the UK, some 300thousand 
SMEs  will  have  received  assistance  by the  end of 
1996, of which more than half were supported over 
the period 1989-93. This had a considerable impact 
on  employment and  240,000 jobs in  net  terms  are 
estimated  to  have  been  created  or  preserved  be-
tween  1989  and  1993  as  a  result  of  Objective  2 
intervention. 
Seco,ldly, firms  have  been  helped to increase pro-
ductive efficiency and encouraged to develop new 
markets,  both  essential  for  long-term  survival.  For 
example,  an  assessment  of aid  schemes in  Haute 
Normandie  (FR)  in  1993,  found  that  Community 
assistance considerably increased available funding 
for  developments  in  research  and  advanced 
technology and helped diversification into up-market 
products less subject to the vagaries of price compe-
tition. More generally, aid programmes have led to an 
emphasis  on  technology  transfer  and  innovation, 
especially in traditional sectors, which was rarely the 
case before. 
Thirdly, support for business has been accompanied 
by training schemes to tackle the shortage and the 
rapid obsolescence of skills.  The  upgrading of the 
skills of both the employed and unemployed as part 
of the process of adaptation to structural change has 
been a priority, including the acquisition of new busi-
ness  skills  as  part of the  change from  economies 
dominated by large firms to ones where SMEs play a 
strategic role. 
Beyond  industrial  restructuring,  the  economic and 
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improvement. In many areas, derelict industrial sites. 
have been transformed into more attractive locations 
for new businesses with the help of Community pro-
grammes. Moreover, there is evidence of increased 
conversion  for  leisure  use (in the  broadest sense). 
The  degradation of sites from industrial decline still 
continues. There remain large abandoned sites, par-
ticularly in steel areas. and much conversion remains 
to be done in the current period. 
Physical regeneration of industrial sites is also linked 
to policy measures on urban renewal.  A number of 
programmes  have also focused on  the  problem of 
water  for  communities  in  mining  areas  and  have 
helped  provide  more  efficient  systems  of  supply. 
These measures improve the living conditions of the 
population. They also help to raise general awareness 
of the  problems  by involving local  people through 
partnerships. which in turn contributes to an inclusive 
approach  to  development  and  to  restoring  self-
confidence (see section 5.4  below). 
The  quantification of  these effects is  at  an  early 
stage. Systematic statistical data are being com-
piled  for  the  evaluation  of  past  programmes 
( 1989-93), and will  be published in  due course. 
Early results  suggest that the  policies have had 
some highly favourable effects on the regions con-
cerned although the availability and quality of data 
vary. In some Objective 2 regions. where relatively 
sophisticated  management  systems  have  been 
developed, very detailed information on  outputs 
across  a  broad  range  of  CSF  priorities  can  be 
obtained. 
According to evaluations, there were some 900 thou-
sand  beneficiaries  of  ESF-supported  training  pro-
grammes  between  1989 and  1993  in  Objective  2 
programmes. The ERDF and ESF have contributed to 
creating or  safeguarding about 850 thousand jobs 
over the period 1989-93. After making adjustments 
for  deadweight and displacement effects,  it is  esti-
mated that a total of 530 thousand net additional jobs 
can be attributed to Objective 2 programmes. 
In addition, these programmes slowed down the pace 
of decline in  industrial  employment in  the  assisted 
regions by helping to maintain jobs at a level that was 
between  11 /2%  and 21 12'%  higher than it would have 
been in the absence of intervention. At the same time, 
the Structural Funds also made a significant contribu-
tion to diversification in Objective 2 areas, since the 
new employment generated by 1993 represents up 
to 1% of the jobs in non-industrial sectors. 
Objective 3: Improving labour market access 
Objective  3  is  aimed  at  complementing  and 
reinforcing national expenditure on human resource 
development at a time of rising unemployment and 
job insecurity. The sums involved are substantial: in 
non-Objective 1 countries they finance between 3% 
and 15% of Member State labour market programmes 
while in Objective 1 countries ttie figure rises to 50-
60%. 
Achievements  under  Objective  3  can  be  best 
measured  by 'coverage  rates'  (number  of  benefi-
ciaries as a proportion of the potential target group). 
For the previous programming period, coverage rates 
varied from 21% in Spain to 60% in Belgium for young 
people and from 9% in Denmark to 32% in Portugal 
for the  long-term unemployed. These  rates  confirm 
that the  main Objective 3 target groups have been 
reached and that young  people were  more  exten-
sively covered by Objective 3 intervention relative to 
long-term unemployed. 
Although employment is not an explicit aim of Objec-
tive 3, placement rates are a commonly used indica-
tor of its impact. At Community level, an  average of 
50%  of mainstream target groups were  placed, al-
though net effects (ie after allowing for the fact that 
some would have found a job anyway) amounted only 
to 10%. These results are in line with those of active 
labour market policies in general. Moreover, available 
data in terms of net impact indicate that displacement 
and deadweight effects are  much lower for  groups 
which are more excluded (unqualified young people, 
very long-term unemployed, migrant workers and so 
on). The fact that estimates of Objective 3 net place-
ment rates were not significantly higher than national 
averages suggests that the policy was not successful 
in  reaching the most vulnerable groups during the 
previous programming period. 
This issue has been addressed in  the  framework of 
the 1993 reform of the Structural Funds. Objective 3 
guidelines were adjusted to  include: the diversifica-
tion of the types of action to be co-financed (greater 
stress on mediation and job counselling measures as 
well  as  on  different  types  of employment  aid);  a 
widening of target groups, with the purpose of reach-
ing the most serio,usly excluded and the development 
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of  the  'pathway  to  integration'  approach,  which 
combines different types of measure tailored to each 
individual. 
These  changes  have  had  an  impact  on  national 
policies, focusing renewed attention on  those  most 
disadvantaged  in  countries where traditionally they 
were  not  a  priority,  such  as  the  southern  Member 
States. Community intervention has been decisive in 
shaping pol icy choices and it has been a source of 
innovation and experimentation in labour market and 
social inclusion policies. 
The institutional framework of Community intervention 
has  also  affected  organisation  and  administrative 
practices  in  Member States.  For  example,  the  im-
plementation of the partnership princi pie has not only 
increased coordination  between national and Com-
munity level  policy but also internally, both horizon-
tally  (with  the  social  partners,  for  example)  and 
vertically (betwew different levels of administration). 
Spain  is  a  clear  exampl8,  territorial  organisation 
giving  rise  to  the  creation  of  coordination 
mechanisms for dialogue with the Comrnunity. Even 
in countries where such mechanisms already existed 
(such as Denmark), a strengthening and extension of 
partnership  was  evident  during  the  previous  pro-
gramming period. 
The Structural Funds have also led to the improve-
ment  of  training  and  employment  services,  in 
terms  of  general  administrative  organisation, 
training of trainers and other staff and the devel-
opment of systems of certification at national and 
Community  level.  Other  changes  concern 
improvements in  the  structures of administration 
for  designing,  monitoring  and  evaluating 
measures for improving the skills of the work force, 
especially  in  countries  where  no  such  bodies 
existed before. 
Objective 4: preparation for economic change 
Objective 4 is relatively new -having been intro-
duced after the  policy review of 1993 - and in 
most countries was only implemented in late 1995. 
Its  impact  should  be  assessed  mainly  in  terms 
of  its  innovatory  nature.  It  aims  principally  at 
improving the  management of human  resources 
with regard to industrial change,  in  particular by 
concentrating  on  workers  threatened  by  unem-
ployment in  SMEs. 
-----------------
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Given the  innovatory nature of measures under this 
Objective,  implementation  has  not  always  been 
straightforward and has varied significantly between 
Member  States.  In  some,  it  has  sometimes  been 
difficult to establish needs and to tailor Objective 4 
aid  to  the  existing  labour  market  situation  and/or 
policies.  It has  also  proved  difficult to  concentrate 
assistance on SMEs rather than large enterprises and 
to  target it on  those  most  at  risk  of  unemployment 
working  in  these.  In  addition,  the  requirements  for 
co-financing have sometimes been an important con-
straint on both private and public sector participation 
in Member States. 
Despite these caveats,  positive effects can already 
be detected in three areas: 
•  a redirection of policy towards a more preventive 
approach  to  unemployment.  In  many  Member 
States, forecasting models are being developed, 
employment observatories by industrial sector are 
being set up or extended (eg in Greece, Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Austria, where this is occur-
ring at a regional level, with tripartite discussion of 
economic and labour market issues).  New initia-
tives are also being undertaken at  the company 
IE:vel.  In  Denmark,  for  example,  labour  market 
monitoring has been deveioped, coupled with ef-
forts to promote the use of the data by companies 
and  with  help  to  firms  to  apply  the  results  of 
forecasts to  their  human resource  policy.  In  Ire-
land, companies obtaining support under Objec-
tive  4  are  required  to  devise  a  business 
development and training plan; 
•  the  acceptance by workers of the  need to  adapt 
to industrial change. From the experience in some 
Member States  (Denmark  and  Austria),  greater 
needs than expected have emerged for general or 
generic skills and less  for vocational or technical 
training,  while  It  also  seems  to  be  important for 
training  to  lead to  formal  qualifications  (e.g.  as 
recommended by an evaluation study in Ireland); 
•  improving training systems. Measures include the 
development  of  courses  and  types  of  training 
methods which can be used to establish training 
structures  at  company level.  Particular attention 
has been paid to the training problems faced by 
SMEs. For example, in Germany there are plans to 
establish  cooperation  structures  between  SMEs 
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Objective 5a: 
Improving structures In traditional sectors 
Agriculture 
The  agricultural sector has been  subject to  sub-
stantial change in recent years. including the de-
velopment  of  new  production  techniques, 
increased  productivity  and  competition  and 
changes in the pattern of demand. These have led 
to a significant reduction in the number of agricul-
tural  holdings - from  8.6  million  in  1989 to 7.8 
million  in  1993.  The  reduction  was  particularly 
large in Portugal (18%) as well as in Luxembourg, 
France,  Spain  and  Belgium  (over  10%).  At  the 
same  time,  the  average  size  of  holdings  in-
creased, althour.h. in the Union as a whole, small 
holdings of between 1 and 5 hectares still account 
for 60% of the total. The rationalisation required in 
the  future  needs to  be accompanied by a reduc-
tion  in  the  average  age of workers  in  the  sector, 
since in  1993 over half of farmers were over 55. 
Objective 5a is aimed at bringing about a restruc-
turing of agriculture across the Union, continuing 
the measures co-financed by the Community Bud-
get over a number of years to maintain agricultural 
activity in rural areas. It is specifically directed at 
preserving viable farming income by creating new 
opportunities  on  or  close  to  the  farm.  The 
measures include both direct transfers to farmers 
in  the  most  disadvantaged areas  and  transfers 
designed to restructure and develop the sector. 
Direct  compensation  to  farmers  is  focused  on 
those in mountainous or other naturally disadvant-
aged  areas,  where  the  decline  of  agriculture 
threatens  serious  depopulation  and  'desertifica-
tion' and  where  agricultural  income  is  less  than 
half  that  elsewhere.  The  systPm  of  support  en-
ables farmers in these areas to maintain a reason-
able level of income. The areas concerned cover 
56% of usable agricultural land in the Union. In the 
15  counties  of  the  Union,  around  11/2 million 
farmers  are  in  receipt of this compensation, rep-
resenting  a  quarter  of  the  holdings  located  in 
these areas. 
Numerous  measures  to restructure  and develop 
the  sector have been funded by the Community. 
These focus,  first of all,  on  the planned improve-
ment of farms themselves. Subsidies are granted 
to  increase  the  competitiveness  of  agricultural 
holdings by adapting structures of production to 
the needs of the market and to promote product 
quality. They also encourage the diversification of 
activities which could generate additional income 
(such as  rural tourism, the sale of farm  products 
and  the  use  of  wooded  areas),  as  well  as  the 
improvement of working conditions, hygiene and 
animal welfare and the natural environment. In the 
last few years, an average of 40,000 improvement 
plans a year have been approved, half in Objec-
tive 1 regions. In 1993, 60% of these were directed 
at  supporting  investment  in  holdings  located in 
disadvantaged areas. 
The  Community  also  offers  support  for  young 
farmers to set up in business not only to provide a 
job for them but also to reduce the average age of 
the agricultural work force, younger farmers being 
more receptive to modern farming techniques and 
better able to adapt to changes in production and 
the  need  to  diversify  activities.  In  the  last  few 
years,  help  has  been  given  to  23,000  young 
farmers a year, some 1.8% of the total in the Union. 
At the  same time, the early retirement of farmers 
of  55  and  over  has  been  encouraged.  For  the 
period  1993-97, more than 210,000 farmers  and 
agricultural workers will be assisted in this way. 
Finally,  the  Community  funds  investment  in  the 
downstream processing and marketing of agricul-
tural  produce with  the aim of improving product 
quality  and  enabling  producers  of  primary  pro-
ducts to  benefit more from the added value from 
processing.  Rationalisation  and  modernisation 
are  essential;  in  1990,  over  90%  of  the 
253,000  firm'3  in  the  agro-food  sector  had  less 
than 20 employees and 6% between 20 and 39. In 
deciding the  assistance to be given,  account is 
taken of market developments and the projects for 
assistance are  selected accordingly. In  general, 
priority  has  been  given  to  investment  involving 
technical  innovation,  enabling  costs  to  be  re-
duced, labels of origin to be  produced and biol-
ogical products to be encouraged. 
These measures account for most of the resources 
deployed under Objective 5a. The other measures 
include  support  for  producer  cooperatives,  for 
service  centres  providing  mutual  aid,  manage-
ment  and  accounting  advice  and  for  vocational 
training. 
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Fisheries 
Structural intervention in the fisheries sector is intended 
to facil~ate adjustment Measures include payments for 
the permanent reduction of the fishing fleet, assistance 
far ~s rrodernisation, for aquaculture investment and aid 
fct downstream activities such as processing. 
Structural measures for fisheries have been in place 
since 1970, but they have only been brought together 
in the form of the Financial Instrument for Fisheries 
Guidance  (FIFG} 'since  1994.  The  largest  benefi-
ciaries have been the fishing communities in  Spain 
and, to a lesser extent, those in  Italy, Portugal and 
Greece. 
The integration of fisheries into the Structural Funds 
in  1994  was  intended  to  reinforce  the  efforts  to 
improve conditions in an industry undergoing exten-
sive restructuring. Before the FIFG was established, 
measures suffered from a lack of strategic focus and 
planning, with aid being insufficiently concentrated. 
Nevertheless, a r,umber of achievements are evident: 
•  significant reductions in the over-capacity of the 
fishing fleet have been achieved. Over the period 
1991-94  the  tonnage  and  capacity  of  the 
Community fleet were reduced by around 10.5% 
and 7.4%, respectively, mostly in Spain, Portugal, 
Denmark  and Germany.  Although  these  reduc-
tions were within the global objectives set out in 
the Multiannual Guidance Programmes (MAGPs), 
the overall situation conceals wide variations be-
tween Member States; 
•  health and safety conditions on  board ships and in 
processing plants have been improved; 
•  the development of fish farming has been encour-
aged,  with  notable  success  in  Greece,  Italy, 
Ireland  and  the  UK  (Scotland),  and  has  con-
tributed to local economic development. 
In  the  current  period,  there  is  a  continuing  focus  on 
reducing fleet capacity in accordance  w~h  the targets set 
out in the MAGPs and on the coordination of measures 
for fishing communities most affected by reductions. 
Objective Sb: restoring the rural economy 
The continuous decline of employment in agriculture 
and of the  share of agricultural production in  GOP 
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create real problems for the maintenance of jobs and 
population in many of the Union's rural areas, where 
prosperity and the environment are threatened. Safe-
guarding  rural  areas  is  essential  to  the  balanced 
development of the Union as a whole and calls for the 
creation of new economic activities or the expansion 
of existing ones. 
Objective 5b is aimed at promoting rural development 
by assisting structural adjustment in areas which are 
particularly  vulnerable.  It  includes  areas  outside 
those  covered  by  Objectives  1  and  6  with  low 
incomes or  other handicaps, such as a location on the 
periphery or in remote islands or mountainous areas, 
an  uncompetitive structure of agricultural holdings, 
on ageing work force or with pressures on the rural 
environment. 
The assisted areas are sparsely populated and the 
challenge  of  providing  access  to  services  is 
accordingly especially difficult. 
.Through the integrated programmes, the Community 
has helped to restore the economic potential of rural 
areas  and  their  capacity  to  provide  viable  jobs. 
Around 70% of EJ funding is currently directed at the 
development of the  economic  base of rural  areas. 
There are three main priorities: first,  support for the 
development and  diversification of agriculture  and 
forestry  - including the  promotion of quality  pro-
ducts and the restructuring of production away from 
the use of exhaustible resources; secondly, the de-
velopment of new SMEs,  where the Union has sup-
ported the establishment of industrial sites and the 
creation of services for assisting businesses; thirdly, 
the  development of rural  tourism  which  can  be  a 
source  of additional  income  for  farmers  and  their 
families. 
These  measures  are  complemented  by others  to 
improve labour force skills or protect the natural en-
vironment. Measures also contribute to improving the 
built  environment  through  the  regeneration  of 
villages. This  represents a  potential opportunity for 
job creation while protecting the local heritage and 
improving the quality of  life. 
Global estimates suggest that over the period 1989--
99 as a whole, more than 500,000 jobs will be created 
or  preserved  in  Objective Sb  areas  as  a  result  of 
Community programmes. Of 20 Objective 5b regions 
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lation  has stabilised in  around  half of them and in-
creased in six. GOP declined in only two of the regions 
and increased or remained the same in the rest. 
Objective 6: Innovation and accessibility 
The new Objective 6 created on the accession in 1995 
of Finland and Sweden  addresses problems of ex-
treme peripherality, climate and low population den-
sity.  These  regions  typically benefit  from  relatively 
well developed infrastructure, especially as regards 
transport, energy and modern telecommunications. 
However, unemployment is high and the regions are 
highly dependent on public sector employment. 
Objective  6  programmes  have  been  used  as  the 
opportunity to address these deficiencies. Innovation 
has been at the heart of the strategies adopted for the 
period  1994-99. and expenditure on  research  and 
technological development and the  new information 
and  communication  technologies  has  been  a  top 
priority.  In  Finland,  this  accounts for  over a third of 
Community a~sistance. 
It is, of course, too early to assess the results of these 
programmes.  The  indications  so  far  are  t11at  there 
have been beneficial effects from both the measures 
themselves and the programming process, which has 
encouraged creativity through the decentralisation of 
management to the regions. 
Community Initiatives 
Through Community Initiatives, the  Union has been 
able to focus attention on particular European prob-
lems and opportunities concerning regional and so-
cial  development,  emphas1sing  actions to  promote 
the  development  of  networks  and  cooperation  be-
tween  regions  across  national  frontiers.  They  have 
sometimes been among the most valuable and inno-
vative actions under the Structural Funds, helping to 
set a new policy agenda for mainstream programmes 
and  having  particular  appeal  to  local  people  and 
organisations.  They  have  also  been  very  popular 
which has produced its own set of problems in rela-
tion to the volume of themes requested for new Initia-
tives. 
Given the limited resources available in relation to the 
variety of issues which have been addressed, lever-
age  has  been  the  guiding  principle  in  the  use  of 
Community  finance.  Accordingly, Community lnitia-
tives focus much less on major 'hardware' investment 
itself and more on seeking to create the conditions for 
national public and private investment in the priority 
expenditure  areas.  Detailed  evaluations  for  most 
Community  Initiatives  for  the  first  programming 
period, 1989-93, are now underway, while a number 
of new Initiatives were introduced only recently. 
Community  Initiatives  have had a particular role  in 
emphasising the trans-border, transnational and in-
terregional dimension. There can be few more import-
ant priorities in the  process of European integration 
than the removal of the traditional barriers between 
Member States which have distorted economic struc-
tures and reduced opportunities, especially for  bor-
der communities. 
With  regard  to  cross-border  cooperation, 
INTERREG I  ( 1  989-93)  achieved  considerable 
success  measured  in  terms  of interest aroused, 
with  some  31  programmes funded. Their unique 
contribution  has  been  to  promote  the  develop-
ment  of  coherent  regional  strategies  across na-
tional frontiers. In this way they have attempted to 
overcome national barriers to economic and spa-
tial development which have traditionally reduced 
opportunities for  border communities  or  led to  a 
wasteful  duplication of effort.  Over half,  56%,  of 
the resources  funded projects directed at  publi-
cising cross-border opportunities, underlining the 
extensive  benefits  of a  Europe  without  borders. 
Initiatives  for  cross-border  mobility were  less  in 
evidence, but  11% of the projects were aimed at 
developing  new  practices  in  economic  cooper-
ation  based  on  the  transfer  of  information  and 
know-how;  8%  were  concerned  to  improve  the 
management of natural resources and, therefore, 
the  attractiveness  and  quality of life  offered  by 
border  areas;  6%  were  aimed  at  developing 
university and research centre networks and pro-
moting cross-border tourism.  Most of these  pro-
jects  contributed  to  job creation  directly,  partly 
through the development of SMEs. 
/NTERREG  II will  carry this  forward  and  seek to 
promote programmes which are genuinely cross-
border in  content.  It has considerably increased 
resources, in  particular for actions in Objective 1 
regions, and it will also help fund the completion 
of  energy networks  to  provide  connections with 
wider  European  networks  funded  under  the 
REGEN Initiative  .. 
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During  the  first  programming  period,  REGEN ex-
posed the  limits of a uniquely national approach to 
planning. It led to a strengthening of collaboration (for 
example,  between  Greece  and  Italy  and  between 
Spain and Portugal), encouraged the diversification 
of energy sources and services (creation of gas dis-
tribution systems) and promoted the establishment of 
networks. 
In order to establish cooperation between EU regions 
and regions in Central and Eastern Europe adjacent 
to the Union. the implementation of projects financed 
under the external aid programme PHARE has been 
linked to INTERREG. More recently, an innovation has 
been  to  introduce  a  spatial  planning dimension  in 
Community Initiatives for the first time (INTERREG lie) 
which will open up possibilities for developing trans-
national cooperation (around the Baltic Sea. the Alps, 
the Mediterranean and the Atlantic). The REGIS initia-
tive aims at  improving integration of the remote re-
gions of the Union by strengthening their economic 
base  and  consolidating  links  with  the  rest  of  the 
Union. 
Community Initiatives have also given impetus to 
innovation. the transfer of know-how and the inte-
gration  of  R&D  in  regional  policies  in  the  less 
developed areas. Under STRIDE, 68 new research 
centres were created  and over  100 others were 
re-equipped or  upgraded.  Almost 300 new pro-
ducts and processes and 46 patents were gener-
ated through  research  activities and 4,400 jobs 
are estimated to have been directly or indirectly 
created. Under TELEMA T/QUE,  17,000 SMEs in a 
wide range of industries developed advanced ser-
vices  (databases  for  open  use  and  support  for 
distance working to  32,000 new users).  PRISMA 
has contributed to the creation of a single market 
by improving standardisation and quality control 
procedures. It has financed some 300 projects for 
certification and quality services which have pro-
duced systems used by some 4,500 organisations 
for checking materials and products to ensure that 
they conform with EU  standards. These three in-
itiatives are reflected in the SME Initiative for the 
second programming period ( 1994-99) aimed at 
assisting SMEs, especially in Objective 1 regions. 
to  adapt  to  the  single  market  and  international 
competition. 
Rural development projects designed and managed 
locally  in  rural  areas  have  been  supported  under 
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LEADER, which is aimed at disseminating good prac-
tice through innovative measures, exchange of ex-
perience and transnational  cooperation. Through a 
'bottom  up' integrated  approach to  rural  develop-
ment. it helped to set up 217 Local Action Groups in 
the  first  phase,  while  for  the  period  1994-99  the 
number of Groups may increase to some  700.  The 
design and implementation of transnational projects 
has been promoted using the European rural devel-
opment network, which offers a permanent facility for 
the exchange of experience and know-how. 
In 1994, the Commission launched the URBAN Initia-
tive.  aimed at social and economic regeneration of 
cities and at improving the environment. URBAN has 
sought to maximise the involvement of the grassroots. 
empowering  local  communities  and  encouraging 
local  people to determine priorities and to take  re-
sponsibility  for  their  own  areas.  It  has  generated 
considerable interest,  receiving  some  133 applica-
tions for funding. 
Other Community Initiatives (RESIDER, RENA VAL, 
RECHAR,  RETEX and KONVER)  are narrowly fo-
cused on areas with particular sector.al problems 
and aim  to  help  local  economies  dependent on 
such sectors diversify. Given their small budgets 
in  relation to the  size  of  the  problem, t11eir  main 
comribution  has  been  to  secure  private  invest-
ment  in  areas  which  have  suffered  from  pro-
gressive disinvestment and which were  seen  as 
unattractive. Evaluations suggest that Community 
funding was  essential to releasing resources for 
virtually  all  of the  RECHAR projects undertaken 
and for 95% of RESIDER and RENA VAL  projects. 
In  financial terms. they have had a high leverage 
effect, inducing public and private funding of over 
21/2 times the amount provided by the Community 
and helping support about 5,000 projects in  the 
areas  concerned.  Given  their  success.  some of 
the  Community  Initiatives  (RECHAR,  RESIDER, 
RETEX and KONVER) were renewed in the second 
programming  period  with  certain  adjustments. 
such as an extension of their geographical scope 
and the addition of new measures. 
The two major Community Initiatives for the devel-
opment  of  human  resources  - EMPLOYMENT 
and ADAPT- aim to focus attention throughout 
the Union on a skilled work force as a key element 
in  the  strategy  presented  in  the  Commission's 
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The EMPLOYMENTinitiative consists of  three inter-re- . 
lated programmes: 
•  NOW,  which  promotes  equal  opportunities  for 
women in the labour market; 
•  HORIZON, which addresses labour market oppor-
tunities for the disadvantaged and the disabled; 
•  YOUTHSTART, which promotes the labour market 
integration of young people under 20. especially 
those without basic qualifications or training. 
From  1997,  a  fourth  programme.  INTEGRA  will  be 
added,  concentrating  specifically on  social  exclu-
sion; after its introduction. HORIZON will focus exclu-
sively on helping the disabled. 
The  ADAPT Initiative  is  aimed,  in  conjunction  with 
Objective 4, at helping the work force adjust to struc-
tural change and, with effect from 1997, will be rein-
forced by a special priority measure concerned with 
tre social aspects of the Information Society (ADAPT-
bis).  (The  Commission  and  the  Member  States 
agreed at the outset a specific transnational frame-
work and timetable for  implementing the two initia-
tives in two phases, 1995-97 and 1997-99.) 
The response at the local level tc the Initiatives has 
been substantial.  In  the  first  phase.  2,400 projects 
were  launched  under  EMPLOYMENT  (770  under 
NOW,  1,100  under  HORIZON and  500  under 
YOUTHSTART).  while 1,350 projects were accepted 
under the first ADAPT Call  for  Proposals.  A further 
5,000 projects are expected under the second Call 
for Proposals to be launched in January 1997. 
It is estimated that, under EMPLOYMENT and ADAPT, 
over 1.1  million people will directly receive training or 
other forms of support to improve their job prospects 
in an increasingly competitive European labour mar-
ket. 
ENVIREG,  aimed at environmental protection, which 
has funded about 800 projects across Europe, has 
given an impetus to the integration of the environmen-
tal dimension into existing programmes and has led 
to  healthy competition  between  local  and regional 
authorities. 
In  1994, the Commission launched the PESCA Initia-
tive, aimed at helping fishing communities cope with 
the economic and social consequences of decline by 
contributing to the diversification of activity and the 
creation of new jobs. 
Finally,  the  European  Union  established  a  Special 
Support Programme  in  1995 to  help underpin  the 
peace process in Northern Ireland through a variety 
of measures to promote opportunities for reconcilia-
tion between the communities both in the  province 
and in the six border counties in Ireland. This initiative 
has  been  an  opportunity to  make  a  major  break-
through in terms of a raising the Involvement of local 
and community groups. 
Although Community Initiatives reflect considerable 
diversity,  experience  so  far  suggests  that  their 
strengths have  been to foster cooperation and the 
formation of new partnerships,  generate a  spirit of 
experimentation and innovation and encourage the 
involvement  of  the  grassroots  (a  'bottom-up'  ap-
proach) and the wider dissemination of best practice. 
They  have  been  an  important  force  for  European 
integration. 
The  experience acquired during the  first  program-
ming period as well as the first results of the present 
period  suggest that three  of them  in  particular -
INTERREG,  LEADER  and  URBAN  - have  suc-
ceeded in  translating the  intentions of their authors 
into effective action. These initiatives, and the partner-
shi;::>s  which they have been responsible for estab-
lishing,  ha.ve  strengthened the integrated nature of 
local development policies and have had a marked 
effect on the ground, mobilising those concerned into 
action. In the future, they are expected to lead to an 
exchange of experience and know-how in respect of 
projects which can be implemented generally in dif-
ferent parts of the Union. 
JNTERREG,  in  particular,  represents  an  unpre-
cedented example of regional cooperation under 
the Structural Funds, and this will  be developed 
further in the present programming period, while 
the 'bottom-up' approach of LEADER has made it 
possible  to  mobilise  people  in  local  areas  and 
attract private capital, which has had significant 
multiplier effects. In addition, the URBAN Initiative 
has encouraged a  number of Member States to 
implement  a  multi-sectoral  approach  to  urban 
problems and will help problem areas to be inte-
grated into the overall process of economic devel-
opment. 
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As a result. these Initiatives have succeeded in their 
aim of adding value to Community cohesion policies 
as  whole.  maintaining  an  identity which  is  distinct 
without becoming submerged within the mainstream 
programmes. 
Pilot projects 
Pilot  projects  initiated  under  the  Structural  Funds 
promote  a  concerted  approach  to  innovation,  ex-
perimentation and diffusion of know-how across re-
gions in Europe. They have demonstrated the scope 
for mobilising individuals and organisations at local 
level in both the public and private sectors with limited 
resources as well as the potential of partnerships for 
development and employment creation. 
Since  1984,  the  Commission  has  co-financed  the 
creation of European Centres of Business and Inno-
vation (EC  BIC) in assisted areas of the Union and 
their  formation  into  a  network within  the  European 
Business Network (EBN).  These  centres,  which are 
the product of local partnership, provide to innovative 
SMEs in the areas in question a wide range of essen-
tial  services,  from the  identification of potential new 
ideas to their concrete development. 
Since  1996,  the  TACIS  programme  provides  the 
possibility for cross-border cooperation, including a 
linking with the INTERREG programme, with a budget 
of 30 million ECU. 
5.4 The delivery system: 
a force for change 
An important part of the gains from cohesion policies 
stems  from  the  delivery system  developed  for  the 
implementation of structural intervention. The system 
has its origins in the 1980s, notably, in the Integrated 
Mediterranean  Programmes  in  France,  Italy  and 
Greece and in a small number of integrated regional 
policy programmes in the UK and the  Netherlands. 
Lessons learned from these innovative programmes 
formed the nucleus of the reform of structural policies 
in  1988 and the system has been further developed 
since then. 
The  delivery  system  has  a  number  of  key  ele-
ments: 
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•  it is targeted  on particular types of activity, particu-
lar localities or social groups; 
•  it is based on medium-term programmes, respon-
sive to, often locally-defined, needs; 
•  it  is supported by systems of financial manage-
ment and control and encourages the  develop-
ment of an evaluation culture; 
•  it is driven by subsidiarity by involving those who 
benefit from the programme, for whom this repre-
sents the most concrele expression of the Euro-
pean Union in practice; 
•  it  has a leverage effect through  attracting addi-
tional resources from the public and private sec-
tors. 
Targeting 
By  targeting  resources  and  attention  on  particular 
types of investment and on particular areas and social 
groups, the delivery system increases the effective-
ness  of  European  structural  policies.  Experience 
since 1989 has shown the virtues of focusing on an 
objective measure of need and confirmed the import-
ance of comparability across the Union and of adopt-
ing  a  common  set  of  criteria  for  determining  the 
allocation of finance. 
This  has  important  side-effects.  It  ensures  that 
policies are genuinely European in scope and that the 
amount of European aid is determined in  the  same 
way whether  policies  are  being  applied  in  Bilbao, 
Birmingham or Berlin. It also helps minimise the infla-
tionary effect of expenditure  since  the  increase  in 
demand induced is matched by an increase in invest-
ment  and  hence  productive  potential.  This  will  be 
especially important in  the  context of a single  cur-
rency. 
Medlum-tenn strategic programmes 
The  strategic, or 'programming', approach adopted 
under  EU  structural  policies  has  itself  been  an 
innovation for many Member States since its introduc-
tion  in  1989.  It  is  an  approach  with  three  distinct 
phases: the diagnosis of problems, the formulation of 
a strategy and the definition of concrete objectives to 
be achieved. As such, it has been recognised as an 
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in  some  cases,  it  has  been  adopted  by  Member 
States for implementing their own policies. It has also 
led  to  some  administrative  reorganisation  in  some 
Member States (a more regionalised approach in the 
UK and Portugal and a more efficiency-oriented ap-
proach in Greece, for example). 
The programming approach has enabled medium-term, 
or  'multi-annual',  development  planning  to  be im-
plemented  and  has  encouraged  the  poorer  Member 
States,  in  particular, to consider not just present policy 
pressures  but  to  plan  for  the  Mure in  a  longer-term 
perspective with guaranteed finance from the Union. 
Above all, perhaps, it has helped encourage a spirit 
of innovation and experimentation in  policy. Experi-
ence has shown that the task of designing and imple-
menting  such  strategies  often  motivates  those 
involved and releases local potential, stimulating the 
development of policy measures tailored to local cir-
cumstances. The  innovative nature of the measures 
implemented can  present a considerable manage-
ment challenge to the Commission and the national 
and regional administrative authorities concerned. 
This  diversity in the  measures undertaken is one of 
the reasons for the number of programmes to tend to 
increase, which itself poses additional management 
problems;  it  remains  an  ongoing challenge for  the 
Commission and Member States to strike the correct 
balance. between the  imperatives of effective man-
agement and innovation. 
Programmes are the means through which different 
European, national and regional structural measures 
are integrated, and there has been marked progress 
in  this  area  since  1989  with  almost  all  European 
regional  policy  programmes  furthering  Community 
policies for industry, training, transport, environmen-
tal  improvement,  research and development, small 
businesses and tourism. 
Financial management, control and evaluation 
The  effectiveness of EU  cohesion  policies requires 
that they be used for the purposes for which they were 
intended. To help achieve this, the Commission has 
attached  top  priority  to  ensuring  that  appropriate 
systems are  in  place in  Member States for  financial 
management and  control. If they are not, the targeting 
of  EU  resources  is  undermined  and  public  con-
fidence in the programmes is eroded. This is particu-
larly important since cohesion policies account for a 
third of the Community Budget. 
Arrangements  for  financial  management  and 
evaluation  emphasise  the  shared  nature  of  re-
sponsibility for policies and for the efficient use of 
resources. The Commission has overall responsi-
bility  for  implementing  the  Community  Budget, 
but, reflect.ng the decentralised nature of the de-
livery system, Member States have the main regu-
latory responsibility for ensuring effective financial 
management and control.  · 
The  prior need  in  this  regard  is  to  have  an  unam-
biguous  understanding of the  respective  responsi-
bilities of the  Commission and the  Member States. 
This  is  currently  underway  through  the  signing  of 
protocols  dividing tasks  and  coordinating  auditing 
schedules and methodology. 
A role for the Commission is to ensure that appropri-
ate systems are in place for effective financial control. 
The Commission makes on-the-spot checks and sys-
tem audits to ensure the efficient use of EU resources. 
Other improvements will be developed in the context 
of the wider exercise inside the Commission (known 
as  Sound  and Efficient Management 2000,  or SEM 
2000) to improve the management of resources. The 
existing  spot  checks  and  system  audits  will  be 
backed up by an improved follow-up of the findings. 
The  exploitation of the opportunities offered by new 
information technology will help in this regard as well 
as in increasing transparency. 
The  cohesion  policies  introduced  after  1988  also 
included provision for  evaluation of measures, both 
ex ante and  ex post.  For many Member States, the 
systematic assessment of results was not a standard 
part of the policy-making process. The Commission 
h3s,  therefore,  been  a force  for  the  diffusion of an 
evaluation  culture,  drawing  on  best  practice  from 
across the Union. 
Evaluation has improved over time. In the first gener-
ation  of programmes  introduced  in  1989,  ex ante 
evaluation  and  the  quantification  of  the  results 
expected  were  inadequate.  This  was  a  serious 
weakness  with  knock-on  effects on  ex post evalu-
ation, which is normally based on this. 
For  the  current  generation  of  programmes,  much 
effort has been made to correct this weakness. Par-
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ticular emphasis has been given to identifying quan-
tified indicators to establish a baseline against which 
the effect of measures can be assessed, as well as 
creating networks of expert support, regular publica-
tions on best practice and case studies. 
Subsidiarity and partnership 
The notion of subsidiarity in  public policy reflects a 
recognition 'f  the virtues of decentralisation, involving 
the  rele~a'lt authorities at  all  levels in the pursuit of 
agreed objectives and the sharing of responsibilities 
for decision-making between central and lower tiers 
of government closer to the grassroots. This is import-
ant,  since it means the involvement of those nearest 
to the problems for which solutions are being sought. 
The  notion of shared responsibility and partnership 
extends to the  social  partners, the precise arrange-
ments for their involvement, together with that of dif-
ferent  levels  of  government,  varying  between 
countries. 
Partnerships  formed  with  the  Commission  have 
played a fundamental  role  in  EU  cohesion  policies. 
By acting  as  a mechanism  for  dialogue  they have 
helped ensure that  political  priorities determined at 
European level  are  transmitted  all  the way down to 
local level. 
Altilough the form of partnership differs between pro-
grammes and Member States, it has proved a robust 
and adaptable means of implementation, at national 
level (in the case of Ireland, for example, under Ob-
jecttve  1  policies)  and  at  local  level  (many  pro-
grammes under the URBAN Initiative being operated 
by local partnerships). It is also adaptable to all types 
of programme (the INTERREG Initiative even requires 
cross-border  partnership)  and  to  different  national 
circumstances. 
The development of a vigorous partnership that is 
genuinely  accountable  helps  ensure  that  pro-
grammes  are  adapted  to  the  needs  of  benefi-
ciaries,  that there  is  support for  policies among 
the people and that a wide range of measures are 
co-financed. 
Leverage 
Programmes financed from the Structural Funds are 
supplemented  by  additional resources from  public 
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and, increasingly, private sources in Member States. 
Indeed, there is a formal requirement that Community 
structural aid should not substitute for national expen-
diture.  Such  leverage  effects  are  often  the  direct 
result of the devolution of policy implementation and 
of  the  mobilisation  of support  from  widely  drawn 
groups of the  population as described above. This 
mobilisation  Is  itself often  reflected  in  greater con-
tributions of matching  finance  coming  from  public 
and private sectors with a correSJ:Onding  improve-
ment in the effectiveness of programmes. Chapter 6 
Ways forward 
6.1  The ongoing need for 
European Union cohesion policies 
Policies  to  promote  solidarity  exist  in  all  Member 
Stc.tes of the Union. There are two major reasons why 
this should be so. 
First.  there  is  a  need to  compensate  for  major 
inequalities in the capacity of regions to generate 
income and in the ability of different social groups 
to compete effectively in the labour market. These 
inequalities tend to dimin1sh only slowly over time. 
Economists have identified many reasons for this, 
in particular. differences in factor endowments (in 
the  skills of the  labour force  or the  provision of 
infrastructure), the  rate of technical progress, or 
the  rate  of  diffusion  of  new  products  and  pro-
cesses.  the  effects  of economies  of  scale  and 
so-called externalities (which arise from the con-
centration of activities in a particular place). trans-
port costs,  imperfections  in  the  competitive 
process and  unequal access to technical know-
how.  All  of these,  especially in  combination, are 
capable of preventing a balanced distribution of 
the gains from trade and economic integration. As 
the evidence of Chapter 2 confirms, distance from 
the centre of economic gravity appears to be one 
of the more convincing explanations for disparities 
in regional income in Europe, but not of unemploy-
ment. 
Secondly, the idea of a 'people's Europe' guarantees 
certain rights to individuals with corresponding obli-
gations  on  the  State.  Neither regional  location  nor 
social  position  are  permitted  to  circumscribe  life-
chances.  ' 
The solidarity policies of the Member States reflect a 
political  desire  to  maintain  the  European  model  of 
society which, as discus  sAd in chapter 1, is based on 
the  social  market  economy.  With  closer  economic 
integration, the European Union shares responsibility 
for  the maintenance of this model of society,  which 
calls for active cohesion policies at European level. 
EU  cohesion policies contribute to the  maintenance 
of  the  European  model  of  society  at  a number  of 
levels. 
At  the  economic level,  they  contribute  to  reducing 
disparities between regions and social groups, allow-
ing more of the population to contribute to economic 
growth. Even though European integration is a histori-
cal  process without precedent, generating substan-
tial overall  economic gains, there has  been the  risk 
that the competitive forces unleashed by the introduc-
tion of the single market could overwhelm some of the 
weaker  parts  of the  Union  and  the  weaker  social 
groups unless they adjust in order to be able to take 
advantage  of  the  new  opportunities.  Unassisted, 
such  adjustments  can  take  an  unacceptably  long 
time to be accomplished, since the starting point is 
the often severely disadvantaged position of the wea-
kest Member States and regions in terms of infrastruc-
ture, productive potential. the capacity for innovation 
and  the  skills  of the  labour force  (chapter  2).  The 
alternative to  assistance  is  large-scale migration of 
labour,  which  is  not  only  socially undesirable  but 
tends to reinforce regional disparities since the most 
skilled and able are likely to be best equipped to find 
a job elsewhere. 
The disparities at European level are much wider than 
those which exist in  any Member State. Moreover, it 
is  in  the  poorer  Member  States  that  budgetary 
115 resources to remedy structural problems and reduce 
disparities tend to be the most scarce. 
At the social level, cohesion policies help to improve 
access to employment, both in  general and  for the 
most  disadvantaged  grou~s. More  than  anything 
else, the  existence of high levels of unemployment 
and the  growing incidence of poverty act to under-
mine the European model of society. Increasing em-
ployment has  become  a top priority  in  the  Union. 
Cohesion policies make a direct contribution to this 
by  promoting  restructuring  and  development  and 
creating durable jobs. In addition, cohesion policies 
explicitly address the equally important issue of who 
takes up those jobs,  by attempting to  equip young 
people, women and those  who have been out of a 
work for  long spells to  compete more effectively for 
employment. 
At  the  political level,  cohesion  policies are  an  ex-
pression of mutual support between Member States. 
They underpin the notion of European solidarity, cre-
ating a new framework of opportunity which is  both 
additional  and complementary to the  national one. 
This is not simply a matter of resource transfer, but a 
Community  approach,  or  method,  which  seeks  to 
make  the  fullest  use  of  the  potential  of  the  Union 
economy as a whole by implementing best-practice 
techniques  and  taking  decisions  as  close  to  the 
grassroots as possible. By involving a wide range of 
people and organisations at regional and local level, 
Community cohesion policies give the most concrete 
expression to the principle of subsidiarity. 
Against  this  background,  the  Commission  remains 
determined  to  maintain,  and  where  possible 
strengthen, the Union's structural policies for promot-
ing the overall harmonious development of the Com-
munity. 
At the same time, cohesion policies must be open to 
critical and continuous appraisal to ensure that they 
are as effective as possible. This chapter addresses 
policy weaknesses and identifies areas for possible 
improvement in the future. Such improvements could 
in  some  degree  already  be  introduced during the 
current programming period, but it is equally import-
ant to begin a reflection on areas for more fundamen-
tal change, which can be addressed in the context of 
future  developments  linked  to  preparations  for  the 
new programming  period  scheduled to  begin after 
1999. 
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The  following  analysis addresses,  first,  ways of in-
creasing the  effectiveness of EU  cohesion policies 
and, secondly, and without prejudging the content of 
future policy, some of the challenges for the future. 
6.2 Raising effectiveness 
Targeting the problems: the 
concentration of resources 
An  appropriate starting point for the analysis is  the 
targeting, or concentration, of resources on the most 
serious problems. Through concentrating resources, 
the Union has been able to mobilise funding to have 
a significant impact on the worst-affected areas and 
social groups. More generally, concentration of sup-
port on physical and human capital has ensured that, 
in all Member States, each ECU from the Community 
is specifically targeted on investment for the future. 
Concentration is,  therefore,  the key principle under-
lying the effectiveness of cohesion policies. 
Enough geographical 
and financial concentration? 
An  excessive dispersal of resources generally limits 
the effectiveness of what is  spent, although there is 
an  inevitable temptation  to  spread resources thinly 
among both regions and social groups. 
So far  as population coverage under Objective  1 is 
concerned, the rule requiring unanimity among Mem-
ber States for the adoption of the list of eligible areas 
makes the rigorous enforcement of economic eligi-
bility criteria more difficult at the  margin (the  Com-
mission proposed majority voting as the general rule 
in  its  submission  to  the  Inter-Governmental  Con-
ference 'Reinforcing political union and preparing for 
enlargement'). Political compromise in 19931ed to the 
inclusion under Objective 1 of 7.4 million people, 8% 
of the total eligible population, living in  regions with 
GOP per head of more than 75% of the Union average 
(ie above the threshold for eligibility established in the 
relevant  regulation).  The  regions  in  question,  how-
ever, did have GOP per head well below the average 
and some were suffering a trend decline in economic 
performance as confirmed by subsequent data (see Chapter 6 Ways forward 
chapter 2). Some regions have since been successful 
in catching up, moving from below to above the 75% 
threshold over recent years. 
The system has largely succeeded in achieving con-
centration on the most serious problem areas in two 
programming periods. If this is to remain the case, it 
may have to be re-examined in the future. 
As  regards financial  allocations under Objective  1, 
some of the variation in aid intensity (Union funding 
per head) between Member States reflects the appli-
cation  of  objective  criteria.  Some  of the  variation, 
however,  reflects  the  'weight of the  past'.  In  other 
words, it has proved difficult to remove inertia entirely 
from  the  system  in  order  to  adjust  allocations  to 
changes in  objective needs, although in  conditions 
where the sums involved are large it is also desirable 
to avoid abrupt changes. Overall, the EU funding per 
head in Objective 1 areas has increased by around 
one-third  in  real  terms  between  programming 
periods. 
Under Objective 2,  16.4% of the Union's population 
lives in currently eligible areas, only slightly above the 
15% established as a guideline in the preamble to the 
regulation  (Table 34).  This  is  marginally  below the 
coverage in  the previous period (16.8%). The addi-
tional resources made available to Objective 2 for the 
1994-99 period have, therefore, been  used to raise 
the amount of aid per head. The distribution of finance 
between  Member  States  reflects  objective  criteria 
and the Member States have also carried through a 
similar  methodology  to  allocations  at  the  regional 
level. Just under one-fifth of the population covered 
by Objective 2 is not, however, eligible for assistance 
under national schemes of regional aid. 
Under Objective 5b, B. 1% of the population is curren-
tly in eligible areas, up from 5% in the previous period. 
The  extra resources made available for the  second 
programming  period  have  been  absorbed  by this 
increase  in  coverage,  so  that aid per head has re-
mained  virtually  unchanged  (Table  34).  Even  so, 
choices made in  one or two  Member States meant 
that some of the more populous medium-sized urban 
centres  in  rural  regions  were  not  included,  even 
though they could have  provided a natural location 
for the promotion of new activities (and SMEs), includ-
ing  producer  services,  in  the  development  pro-
grammes.  The  extended  geographical  coverage 
under this Objective in the current period is a reflec-
tion,  in  particular,  of  the  change  in  the  selection 
method for the period 1994-99, and only half of the 
regions eligible under Objective 5b are eligible under 
national schemes of regional aid. 
Objective 6, created on the accession of Nordic Mem-
ber  States  in  1995,  has an  extensive geographical 
coverage but, because  it assists areas of very low 
population  density,  only comparatively few  people 
live in eligible areas - 0.4% of the EU total - while 
aid per head of population is  below that in  Objec-
tive 1. Over 99% of these are covered under national 
regional policies. 
Overall, the present situation is one where just over 
half (50.6%) of the total population is eligible for the 
four regional Objectives of the Structural Funds, while 
4  7%  of  the  population  is  covered  by  regional  aid 
schemes. In view of the need for resources to be of a 
certain amount in order to be effective, the preceding 
analysis suggests that there may be a case for a more 
determined application of the principle of concentra-
tion.  It is essential that under all the regional Objec-
tives, the most serious problems and disadvantaged 
regions are identified and targeted. 
First, as discussed in chapters 3 and 4,  improved 
coordination  between  the  determination of eligi-
bility  under  the  regionalised  Objectives  of  the 
Structural Funds and the decisions on eligibility for 
assistance under Member State regional policy (ie 
derogations  for  regional  aid  under  competition 
policy rules)  may  be  necessary. The  fact that a 
region is eligible for assistance under the Structu-
ral Funds should be one of the criteria for eligibility 
for  national  assistance.  At  present,  7.1%  of the 
population lives in regions which are covered by 
EU  regional  Objectives  but  not  by  national  re-
gional policy, while 3.2% lives in regions eligible 
for the latter but not the former. More coordination 
would enable Member States and the Commission 
to address these inconsistencies. 
Secondly, the intensity of EU  aid, in terms of ex-
penditure per head, may have to be more finely 
tuned to the position in eligible regions to ensure 
that the  resources made available reflect objec-
tive needs. This, however, needs to be balanced 
against the  need to avoid abrupt changes in  the 
level  of financial  aid to Member States  and  re-
gions.  This  also  would  imply that when  lists of 
assisted regions are reviewed, there should be a 
117 phasing  out  of  assistance (rather than  it  being 
brought to a sudden halt). 
Concentration  is  equally  an  issue  for  the  non-
regional Objectives. For Objective 3, the difficulty 
has been to establish a real policy dialogue to help 
focus  the  efforts at  the Union level on  the  most 
vulnerable groups in  the  labour market so  as  to 
increase the effectiveness of assistance and raise 
its visibility. In the case of the recently introduced 
Objective  4,  the  desired  concentration  of 
assistance on SMEs and the involvement of other 
social and business partners have been difficult 
to achieve in practice. 
More pertormance orientation? 
In addition to greater concentration, a more focused 
application of the Structural Funds results might also 
increase their effectiveness. This was an issue taken 
up by experts in the Commission report Stable Money 
- Sound Finance  which  suggested  a  number  of 
possible modifications to the operation of the Struc-
tural Funds,  including avo1ding  fixed  a priori alloca-
tions to Member States, with more incentives for the 
achievement of verifiable targets. Targets suggested 
concerned  project  realisation,  the  overall  improve-
ment made in structural adJustment and the achieve-
ment of macroeconomic policy aims. 
But  performance  orientation  in  these  terms  has its 
limits. The allocation of resources must focus on those 
most in need, whether regions or social groups. As 
shown  in  chapters  2  and  3,  social  and  economic 
disparities remain substantial, even if there has been 
significant progress in narrowing them in some cases, 
and  their  reduction  must  be  the  overriding  aim.  A 
fundamental  requirement  is  that  any  performance 
criteria should only be related to the achievement of 
cohesion objectives and not to other ends. 
The  essential  precondition  for  increased  perfor- · 
mance orientation is the existence of clearly defined 
cohesion objectives, which today may need to take 
employment  developments  into  account.  Other 
requirements include more efficient financial control, 
a renewed drive against fraud and irregularities and 
further  improvements in  monitoring and  evaluation. 
The Commission has already made 'sound and effi-
cient management' one of its major political priorities 
during  the  present  period  and,  for  the  Structural 
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Funds  in  particular,  progress  has  already  been 
achieved.  Nevertheless,  the  impending  review  of 
structural  policies  tor  the  period  after  1999  is  an 
appropriate occasion to consolidate and deepen the 
progress already made. 
Any  move  away  from  fixed  a  priori allocations  to 
Member State would have to be treated with caution. 
On the one hand, it is probably true that the quality of 
programmes could be improved by more competition 
for scarce public resources.  On  the other hand, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, medium-term pro-
grammes  can  only  be  developed against  a back-
ground  of  predictability  and  stability  and  those 
involved in  the planning process must have a clear 
idea of the amount of Community financial assistance 
they can expect. The option of allocating resources 
to Member States only after they have submitted their 
plans seems unrealistic for largely practical reasons. 
Nevertheless, while the point is  a sensitive one, the 
advantages and disadvantages of some  additional 
degree of flexibility in  the  allocation of resources to 
take  account  inter alia  of changing  circumstances 
would seem to merit further consideration. 
The absorption issue 
Successful  concentration  of  f1nancial  support  de-
pends on Member States being able to take  up the 
funds.  There  is  little  point  in  making the  resources 
available if for one reason or another Member States 
are  unable to  make  use  of  them.  Absorption  con-
straints in countries and regions arise for three main 
reasons: 
•  physical absorption problems arise where the re-
ceiving authorities do not have the administrative 
capacity to absorb the  funds on offer, to identify 
suitable programmes and projects and to manage 
their implementation; 
•  budgetary  absorption  problems  arise  where, 
under  matching  funds  arrangements,  Member 
States are unable to raise the counterpart finance 
because of budgetary constraints; 
•  macroeconomic absorption difficulties potentially 
take various,  but generally less tangible,  forms, 
such  as  inflation, the  crowaing out of private  in-
vestment  by  EU-funded  public  expenditure,  an 
unduly large growth in imports and the leakage of 
transfers from investment into consumption. Chapter 6 Ways forward 
These are far from being theoretical constraints. The 
implementation of cohesion policies has sometimes 
encountered  significant  absorption  problems  (see 
European  Commission  (1996):  Seventh  Annual 
Report on the Structural Funds,  pp 202-206). Some 
easing of these might be achieved by more flexible 
financial procedures. The absorption problem, how-
ever. needs to be considered with the issue of addi-
tionality, taking into account the general context of a 
more restrictive budgetary policy environment within 
which structural policy has to operate. 
Addltlonallty 
In the existing system, the principle of additionality is 
one of the important means for achieving better per-
formance.  It  is  intended to ensure  that Community 
support for economic development does not replace 
national government efforts. On the other hand, addi-
tionality has not been made a compulsory element of 
the Cohesion Fund as one of its prime purposes is to 
help the Member States concerned meet budgetary 
targets  for  satisfying  the  conditions  for  monetary 
union. 
While  there have  been improvements in the current 
programming period on  the  verification of addition-
ality  (a  clearer  and  more  practical  definition  was 
included  in  the  rev1sed  regulations),  it  has  been  a 
complicated methodological task. 
It might be argued in the extreme that the principle of 
addiiionality  is  outdated  in  view  of  the  overriding 
concern today for budget discipline. But experience 
has shown that the means chosen for reducing bud-
get deficits is often  determined by political expedi-
ency, resulting in cuts in public investment rather than 
in  current  expenditure,  with  detrimental  effects  on 
growth, running counter to the essential aim of Union 
support. 
The  principle  of  additionality  protects  against  the 
substitution of Union aid for national spending. In the 
light of experience gained in the current programming 
period,  the  methodology could  be  adapted,  taking 
account, for example, of demands by some Member 
States that verification should be related to the relative 
scale of Union assistance in the  programmes under 
cons ide ration. 
Another possibility could be that the Commission 
would  be concerned  to  ensure  that  appropriate 
leverage exists in relation to Union financing and 
less concerned as to the source of finance within 
Member States.  possibly taking into account pri-
vate sources. 
This  should  not  pre-empt  a  reflection  on  other 
possible ways of increasing Member State invol-
vement and their  responsibilities  for  ensuring  a 
successful  outcome  from  the  implementation of 
structural policies. 
Better financial engineering 
With tight constraints on public finance, a combi-
nation of increased use of  loans and greater pri-
vate sector participation could provide additional 
resources for cohesion policies. 
In  financing  development  programmes,  the  bal-
ance between grant aid and other sources of fund-
ing remains an  important issue. Greater recourse 
to  loans  would  contribute  to  introducing  market 
discipline and  stimulating  more  efficiency while 
lowering  some  of  the  costs ot failure  involved in 
financing  projects largely or  exclusively  through 
grants. Where projects are revenue generating, it 
seems  appropriate to  increase the  scale of loan 
finance.  Where  revenue  returns  are  very  long-
term, which is  perhaps more likely to be  the case 
in the poorer countries, the scope for loan finance 
(and private capital) may be more limited. 
The experience of the European Investment Bank 
(EIB)  suggests  that  a  new  balance  needs  to 
be  struck  between  grants  and  loans,  since,  in 
particular  cases,  EIB  activities  seem  to  have 
been limited by the (too) ready availability of EU 
grants. 
Future  improvements  should  seek  to  raise  the 
level of involvement of EIB and other loans as well 
as  the guarantees and equity participation of the 
European Investment Fund, and to deepen private 
sector  involvement  through  public-private  part-
nerships. The latter implies a more systematic use 
of the  seed-capital  and  development-capital 
funds available in the regions. some of which have 
been  created  or  supported  by  the  Structural 
Funds  themselves,  while  not  precluding  an  on-
going search for  other innovative approaches to 
financing programmes. 
119 Overly complex programming 
procedures? 
As  discussed above, the strategic, or programm-
ing,  approach  adopted  under  EU  structural 
policies  has  been  a  key  aspect of the  delivery 
system.  Since  the  first  programmes  were  intro-
duced in  1989, the difficulties encountered do not 
concern the principle itself,  but there have been 
some  teething  problems  in  practice,  while  the 
process  remains  overly  complex  in  certain 
respects. 
When the first programmes were adopted, the exer-
cise was affected by shortage of time, which meant 
that in  some  cases the  Community Support Frame-
works  were  composed  of  a  series  of  loosely  con-
nected  proposals  for  discrete  action.  Steps  were 
taken  in  the  second  programming  period,  which 
began  in  1994,  to  improve the  preparatory  phase, 
notably through  a more  systematic identification of 
regional strengths and weaknesses,  a more careful 
reflection on the strategic priorities to tackle problems 
and on their coherence and a fuller quantification of 
the objectives to be achieved. 
In  responding  to  the  procedural  problems,  the 
so-called  Single  Programming  Document  (SPD) 
wE.s introduced for the current period. Outside the 
main Objective 1 areas, this gave Member States 
the  option  of dispensing with the  procedure  for 
committing resources which formerly required two 
decisions on the part of the Commission-the first 
to approve  the  Community  Support  Framework, 
the second to approve the individual programmes 
within it- in favour of a single decision based on 
a SPD setting out the strategy and the operational 
means of achieving it. 
Further streamlining 
Possibilities  for  further  simplifying and streamlining 
programming procedures need to be examined. First, 
there  is  the  question of the  appropriateness of the 
programming approach in all cases. For certain kinds 
of inteNention, such as those involving small amounts 
of money or which depend on a significant input from 
the grassroots, it may be better to use a global grant 
procedure,  appointing  a  qualified  intermediary  to 
handle implementation,  and  to  reduce the  involve-
ment of the Commission in day-to-day management. 
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For large projects, on the other hand, such as major 
infrastructure  investment,  separate  identification  in 
the  programming  process and individual  appraisal 
might be  called for  (including  consideration of the 
appropriate balance between grant and loan finance). 
Secondly,  in  the  mainstream case where  program-
ming remains appropriate, transparency and admin-
istrative  effectiveness  could  be  enhanced  by 
addressing the various aspects of the problem in  a 
more coherent manner. At present. within an individ-
ual  regional  authority area,  or group of areas,  it  is 
possible  that  different  parts  may  be  eligible  for 
Objectives 2 and Sb, while assistance under Objec-
tives  3,  4 and  Sa  might  also  be  given,  implying  a 
considerable administrative overhead in terms of co-
ordination between the five different Funds and other 
sources of finance. Community Initiatives might also 
add further layers of adm;nistrative complication. 
It,  therefore,  seems  necessary to  examine  existing 
systems to  ensure that there is  an  efficient balance 
between quality and simpltcity. 
In the drawing up of the  programmes, opportunities 
for synergy with the other non-structural policies of the 
Union need to be considered. Coordination is, there-
fore, important to ensure that the lessons learned from 
the  non-structural  policies  can  be  incorporated  as 
appropriate-including the transfer of best practices 
- and  to  ensure  that  the  programmes  maximise 
complementarities. 
Finally, the success of the SPD method depends on 
the way that it is implemented in practice. A smoother 
decision-making process,  avoiding undue delays in 
the  commitment of Community resources, depends 
in part on the Member States undertaking sufficiently 
detailed work in each of the preparatory phases of the 
programming process referred to in chapter 5 above, 
while  the  Commission  must  also  avoid  unjustified 
delays in its approval procedures. 
Community Initiatives 
Actions  under  Community  Initiatives  are  aimed  at 
pursuing common  aims,  encouraging experimenta-
tion and innovation in areas which otherwise tend to 
be  insufficiently  emphasised  in  the  programmes. 
They  include  Initiatives  to  promote  cross-border, 
transnational  and interregional cooperation,  as  well 
as those which address.European problems, such as Chapter 6 Ways forward 
the crisis affecting urban areas or the restructuring of· 
the European defence industry. 
At  the  same  time,  there  remains  a  perception 
that  the  effort  has  been  dispersed  across  an 
excessively  large number of  Initiatives,  often  in 
response to  specific demands from the Member 
States, implying a need to define more restrictively 
their fields of intervention. In addition, experience 
and best practice developed through the  Initia-
tives need to be transferred more systematically 
and  effectively than  at  present  into  mainstream 
policies  and  programmes.  Finally,  procedures 
require  simplification  and  the  Initiatives  need 
to  be  made  more  amenable  to  transnational 
cooperation between countries, regions and local 
areas. 
Subsidiarity and partnership 
In  the  implementation of EU  structural  policies,  the 
major expression  of the  principle  of subsidiarity  is 
the operation of partnerships in the Monitoring Com-
mittees. However, these have only just begun to con-
tribute  creatively  to  problem  analysis  and  to  the 
assimilation  and  local  implementation  of  new 
Community gu1delines and priorities (in areas such as 
employment,  the  environment  and  equal  oppor-
tunities). The situation is improving rapidly in certain 
Member States  where  Monitoring Committees have 
seized  the  initiative,  organising  separate  but com-
plementary initiatives of their own, improving the dis-
semination  of  information,  undertaking  rigorous 
problem analysis and so on. 
A basic need is one of information on the functioning 
of partnerships in  practice and, by analysing this,  it 
should be possible to identify best practices and their 
transferability. 
In  some  cases,  where  partnerships  are  less  de-
veloped, it would be helpful to the operation of the 
Monitoring Committees to make a distinction be-
tween decision-making and consultative partners, 
the  former  consisting  of the  authorities  respon-
sible for co-financing, the latter being mainly the 
social  partners· and  representatives  of  interest 
groups. This  might allow the  political authorities 
responsible  to  take  a  more  objective  and  con-
structive view of the latter and embrace their invol-
vement more whole-heartedly. 
Finally, there might be other ways of increasing the 
commitment of the partners to the overall aims of EU 
cohesion policies, in particular, by greater efforts to 
explain the Union's priorities,  more  informal oppor-
tunities for dialogue (on the lines of the informal work-
ing group set up by the social partners in 1995) and 
pilot  actions  in  conjunction  with  certain  national 
and/or regional  authorities  (eg  territorial employ-
ment pacts). 
6.3 Policy Challenges 
Priority concerns for current 
Structural Funds programmes 
In  their  effort to  reduce  regional  disparities and  to 
promote economic and social cohesion, Community 
structural  policies  seek  to  address  the  political 
priorities of the European Union and the main preoc-
cupations  of  its  citizens.  The  actions  under  these 
policies are, therefore, selective rather than 'catch-all' 
-and  a complement to Member States' own actions. 
The policies have proved to be flexible and adaptable 
in  response to changing circumstances and recog-
nise that there can be no single remedy for all struc-
tural problems and all circumstances. 
Mobilising the required effort on the part of the Mem-
ber States in pursuit of the main priorities is an addi-
tional issue. In procedural terms, one way of ensuring 
that  agreed EU  priorities  are  better  understood  is 
through the  issuing of guidelines in  advance of the 
preparation of the  plans. This has been a feature of 
the preparation for Objective 2 for the period 1997-
99, and experience suggests that its generalisation to 
other Objectives may be worthwhile. 
During the current programming period, four priority 
areas  have  emerged  which  EU  cohesion  policies 
have specifically sought to address: employment cre-
ation, competitiveness, environmental protection and 
equality of opportunity between the sexes. 
Employment 
The fight against unemployment and the creation of 
new jobs to provide work for over  18  million unem-
ployed is an overriding priority for the European Union 
and  the  Member  States.  The  1993  White  Paper 
121 stressed an approach which combined an emphasis 
on developing the competitiveness of the European 
economy  with  a  renewed  search  for  employment 
opportunities  in  growth  sectors  including  those  in 
non-traded activities at the local level in the cultural, . 
social and environmental fields. 
The Essen European Council in  1994 took up these 
ideas and identified five main priority areas for  short 
to  medium-term  action  to  increase  employment 
through  coordinated  multi-annual  programmes.  Of 
these, four - promotion of investment in vocational 
training,  increasing  the  employment  intensity  of 
growth, improving the effectiveness of labour market 
policy  and  strengthening  measures  to  help  those 
particularly affected by unemployment - fall  within 
the scope of the Structural Funds. The Madrid meet-
ing of the European Council underlined 'the mutually 
beneficial  effects  of  greater  coordination  of  the 
Union's economic and structure.! policies'. 
EU  cohesion  policies  have  helped  to  focus  more 
attention on  employment and Member States  have 
increased the  importance attached to job creation. 
The Structural Funds play an important role in promot-
ing employment; not only do they boost demand for 
goods and services in recipient regions in the short-
term but.  by raising economic potential and improv-
ing  the  skill  level  of the  work  force.  they  provide 
support  for  the  creation  of durable  jobs  over  the 
long-term. It is within such a time-frame that the major 
part of the contribution of the Funds to employment 
growth must be expected. This applies to Objective 
1 regions, where policies address the persistence of 
major  gaps  in  basic  infrastructure  endowments. 
These contribute to short-term job creation during the 
construction phase while the fact that the  individual 
projects are generally part of a coherent development 
strategy geared to competitiveness and growth which 
is sustainable and, ultimately,  self-sustaining, helps 
to ensure that they contribute to longer  -term, durable, 
jobs.  As  discussed  above,  the  results  of  macro-
economic model simulations for Objective 1 regions 
and the  global  estimates  for  Objectives  2  and  5b 
suggest that the effects on employment are substan-
tial. 
The Structural Funds promote job creation in anum-
ber of other ways. Aid to SMEs is an important aim in 
many programmes, and these are the major source 
of private sector employment in the EU. Promotion of 
tourist-related projects leads to an inflow of spending 
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power and the creation of local jobs. Supporting the 
adaptation of workers to industrial change helps to 
develop a preventive  rather than  a purely reactive 
appmach to  saving jobs. Training the  unemployed 
not only gives them a better chance of a job but helps 
to  create a pool of skilled labour and expands the 
human resource potential of the  EU  as  a whole  by 
integrating those who were  previously excluded.  In 
addition, by promoting indigenous development. EU 
policies have helped to  create self-sustaining local 
economies, including those in rural areas, providing 
employment in social, cultural, commercial and craft 
activities which are  not affected by global competi-
tion. 
The  effects  of  recession.  and  economic  changes 
more generally, mean that reinforcing the job creation 
aspect of EU structural policies must remain a priority. 
To  this  end,  the  Commission  has  proposed (in  its 
Communication  'Community  Structural  Assistance 
and Employment') to use available margins of flexi-
bility within the programmes for the period up to 1999 
to increase the rate of job creation of expenditure, by 
offering support to the main sources of employment 
- the  SMEs  - and  promoting new sources of job 
opportunities. 
Meanwhile,  the  Heads  of  State  meeting  at  the 
European Council  in  Florence  in  June  1996  invited 
Member States, on a Commission proposal, to imple-
ment coordinated actions at the  local  level  specifi-
cally  focused  on  new  employment  (Employment 
Pacts). A number of areas or cities which could par-
ticipate in pilot projects in 1997 were agreed. 
Competitiveness 
One of the main contributions of structural policies is 
to  rais~  the competitiveness of structures of produc-
tion. As explained in  Chapter 1,  improving competi-
tiveness is not a euphemism for uncertainty and job 
insecurity.  On  the  contrary,  increasing  productivity 
and competitiveness is part of the process by which 
economies generate increasing wealth over time to 
raise living standards and the quality of life. Compe-
titiveness is not, therefore, an end in itself but a means 
of consolidating the European model of society. 
Structural policies contribute to raising the productiv-
ity of both labour and capital by increasing efficiency 
and reducing costs.  Investment in  upgrading infra-
structure,  including  th~ investment  forming  part  of Chapter 6 Ways forward 
trans-European networks, improves accessibility and 
reduces distance costs for business. Assistance to 
the private sector is designed to stirrulate innovation 
and to support investment in new capital equipment. 
EU  policies attach priority to efforts to support RTD. 
especially to encourage product and process inno-
vation  in  SMEs  where the finance required is more 
limited. Combined with efforts to improve the skills of 
individual workers  through training, this raises  pro-
ductive potential. This is supported by modern think-
ing in regional economics which stresses the role of 
these  'endogenous factors',  emphasising the need 
for the transfer of knowledge and know-how to weaker 
regions and the promotion of innovation. 
As  a  result.  the  links  between  competitiveness. 
growth  and  employment  creation  are  being made 
more explicit. Regions which succeed in raising their 
productivity and increasing their cost advantage will 
be  more competitive  by deftnition,  which  is  a pre-
condition for further growth and employment creation. 
Competitiveness  is  not  only a  matter  of  costs  but 
involves other dimensions. In particular, the develop-
ment  of  a  solid  SME  base  - a  priority  under  EU 
structural policies - appears to be central  to  long-
term competitiveness, although there are many exter-
nal economic factors as well as social and institutional 
ones which affect their performance. 
Environmental protection 
The impact of the Structural Funds on the environment 
and their coherence with the Union's environmental 
policy, is one of the most closely monitored aspects 
of their activity. As the Commission has emphasised 
(COM (95) 509), development has both positive and 
negative effects on the environment, but the environ-
ment itself is a major factor for regional development. 
There are many cases, notably in the cohesion coun-
tries  and  in  Eastern  Germany, where  considerable 
resources have been targeted on improving the envi-
ronment, on the grounds that this is a prerequisite for 
sustainable growth. Moreover, as noted above, many 
Objective  2  programmes  include measures  to  im-
prove urban areas blighted by the dereliction left by 
former industrial activities. 
The challenge for structural policies is to ensure that 
economic development is reproducible in that it does 
not exhaust non-renewable resources. All major pro-
ject proposals are now required to include an assess-
ment of costs and benefits including those relating to 
the  environment.  While  specific  effects  can  be 
measured  by changes in  indicators such as water 
quality, air purity, disposal of waste and so on, it is 
much  more  difficult  to  balance.  for  example,  a 
possible increase in water pollution resulting from a 
particular investment project against a reduction  in 
traffic  emissions.  Nevertheless,  the  Commission  is 
committed to developing indicators and environmen-
tal assessment techniques to enable better prediction 
and monitoring of environmental effects of structural 
policy measures. 
Since the Communication on Cohesion Policy and 
the  Environment  (1995),  progress  has  been 
achieved  in  the  implementation  of  measuras 
aimed at  increasing the environmental dimension 
of Structural  and Cohesion Fund measures. Half 
of Cohesion Fund expenditure will be devoted to 
environmental  projects and,  in  its  guidelines on 
the new Objective 2 programmes (1997-99), the 
Commission  has  stressed  the  environment as  a 
main priority. Current studies to identify preventive 
measures and best practice in Objective 2 areas 
will be  used for later programme negotiations. 
As part of the drive to make sustainability a primary 
objective  of  regional  development  strategies  and 
raise the  environmental quality of programmes and 
projects. the  Commission has also intensified its ef-
forts  to  encourage  Member  States  and  regions, 
through the  Monitoring Committees, to adopt better 
environmental  appraisal,  including holding environ-
mental training seminars. 
Equality between men and women 
Cohesion policies are also aimed at reducing inequal-
ities  between men and women,  an objective which 
has  been  reinforced  following  the  policy review of 
1993,  which  explicitly established the  promotion of 
equal  opportunities  as  one  of the  priorities  of the 
Funds. to be taken into account at every stage of the 
process. 
Here cohesion policies appear to be working with the 
grain of labour market trends, since employment for 
women, unlike that for men, increased over the period 
1989-94 while activity rates rose by even more, again 
in contrast to those of men. The increase in both was 
especially marked  in  the  cohesion  countries.  Con-
cerns remain, however, about the quality of some of 
the jobs which hqve been taken up by women. 
123 Under the Social Fund, particular attention has been 
paid to equality of opportunity since 1989, as well as 
to the issue of job quality. This includes actions under 
the Community NOW  Initiative (New Opportunities for 
Women) which was lau·nched in 1991 providing man-
agement training and supporting local  networks of 
small firms.  These  measures,  however, with  limited 
funding,  remain  essentially experimental  in  nature. 
The next step must be to build on the lessons learned 
and to integrate similar types of project into the main-
stream programmes of the Structural Funds. 
A renewed impetus for using more fully the talents of 
women in traditional male activities has resulted from 
the  accession  of  Finland  and  Sweden  to  the  EU. 
Nearly all  of the  measures  in  the  various  Swedish 
programmes pay particular attention to the principle 
of equal opportunities and the participation of women 
in the activities being promoted. These programmes 
contain many examples of highly innovati-..e projects 
helping to realise the potential of women as entrepre-
neu;s, which could be taken up as  best practice in 
other regional development programmes. The Struc-
tural  Funds  play  an  important  role  in  supj:'orting 
measures aimed at  providing a full package of ser-
vices such as information, financial assistance, train-
ing and on-going Consultancy. 
Local or regional business service centres for women 
entrepreneurs could make available a whole range of 
shared services at a lower cost and, at the same time, 
serve as  a forum for encouraging commercial part-
nership. Progress has also been made in other areas, 
such  as  through  the  URBAN Community  Initiative, 
which  explicitly  includes  measures  for  increasing 
equal opportunities. 
Maintaining relevance 
It is  important to ensure that the priorities identified 
remain relevant to the circumstances existing at the 
time. It is inevitable that the current priorities will be 
added to or,  in  some cases, replaced by others, at 
some time in the future, including the ongoing exam-
ination of the relevance of the Objectives of the Struc-
tural Funds themselves. 
The Objectives have already been subject to adjust-
ment at the time of the review in 1993. Then, the major 
innovations were two-fold:  a recognition of the  par-
ticular difficulties facing communities dependent on 
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fisheries and a refocusing of labour market policies 
towards  retraining  workers  in  sectors  undergoing 
technological  change.  With  the  accession  of the 
Nordic countries in 1995, a new Objective 6 to cover 
sparsely-populated  regions  was  created.  The 
general approach has been successful on the whole 
and recognition of its virtues has helped shape the 
regional policies operating in certain countries. 
New challenges continue to emerge. Sectoral change 
driven by new technology has quickened. The  glo-
balisation of economic activity and financial services 
only  serves  to  accelerate  the  rate  at  which  the 
changes occur. It has given rise to new problems and 
new opportunities. 
In Europe, industrial restructuring has taken its course 
and employment in many regions is now significantly 
less  dependent  on  traditional  industries,  such  as 
steel, coal and shipbuilding, than 20years ago. More 
recently, new problems of restructuring have arisen, 
for example, in the defence industry. 
Economic activity depends to  a greater extent than 
before on intangible investment in highly-skilled acti-
vities, such as research and information technology. 
Economies  with  a  highly-trained  labour  force  and 
good communication infrastructure stand to gain from 
these developments. 
This has major geographical and social implications. 
Many of the new activities have requirements which 
could favour the large metropolitan areas and/or the 
most highly qualified workers. They, therefore, pose 
a new set of future challenges to the Union's efforts 
to promote a more even distribution of opportunities 
between regions and to ensure that all social groups 
have access to these. 
Structural  policies will have to respond through ap-
propriate investment in  infrastructure and in  human 
resources to strengthen education and training, facili-
tate adjustment to the demands of new organisation 
of work and to promote regional and local initiatives 
and more effective labour market policies. 
The  development, and the  widening application, of 
information and communication technology (ICT),  is 
also a factor. Again there are geographical and social 
implications. The speed of introduction of ICT varies 
between countries, regions,  sectors, industries and 
enterprises.  The  benefits.  in  the  form  of increased Chapter 6 Ways forward 
prosperity, and the costs, in the form of the burden of 
change,  are unevenly distributed between different 
parts of the Union and social groups. 
ICT  is  also  an  opportunity  to  create  an  inclusive 
society.  It  requires  an  approach which  recognises 
that the  Information Society should be about people 
and that  it  should be used as  a tool  to unlock the 
power of information,  not to create inequalities be-
tween  the  'info  rich'  and the  'info  poor'.  Structural 
policies and policies to develop the  Information So-
ciety need to be more closely integrated and to pro-
mote involvement at local level; territorial employment 
pacts could be  an  important vehicle  to  exploit the 
opportunities. 
Many of the problems of adjusting to change appear 
to  have  fallen  on  some of the  Union's major urban 
areas.  There  is  a very real danger of a further frag-
mentation  within  European  cities,  rising  unemploy-
ment and social exclusion being accompanied by a 
deepening of the  social  divide between haves and 
have-nots. In  some Member States, the urban prob-
lem  is  already  regarded as  the  major  challenge to 
national  cohes1on  and  they  new  integrated  urban 
policies  have  been  designed  and  implemented.  A 
more  focused approach may also be  necessary at 
Union level. 
Meanwhile,  the  rural areas of the Union continue to 
face  the  many handicaps  described  in  chapter  5. 
Seizing  new  opportunities will  depend on  an  inte-
grated, comprehensive rural  development policy. A 
starting  point  is  to  recognise  the  diversity of rural 
circumstances, and of the need for sustainability and 
to develop policy responses which seek to balance 
economic,  social  and  environmental  concerns.  It 
requires partnership between public and private sec-
tors and the involvement of local people and organi-
sations to exploit the particular economic potential of 
individual  areas,  including their natural and cultural 
potential. 
The  urban  and  rural  problems  are  also  part  of  a 
broader question of persisting imbalances in the use 
of European territory as  a whole. This is  reflected in 
severely congested urban centres,  the  absence of 
genuinely  trans-European  communications  and 
energy networks, the unsustainable use of resources 
and depopulation in rural  areas. This results  in  part 
from the problems generated by the historical legacy 
of separate development - and development plan-
ning-within the confines of 15 nation states, which 
has  led  to  inconsistencies  and  imbalances  at  the 
spatial level which have yet to be fully and systemati-
cally addressed. Accordingly, there is a case for more 
resolute  action  in  territorial  planning.  This  is  very 
much the purpose of the actions proposed under the 
new INTERREG 1/c Community Initiative. 
In  this context, there is also a need to pursue more 
concretely the priorities which have been developed 
in past discussions between the Commission and the 
Mernber States in the context of the work on Europe 
2C)()0. These have been elaborated in the 'European 
Spatial  Development  Perspective'  (ESOP)  which 
represents  a  shared  vision  of  the  problems  and 
opportunities,  though  in  accordance with  the  prin-
ciple of subsidiarity its  policy guidelines are  purely 
indicative.  Further  discussions  on  the  ESOP  are 
planned for  1997. 
All  of  these  developments  suggest  that  it  will  be 
necessary to review carefully the priority Objectives 
of the Structural Funds before the next programming 
period  beginning  in  2000  to  make  sure  they  are 
relevant to the problems facing Europe's citizens. 
One of the conclusions to emerge from this report is 
that  rapid  change  has  become  endemic.  Conse-
quently, there  seems to  be  an  unavoidable need to 
adopt more  flexible  approaches  in  the  process  by 
which priorities for structural policies are defined and 
implemented. The existing system permits only occa-
sional and limited review and programming priorities, 
once established, are relatively rigid. 
In  the  current  programming  period  which  ends  in 
1999, the Commission will make the fullest use of the 
margin of flexibility which exists. while fully respecting 
commitments agreed by the European Council meet-
ing in Edinburgh in 1992. The mid-term review in 1997 
and the  financial leeway created by the process of 
adjusting  planned  resources  for  inflation  provide 
some  room  for  manoeuvre  and  an  opportunity  to 
change priorities. The Commission has encouraged 
the Member States to exploit the opportunity in favour 
of the top priority- the fight against unemployment. 
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Conclusions 
The contours of the global economic landscape have 
changed radically over the past two decades. Glcr 
balisation of production  and financial  markets and 
rapid technological progress have led to far-reaching 
changes in national and regional economies, in pat-
terns of employment and in the organisation of work. 
These have had positive effects, although unemploy-
ment  and  greater  social  exclusion  have  become 
structural problems of the Union economy over recent 
years. 
The Union, meanwhile, is entering a critical period in 
the history of its  integration process, with monetary 
union, enlargement and future financing high on the 
agenda. 
In the face of the challenges, the Member States 
and the Union need to work in partnership to help 
the adjustment to new circumstances and to seize 
new opportunities for the benefit of all regions and 
people. 
The  primary  responsibility  for  improving  economic 
and social cohesion falls on the Member States. Ef-
forts to maintain fiscal  discipline and to combat the 
recent rise in public debt need to be continued. This 
should be done in a way which guarantees the main-
tenance of structural programmes which invest in the 
future, while ensuring that incentive systems, fiscal or 
otherwise, favour job creation. 
At the same time, and as recognised by the Member 
States themselves when they signed the Maastricht 
Treaty, the harmonious development of the Union as 
a whole cannot be achieved through national policies 
alone. The Union's structural policies address cohe-
sion  directly while  its  other,  non-structural,  policies 
can also make an important contribution. 
The  most far-reaching of the non-structural policies 
has  been the  Single Market Programme which has 
swept  away  many  of  the  obstacles  to  trade  and 
helped to create an  integrated European economy. 
Fears that this would overwhelm the poorer Member 
States have not been borne out in practice. 
Many of the Union's non-structural policies have the 
potential to make a greater contribution to cohesion. 
For the  market policies of the Common Agricultural 
Policy, the Commission confirms its intention to con-
tinue resolutely the  approach begun with the  1992 
reforms  in  such  a  way  as  to  develop  further  the 
environmental and social aspects in the context of a 
more integrated rural development policy, thus con-
tributing even more effectively to cohesion. 
For EU competition policies: 
•  the Commission has reacted positively to the need 
for more flexibility in the granting of state aids by 
revising the  de  minimis rules  and by creating a 
framework which addresses specific urban prob-
lems.  It is the intention of the Commission to pur-
sue  its  efforts  to  increase  efficiency  and 
transparency in the management of state aids; 
•  permitted aid ceilings for investment in the poorest 
regions of the  Union tend to exceed levels affor-
dable from national budgets, while lower aid ceil-
ings  are  exploited  more  fully  in  richer. Member 
States.  The question arises as to whether a con-
certed effort should  now be  made to  achieve a 
general reduction in expenditure on state aids; 
•  within  the  context  of  the  concentration  of  re-
sources on the most disadvantaged regions, the 
127 Member States and the Commission need to ad-
dress. in partnership, inconsistencies between the 
regions  which are  supported under national re-
gional  policies  and those  which  are  supported 
under Union regional policies. Eligibility for Union 
regional aid should in the future become one of the 
criteria  for  allowing  assistance  under  Member 
States' own regional policies. 
For the Union's RTD policy, which aims at promoting 
European cor1petitiveness through scientific excel-
lence. efforts to develop research activities and ca-
pabilities in  the weaker parts of the  Union must be 
continued. Innovation. mobility of researchers as well 
as  increasing linkages and networks between RTD 
facilities in the  Member States are  particularly valu-
able to structural development. Efforts to ensure the 
widest diffusion of resu:ts and the pursuit of research 
attuned to  the  strengths of the weakest regions are 
also important.  It  is  essential  that the  scientific and 
technological base of the less advanced regions be 
further strengthened as  a major factor in helping to 
close the development gap with the richer regions. 
For Union network policies in transport. telecommuni-
cations  and  energy  supply,  the  basic  need  is  to 
ensure  that  the  whole  Community  shares  in  the 
benefits from innovation and liberalisation: 
•  public service contracts and/or universal service 
obligations must be  maintained and current tar-
gets achieved to ensure that regional and social 
needs  are  met  in  conditions  where  the  market 
alone would not otherwise meet them; 
•  in transport, Union actions for intermodal networks 
must continue to promote sustainable mobility and 
ensure good linkages with local networks to maxi-
mise cohesion benefits. The advantages of pub-
lic/collective transport for cohesion should be fully 
recognised; 
•  in telecommunications; steps may be required to 
promote access on favourable terms to new ser-
vices  in  schools,  hospitals,  libraries.  etc.  Such 
measures should include adequate training and 
provision of the necessary equipment; 
•  in  energy supply, greater effort is  required to in-
crease access to different energy sources in view 
of  the  greater dependence on oil  in  the  poorest 
Member States. 
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For  social  policy,  further  efforts  need to  be  made: 
reducing unemployment and promoting fundamental 
rights,  and,  in  particular,  equal  opportunities,  will 
remain high on the Union's agenda. 
For Union environmental policies, the challenge for the 
cohesion  countries  is  to  strike  a  balance  between 
the push for economic growth and the need to protect the 
environment in order to ensure sustainable development. 
This challenge  can  be met by accompanying environ-
mental measures in the form of an appropriate package 
of fiscal incentives. charges and public expenditure. 
Finally,  in  addition to  improvements  in  the  policies 
themselves,  opportunities  for  synergy  with  the 
Union's cohesion policies need to be more systemati-
cally  identified  and  addressed  in  order to  make  a 
more effective contribution to reducing economic and 
social disparities, while respecting the primary objec-
tives of these policies. 
The starting point for the Union's structural policies must 
be  to  guarantee  long-term  support for  the  poorest re-
g1ons,  in view of the  profound disparities which persist 
between the lagging regions (Objective  1) and the rest. 
Solidarity  with  these  regions  is  an  important  basis  for 
progress  not  just  for  social  reasons,  but  in  order  to 
increase the economic potential of the Union as a whole. 
Catching-up tends to be a slow process, necessitating a 
long-term commitment. 
The problems affecting other parts of the Union must 
also  be  recognised:  rapid  economic and structural 
change,  including  changes  affecting  rural  areas, 
urban deprivation, social exclusion, congestion and 
other territorial imbalances and the unsustainable use 
of  scarce  resources.  The  Union  must  be  ready  to 
support the process of adjustment affecting different 
regions, local communities and social groups, to ac-
celerate their adaptation to new circumstances and 
to promote employment. 
The Union's response to these problems is a strategic 
one which seeks to  promote, in  partnership with the 
Member States,  investment in  new areas of growth 
and  sustainable  development.  to  improve  physical 
and  human  capital  to  raise  competitiveness  while 
helping SMEs  exploit their  full  potential for  job cre-
ation and develop their innovative capacity. 
Effectiveness must be ensured through the quality of 
strategic responses  an.d  by  the  streamlining of the Chapter 7 Conclusions 
delivery system. There are a number of key areas for 
reflection: 
•  scarce resources must be better targeted on the 
most serious problems and problem areas while 
addressing priority concerns which are relevant to 
the prevailing economic circumstances; 
•  a greater degree of performance orientation could 
be introduced into cohesion policies by directly 
linking  performance criteria to the attainment of 
cohesion  objectives.  The  Commission  and  the 
national authorities must cooperate further to im-
prove programming, to increase the transparency 
of policies and to ensure that effective monitoring, 
control and evaluation systems are in place: 
•  more effort should be made to increase the use of 
loans and private sources of finance: 
•  opportunities must be more exhaustively explored 
for networking across regions and across borders 
to attain common goals and to exchange experi-
ence and best practice; 
•  in view of the complexity of present procedures, 
all  avenues for the simplification of the financing 
and Implementation of the measures need to be 
explored; 
•  strengthened subsidiarity should go hand-in-hand 
with widely drawn partnerships, which should play 
an active role in the programmes. 
With  regard  to  the  content  of  the  Structural  Fund 
programmes themselves, four priority concerns have 
emerged which Union cohesion policies have speci-
fically  sought  to  address:  employment  creation, 
which is the overriding priority for the Union and the 
Member States, competitiveness, environmental pro-
tection  and  equality  of opportunity  between  the 
sexes. 
Finally,  structural  policies  as  whole  must  become 
more  flexible  than  at  present in  order to  adapt  to 
changing circumstances and, in particular, to be able 
to  respond to new challenges and opportunities as 
they arise. 
In seeking to prepare the way forward, it is important 
to begin dialogue now. This Report is intended to lend 
structure to this dialogue. It will be used to launch a 
debate involving the other institutions and bodies of 
the  Union  which  are  preparing  their  own  position 
papers on the future. 
It will be complemented by .further initiatives. The first 
is the organisation of a major conference - a Cohe-
sion  Forum - in  Spring  1997 which will  provide a 
platform for a debate on structural policies with rep-
resentativer; of all interested parties. 
Secondly, during 1997, the Commission will complete 
the mid-term review of progress under the different 
Objectives since  1994. This  will  provide an  oppor-
tunity to adapt the programmes to new priorities for 
the remainder of the period, as well as serving as an 
experimental basis for actions to be taken after 1999. 
Meanwhile,  new  strategies  recently  negotiated  for 
Objective 2 (only) for the  period  1997-99 will  be in 
place, which will give the Commission the opportunity 
to see how far they reflect a more focused approach 
to the major priorities which have been agreed with 
the Member States. 
The  Report  should,  therefore.  be seen  as  a further 
contribution to the process of improving the effective-
ness of Union action to promote economic and social 
cohesion. 
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Table 1 
Regional disparities In Income, productivity and unemployment In the Union, 
1983 and 1993 
GOP per head  GOP per per.on employed  Unemployment 
(PPS, EUR1S.100)  (EUR1 S.1 00)  (% labour force) 
1983  1i93  1983  1993  1883  1993 
Between Member States 
Best-off  134.8  160.1  1242  124.3  3.3  2.3 
Worst-off  55.1  63.2  51.3  58.6  17.4  22.3 
Best-off/Worst-off (a)  2.4  2.5  2.4  2.1  5.3  9.7 
Standard Deviation  17.2  12.8  13.5  14.4  3.1  4.6 
(Gini coeffiCient)  (0.089)  (0.059) 
Between Regions 
Best-off  184.0  189.0  398.0  420.4  1.7  3.2 
Worst-off  39.0  37.0  32.1  36.6  22.5  33.3 
Best-off/Worst-off (a)  5.0  4.5  12.4  11.5  13.2  9.0 
10 Best-off  154.0  158.0  146.0  156.0  3.8  3.9 
10 Worst-off  44.0  48.0  49.4  48.6  19.4  26.4 
10 Best-off/Worst-off (a)  3.2  3.1  30  3.2  5.1  6.8 
25 Best-off  140.0  142.0  131.3  130.7  4.8  4.6 
25 Worst-off  53.0  55.0  63.3  63.1  17.2  22.4 
25 Best-off/Worst-off (a)  2.5  2.5  2.1  2.1  3.6  4.9 
Standard Deviation  26.8  27.2  18.0  17.6  4.2  6.0 
(Gini coefficient)  (0.149)  (0.153) 
I•J For unemployment, highest unemployment ratet1owest unemployment rate 
Table 2 
Regional disparities In Income and unemployment by Member State, 1983 and 1993 
GOP per head  Unemployment  Employment 
PPS (EUR15 •  1  00)  Regional disparity  •t. labour force  Regional disparity  Annual 
(standard deviation)  (standard deviation)  e;. change 
1983  1993  1983  1993  1983  1993  1983  1993  1983-93 
8  105.4  113.6  145  17.1  11.1  8.9  0.5  1.4  0.4 
OK  108.6  112 0  - - 8.9  10.1  - - 0.2 
O{W)  116.5  107.9  20.7  24.5  6.9  5.9  1.7  1.9  1.0 
GR  61.9  64.5  6.6  7.6  7.1  8.6  0.7  2.4  0.8 
E  70.5  77.8  12.7  15.3  17.5  22.8  3.9  5.5  0.8 
F  113.4  109.1  27.0  27.9  8.1  11.7  1.6  2.0  0.1 
IRL  63.6  80.2  - 14.0  15.6  - - 0.2 
I  101.6  103.5  23.4  24.6  7.7  10.3  2.8  5.9  0.1 
L  131.9  162.2  - - 3.5  2.7  - - 2.5 
NL  102.7  1036  27.7  11.8  97  6.6  - 0.7  1.9 
A  107.6  112.0  - - 4.1  4.1  - 0.9  0.6 
p  55.1  682  15.0  20.2  7.8  5.7  - 1.9  0.3 
FIN  100.7  91.4  - - 6.3  17.5  - 2.2  -1.8 
s  112.3  98.2  - - 3.9  95  1.4  1.1  -0.4 
UK  98.7  98 9  18.4  19.0  11.1  10.5  3.6  2.4  0.6 
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Table 3 
Income distribution and poverty by Member State 
Adjusted wage ahare <•l  Pei"SSnnlllncome  % population living below poverty line (bl 
(%GDP)  distribution (Ginl coeff.) !bl 
1983  1993  urty1HO.  late 1880.  Reference yeara  early 1980a  late1980s 
B  76.5  73.1  0.228  0.235  1978(79)-87(88)  5.5  6.6 
DK  752  69.5  - - 1981-87  4.2  4.9 
D  72.3  68.7  - - 1983-88  10.9  11.2 
GR  74 7  64.5  - - 1982-88  18.5  19.9 
E  75.5  67.9  - - 1980-90  18.7  17.3 
F  76.0  68.0  0.297  0.296  1984(85)-89  13.2  14.9 
IRL  80.8  71.9  0.3~  - 1980-87  18.4  15.8 
I  74.2  71.4  0.310  - 1985-88  19.6  22.0 
L  73.4  73.5  0.238  - 1988  - 9.2 
NL  69.3  67.1  0.247  0.268  1980-88  5.0  6.2 
A  72.4  69.5  - - - -
p  73.7  64.8  - - 1980-89  27.3  26.5 
FIN  72.2  69.6  0.207  0.215  - -
s  73.9  72.5  0.199  0.220  - -
UK  71.8  73.8  0.270  0.304  1985-88  14.3  17.2 
(•J Compensat1on of employees as a "  of GOP at factor cost. adjusted for self-employment 
{b) See box for data definitions 
Table 4 
Growth of GOP per head in the cohesion countries, 1983-95 
GR  E  IRL  p  EUR4  EUR11  EUR15 
Annual growth rate  1983  0.4  2.2  -D.2  -D.2  1 5  1. 7  1.7 
In GOP(%)  1984  2.8  1.5  4.3  -1  9  1.4  2.5  2.3 
1985  3.1  2.6  3.1  2.8  2.7  2.5  2.5 
1986  1.6  3.2  0.3  4.1  2.9  2.9  2.9 
1987  -D.5  5.6  4.7  5.9  4.7  2.7  2.9 
1988  4.5  5.2  4.3  55  5.1  4.1  4.2 
1989  3.8  4.7  6.1  5.3  4.7  3.3  3.5 
1990  0.0  3.7  7.8  46  3.6  2.9  2.9 
1991  3.1  2.3  2.2  23  2.4  1.4  1.5 
1992  0.4  0.7  3.9  1.1  0.9  0.9  0.9 
1993  -1.0  -1.2  3.1  -1.2  -0.9  -D.7  -D.7 
1994  1.5  2.1  6.7  08  2.1  2.8  2.7 
1995  2.0  3.0  8.6  2.5  3.2  2.3  2.4 
1983-1993  1.8  3.0  3.9  28  2.9  2.4  2.5 
1983-1995  1.8  3.0  4.5  2.6  2.8  2.4  2.5 
Annual population  1983-1993  0.5  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.2  0.4  0.4 
growth(%)  1983-1995  0.5  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.2  0.8  07 
1983  61.9  70.5  63.6  55.1  66.2  107.4  100.0 
GOP per head (PPS)  1988  59.6  72.4  65.0  56.5  67.4  107.2  100.0 
EUR15=100  1993  64.5  77.8  80.2  68.2  74.2  105.3  100.0 
1995  64.3  76.2  89.9  68~  73.8  105.4  100.0 
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Table 5 
GOP per head In richest and poorest regions In the Union, 1983 and 1993 
(GOP per heed In PPS, EUR15 •  1  00) 
1983  1993 
Regions  GOP  R•nk  Regions  GOP  ~nk 
Hamburg (D)  184  1  Hamburg (D)  189  1 
lie de France (F)  168  2  Reg.Bruxelles-Cap./Brussels Hfdst.Gew.(B)  183  2 
~g.Bruxelles-Cap./Brussels Hfdst.Gew.(B)  165  3  lies de France  163  3 
Wien (A)  151  4  Darmstadt (D)  164  4 
Bremen (D)  149  5  Luxembourg (L)  162  5 
Darmstadt (D)  149  6  Wien (A)  161  6 
Greater London (UK)  144  7  Oberbayem (D)  158  7 
Oberbayern (D)  140  8  Bremen (D)  154  8 
Stuttgart (D)  138  9  Greater London (UK)  144  9 
Luxembourg (L)  135  10  Stuttgart (D)  141  10 
Highest 10  154  Highest 10  158 
Ahvenanmaa.Jiand (FIN)  133  11  Antwerpen (B)  137  11 
Stockholm {S)  132  12  Grampian {UK)  134  12 
Uusimaa {FIN)  131  13  Lombardia (I)  132  14 
Lombardia (I)  131  14  Valle d'Aosta {I)  131  15 
Grampian (UK)  130  15  Karlsruhe (D)  127  16 
Berlin {D)  130  16  Mittelfranken (D)  127  17 
Valle d"Aosta (I)  128  17  Emlia-Romagna (I)  127  18 
Emilia-Romagna (I)  128  18  Ahvenanmaa/land (FIN)  127  19 
Antwerpen (B)  126  19  Salzburg (A)  125  20 
Dusseldorf (D)  125  20  Trenlino-Aito Adige (I)  125  21 
Karlsruhe (D)  124  21  Dusseldorf (D)  123  22 
Mittelfranken (D)  124  22  Liguria (I)  122  23 
Trentino-Aito Adige (I)  119  23  Lazio (I)  121  24 
Salzburg (A)  118  24  Friuli-Venezia Giulia (I)  119  25 
Noord-Holland (Nl)  118  25  Stockholm (S)  119  26 
Highest 25  140  Highest 25  142 
~ores  (P)  39  1  Guadeloupe (F)  37  1 
Guadeloupe (F)  40  2  A<;ores (P)  42  2 
Extremadura (E)  43  3  Alentejo (P)  42  3 
Madeira (P)  43  4  Madeira (P)  44  4 
Voreio Aigaio (GR)  43  5  Reunion (F)  47  5 
Centro(P)  43  6  lpeiros (GR)  47  6 
Guyane (F)  44  7  Centro (P)  49  7 
Alentejo {P)  45  8  Voreio Aigaio (GR)  50  8 
Reunion (F)  45  9  Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (D)  52  9 
Norte {P)  46  10  Martinique (F)  52  10 
Lowest 10  44  Lowest 10  48 
Ceuta y Melilla (E)  48  11  ThOringen (D)  52  11 
lpeiros {GR)  50  12  Sachsen (D)  53  12 
Algarve (P)  50  13  Sachsen-Anhalt (D)  54  13 
Martinique (F)  54  14  Dytiki Ellada (GR)  55  14 
Andalucia {E)  55  15  Ex1remadura {E)  55  15 
Ionia Nisia (GR)  56  16  Ionia Nisi a {GR)  56  16 
Dytiki Ellada (GR)  56  17  Guyane (F)  57  17 
Dytiki Makedonia (GR)  57  18  Brandenburg (D)  57  18 
Castilla-la Mancha {E)  57  19  Kriti(GR)  58  19 
Thessalia (GR)  57  20  Andalucia {E)  58  20 
Kriti (GR)  58  21  Algarve (P)  59  21 
Kentriki Makedonia (GR)  58  22  Thessalia (GR)  59  22 
Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki (GR)  59  23  Galicia {E)  60  23 
Galicia (E)  61  24  Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki (GR)  60  24 
Calabria {I)  63  25  Calabria {I)  61  25 
Lowest 25  53  Lowest 25  55 
German new Ltlnder: no data for 1983 
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Table 6 
lndlaatara tor agricultural, Industrial and eervlce regions 
emplorment  PopW.tlon  GDP  Unemployment 
Reglona moat  ,.  toall  AnnUal%  miHion  hlblkm
2  PPSper  Annual%  %1985  %point 
dependent on tal:  '"'ptoyment  c:baftge  hMd  change  change 
'  1.3  1813-83  1113  1183-83  1983-93 
Agriculture  27.4  0.3  43.4  91  66  22  17.1  4.3 
lnduatry  43.9  0.9  86.7  327  109  2.3  8.3  -1.0 
BeiVIoa  68.8  0.7  88.5  786  116  2.4  10.1  1.6 
EUR15  - 0.5  369.0  116  100  2.5  10.7  0.9 
(~ Defined as the 20" tlf regions with the highest shN6 of  employment in the relevant sector In 1983 
Table 7 
Disparities In GOP per head In PPS by region within Member States, 1983·93 
(EUR15 •  100, atandllrd deviation) 
1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  11UI9  1990  1991  1992  1993 
B  14.5  16.2  16.3  14.9  15.0  15.2  15.2  15.4  15.9  16.3  16.8 
o (axel new Under)  20.9  21.5  21.7  22.4  22.2  21.6  21.7  22.9  24.5  25.0  23.4 
D (lncl new Linder)  39.3  36.8  32.7 
GR  6.6  6.9  6.5  6.6  6.9  6.9  6.3  6.2  7.0  7.3  7.7 
E  12.7  12.5  13.0  13.8  14.0  14.0  15.0  15.0  16.0  16.0  15.3 
F  26.7  25.6  26.7  26.1  28.4  28.8  28.9  29.2  30.2  28.2  27.7 
23.4  23.5  24.7  25.3  25.2  25.9  26.1  26.0  25.0  25.4  24.8 
NL (lncl Gronlngen)  27.4  29.6  32.3  19.4  12.8  11.6  10.8  10.7  12.0  11.7  11.8 
NL (axel Gronlngen)  12.4  12.5  12.3  11.9  10.8  11.0  10.3  9.9  10.1  10.1  10.6 
p  13.7  12.9  12.9  14.9  17.2  15.3  15.7  16.9  18.5  19.1  19.9 
UK  18.7  18.7  18.8  20.4  21.2  21.5  21.1  20.6  19.1  18.8  19.0 
A  24.2  24.0  25.2  25.1  25.9  25.0  24.9  25.2  26.1  262  27.1 
FIN  17.5  17.5  17.7  17.6  18.6  18.8  18.3  18.4  18.2  15.7  17.1 
s  9.3  9.5  9.5  9.5  9.5  12.0  11.8  11.6  11.3  10.8  10.5 
EUR15 (by region)  26.8  27.1  27.5  27.2  27.0  26.9  26.7  26.9  29.7  28.8  27.2 
EUR15 (by Member Stata)  17.2  17.6  17.5  17.3  16.6  16.2  15.7  15.7  13.5  13.5  12.8 
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TableS 
Unemployment rate In worst and least affected regions In the Union, 1983 and 1995 
1983  1i95 
Reglona  Rate  Rank  Reglona  Rata  Rank 
Andalucia (E)  22.5  1  Andalucia (E)  33.3  1 
Gataluna (E)  21.3  2  Ceuta y Melilla (E)  33.0  2 
Pais Vasco (E)  20.4  3  Extremadura (E)  30.5  3 
Canarias (E)  19.2  4  Campania (I)  24.7  4 
Merseyside (UK)  18.4  5  Calabria (I)  23.7  5 
Exttemadura (E)  17.3  6  Canarias(E)  23.7  6 
West Midlands (County) (UK)  17.3  7  Sicilia (I)  23.5  7 
Regi6n de Murcia (E)  17.0  8  Pais Vasco (E)  23.0  8 
Comunidad Valenciana (E)  16.8  9  RegiOn de Murcia (E)  22.2  9 
Northern Ireland (UK)  16.8  10  Cllmunidad Valenciana (E)  22.2  10 
Highest 10  19.4  Highest 10  26.4 
Cleveland, Durham (UK)  16.7  11  Sardegna (I)  21.7  11 
Comunidad de Madrid (E)  16.5  12  Ita-Suomi (FIN)  21.7  12 
Umburg (B)  16.0  13  Cantabria (E)  21.4  13 
Sardegna (I)  15.~  14  Pohjois-Suomi (FIN)  21.1  14 
Dumfries & Galloway, Strathclyde  (UK)  15.8  15  Principado de Asturias (E)  209  15 
Comunidad feral de Navarra (E)  15.7  16  Comunidad de Madrid (E)  20.7  16 
Northumberland, Tyne and Wear (UK)  15.3  17  Castilla-la Mancha (E)  20.4  17 
Castilla-la Mancha (E)  15.2  18  Castilla y Le6n (E)  20.3  18 
Ireland (IRL)  14.8  19  Catalul\a (E)  19.9  19 
South Yorkshire (UK)  14.4  20  Molise(l)  18.7  20 
Gwen!, Mid-South-West Glamorgan (UK)  14 3  21  Etela-Suomi (FIN)  18.3  21 
Uege (B)  13.7  22  vali-Suomi (FIN)  18.1  22 
Principado de Asturias (E)  13.7  23  Basilicata (I)  17.6  23 
Hainaut (B)  13.6  24  Galicia (E)  17.2  24 
Castilla y Le6n (E)  13.6  25  Sachsen-Anhalt (D)  16.7  25 
Hlghest25  17.2  Highest 25  22-4 
Uusimaa (FIN)  1 .7  1  Salzburg (A)  3.2  1 
Stockholm (S)  1.9  2  Ionia Nisi a (GR)  3.4  2 
Luxembourg (L)  3.3  3  Tiroi(A)  3.4  3 
Smllland med Oarna (S)  3.8  4  Notio Aigaio (GR)  3.5  .4 
Stuttgart (D)  40  5  NiederOSterreich (A)  3.6  5 
Vastsverige (S)  4.0  6  Luxembourg (L)  3.8  6 
Ostra Mellansverige (S)  42  7  Kriti (GR)  3.8  7 
TObingen (D)  4.3  8  Karnten (A)  4.1  8 
Oberbayern (D)  4.4  9  Oberbayern (D)  4.1  9 
Freiburg (D)  4.6  10  Vorarlberg (A)  4.3  10 
Lowest10  3.8  Lowest 10  3.9 
Krill (GR)  4.6  11  Trentino-Aito Adige (I)  4.5  11 
Trentino-Aito Adige (I)  4.7  12  Schwaben (D)  4.5  12 
Darmstadt (D)  4.9  13  Niederbayern (D)  4.6  13 
Sydsverige (S)  4.9  14  Centro(P)  4.7  14 
Karlsruhe (D)  5.0  15  Burgenland (A)  4.7  15 
Schwaben (D)  5.0  16  Madeira (P)  4.9  16 
Meflersta Norrland (S)  5.0  17  Steiermark (A)  - 4.9  17 
Surrey, East-West Sussex (UK)  5.6  18  TObingen (D)  4.9  18 
Etela-Suomi (FIN)  5.6  19  Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire (UK)  5.2  19 
VAll-Suomi (FIN)  56  20  OberOsterreich (A)  5.2  20 
lie de France (F)  5.7  21  Koblenz (D)  5.4  21 
Alsace (F)  5.7  22  Trier (D)  5.4  22 
Niederbayern (D)  5.8  23  Untertranken (D)  5.5  23 
Unterfranken (D)  5.8  24  Oberpfalz (D)  5.5  24 
Ugurla (I)  5.8  25  West-Vlaanderen (B)  5.5  25 
Lowest 25  4.8  Lowest 25  4.6 
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Table 9 
Disparities In unemployment rates by region within Member States, 1983-95 
(Sblndard deviation) 
1SI83  1e84  1185  11185  11187  1e88  1SI88  111SIO  1SISI1  11182  111113  11194  1995 
B  0.5  1.0  1.4  1.3  1.3  1.6  1.4  1.3  1.0  0.9  1.0  1.4  1.4 
0 1•1  1.7  2.0  2.2  2.2  2.2  22  2.0  1.8  1.6  1.9  1.8  1.8  1.9 
GR  0.7  0.9  1.8  2.6  1.9  2.1  1.9  1.9  2.1  2.1  2.4  2.4  2.4 
E  3.9  5.4  5.1  5.0  5.7  5.0  5.4  5.4  5.3  5.4  5.6  5.4  5.5 
F  1.6  1.9  2.0  1.8  1.8  1.9  1.8  1.7  1.8  2.0  1.9  2.1  2.0 
I  2.8  3.0  3.3  4.0  5.2  6.4  7.1  6.4  6.7  4.3  5.4  6.4  5.9 
NL  - - - - - 1.1  1.0  1.2  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.8  0.7 
p  - - - 2.9  2.6  3.1  2.4  2.0  1.5  1.2  1.3  1.8  1.9 
UK  3.5  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.5  3.3  3.3  3.2  2.6  2.3  2.3  2.4  2.4 
A lbl  - 1.0  1.1  0.8  1.0  1.2  1.2  1.1  1.1  1.0  0.8  0.9  0.9 
FIN lbl  - - 2.6  2.6  2.5  2.3  1.9  2.(1  2.2  2.1  2.5  2.4  2.2 
s<bl  1.4  1.2  1.1  1.1  1.0  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.7  0.9  1.1  1.1  1.1 
EUR12  4.2  4.8  5.3  5.3  5.5  5.4  5.2  4.9  5.0  4.9  5.7  6.1  6.0 
EUR15 (by region)  42  5.0  5.4  5.4  5.6  5.5  5.3  4.9  5.0  4.8  5.6  6.0  6.0 
EUR15 (by Member $tate)  3.1  3.8  4.3  4.2  4.1  3.9  3.5  3.6  3.7  3.4  4.4  5.0  4.6 
f•! West Germany only 
(tJ)  National data for the years 1983-91 
Table 10 
Civilian employment by sector, 1983 and 1993 
Agriculture(%)  lnduatry (%)  Servlcea (%)  Total ('OOOa) 
Ireland 
1983  17.5  30.6  51.9  1118 
1993  13.1  27.1  59.7  1155 
Spain 1•1 
1983  16.2  31.8  51.9  10834 
1993  10.2  30.8  59.0  11868 
Portugal 1•1 
1983  21.5  33.9  44.4  4225 
1993  11.6  32.9  55.6  4464 
Greece 
1983  30.0  27.1  42.9  3509 
1993  21.3  24.2  54.5  3715 
EURS benchmark (b) 
1983  5.4  36.3  58.0  78945 
1993  3.6  31.8  64.3  93881 
f•i 1986 and 1993 
(b)  EUR5 benchmark Is a weighted average of Belgium, Germany, France, the Netherlands and the UK.  Germany includes the new 
LAnder in 1993 but not In 1983. 
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Table11 
Participation and employment rates by age and sex 
In the Cohesion Four, 1983 and 1993 
Men  Women 
Participation  Employment  Participation  Employment 
(%population In each age group)  (% population In each age group) 
1883  1983  1883  18i3  1983  1983  1883  1993 
Ireland 
15-24  65.4  49.5  50.2  36.2  55.2  44.0  44.8  34.1 
25-54  95.0  91.1  82.7  78.2  36.8  51.4  31.2  43.9 
55~  76.4  65.2  703  60.1  20.2  20.1  18.6  18.0 
Spain l•l 
15-24  54.5  47.5  30.4  28.9  38.8  38.0  19.5  20.3 
25-54  94.4  93.0  80.6  78.8  36.0  51.9  30.0  38.5 
55~4  66.1  59.2  57.5  52.1  19.2  20.4  18.0  18.7 
Portugal l•l 
15-24  69.7  51.9  58.3  46.9  53.0  43.0  39.5  36.6 
25-54  93.5  94.0  89.0  90.7  61.5  722  56.2  68.4 
55-64  64.7  62.8  63.1  60.1  29.2  34.0  28.6  33.4 
Greece 
15-24  50.4  43.1  41.8  34.5  36.2  34.6  25.3  21.1 
25-54  95.1  94.3  90.5  89.9  43.8  53.1  40.1  47.0 
55-64  70.8  58.6  68.8  56.9  25.7  22.3  25.2  21.9 
EUR4 benchmark lbl 
15-24  54.0  49.5  46.4  42.9  47.5  45.5  39.2  39.0 
25-54  95.3  93.6  90.3  87.9  58.8  70.1  54.1  64.1 
55-64  55.8  48.8  52.9  45.1  25.6  26.5  24.2  24.3 
f•J  1986 and 1993 
101  EUR4 benchmark is a weighted average of Belgium, Germany, France and the Netherlands 
Table 12 
Population covered by national aid to regions, 1996 (%) 
Overall cowrage  Least developed regions C•l  Other problem regions lbl 
GR  100.0  100.0  00 
IRL  100.0  100.0  0.0 
p  100.0  100.0  0.0 
E  75.9  59.6  16.3 
I  489  34.2  14.7 
L  42.7  0.0  42.7 
F  42.4  2.5  39.9 
FlN  41.6  0.0  41.6 
UK  38.1  2.9  35.2 
D  37.6  20.8  16.8 
A  35.2  3.5  31.7 
B  35.0  .Q.O  35.0 
OK  19 9  0.0  19.9 
s  18.5  0.0  18.5 
NL  17.3  0.0  17.3 
I•J Article 92(3)8 of the Treaty 
{bJ Article 92(3)c of  the Treaty 
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Table 13 
The Impact of government expenditure and taxes on regional disparities In GOP per head 
In selected Member States, 1993 
(Gin I coefficients of the distribution of GDP between reglone beforw and after transfera) 
Beforw transfere  After trenefera  Equalisation effect(%) 
[1]  [2]  [2] I [1] 
F  0.12  0.11  -8 
D  0.15  0.12  -16 
I  0.13  0.10  -28 
p  0.15  0.13  -11 
E  0.11  0.07  -38 
s  0.05  0.04  -14 
UK  0.07  0.04  -33 
Average reduction in lnequallty<•l  -23 
Reduction In Inequality In 7 countries as a,whole: 
In GOP (ECU)  0.19  0.17  -10 
In GOP (PPS)  0.14  0.12  -15 
See Sources and metl'lods for an explanation of  the Gini coefficient and tl'le method used to derive the estimates of tl'le effect of 
budget  transfers. Budget transfers are government expenc:iture, including social  protection benefits and  sllowances (except in France 
and Germany), less taxes. 
(a} Weighted by  population 
Ti1ble 14 
The effect of budget transfers on eelected regions 
with similar GOP per head, 1993 
Transfe,.  GOP  Net GOP 
% regional GOP  ECU per head  ECU per head  ECU per head l•l 
Usboa 6 VT(P)  -2  -187  10207  10020 
Brandenburg (D)  17  1807  10637  12444 
Wales (UK)  8  932  11734  12666 
Arag6n (E)  -3  -379  11776  11397 
North (UK)  9  1176  12433  13609 
North-West (UK)  4  552  12507  13059 
West Midlands (UK)  1  75  12722  12797 
East Anglla (UK)  -3  -358  14140  13782 
Languedoc-Rouaalllon (F)  9  1272  14500  15772 
Toscana (I)  -7  -1025  15450  14425 
Bretagne (F)  3  395  15621  16016 
Mldi-Pyr6nNs (F)  5  869  15842  16711 
See the notes to table 13 
(a) GOP plus net transfers (Column 2) 
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The calculation of transfers associated with the CAP was undertaken by external experts (College of Europe). It involves a number
of simplifying assumptions due to the individual nature of different agricultural markets and the fact that, for some products, there is
no international reference price. See Sources and methods below.
Transfers arise between consumers and producers as a result of EU price support. This gives rise to transfers between Member
States — ‘a net trade transfer’ — which depends on national patterns of consumption and production. Transfers from consumers to
producers are estimated by multiplying the amount of each product available for consumption in each country by the EU ‘price
support’. OECD data are used to calculate PSEs (Producer Subsidy equivalent) and CSEs (Consumer Subsidy Equivalent). These
data relate to a period before the Uruguay Round Agreement. Support rates for fruit, vegetables, wine and olive oil had to be estimated.
Direct payments are unrelated to production and affect sectors such as cotton and tobacco. In the case of Portugal and Spain,
comparisons involving data for the period before 1993 are of limited relevance because their agricultural sectors were subject to
transitional arrangements, negotiated on accession in 1986, during that period.
Table 15
Gross payments to Member States under the market support
policy of the CAP (EAGGF Guarantee), 1990-94 (a)
Population
(ECU mn) (000)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1994
B   873,7  1468,5  1378,2  1298,7  1170,4 B  10115,6
DK  1113,7  1220,3  1166,8  1334,7  1278,4 DK  5205,0
D  4355,2  5234,5  4830,5  4976,2  5179,9 D  81422,0
GR  1849,7  2211,2  2231,4  2715,0  2718,9 GR  10426,3
E  2120,8  3314,3  3578,1  4175,7  4408,3 E  39149,5
F  5142,2  6394,4  6916,5  8184,8  8001,2 F  57899,7
IRL  1668,4  1731,1  1452,8  1649,9  1480,0 IRL   3570,7
I  4150,3  5353,4  5141,5  4765,4  3460,6 I  57203,5
L     5 , 2     2 , 8     1 , 1     7 , 3    1 2 , 1 L    4 0 3 , 8
NL  2868,7  2679,3  2389,8  2328,1  1916,0 NL  15382,8
P   214,2   315,6   423,8   478,1   708,4 P   9902,2
UK  1975,9  2391,3  2451,1  2737,9  2939,0 UK  58394,6
Community 
(a)
  2 1 5 , 5    6 9 , 2   1 4 5 , 9    9 6 , 4   1 3 9 , 0
EUR12 26453,3 32385,9 32107,5 34748,2 33412,2 EUR12 349075,6
(a) Adjusted for expenditure against carryovers and the financial consequences of clearance
of accounts decisions
(b) Payments direct to recipients made by the Commission under the EAGGF Guarantee
Section
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Table 16 
Trans-European Transport Networks -expenditure by main mode 
Tot.! spending  EIBto.na  structural Funds  TENs 
of which:  of which:  of which:  of which: 
EUR4  EUR4  EUR4  EUR4 
(ECU mn)  (%)  (ECU mn)  (%)  (ECUmn)  (%)  (ECUmn)  (%) 
TGV  24489  11  3574  22  11  100  184  4 
Roads  26473  67  6551  63  3309  96  78  87 
Combined tranaport  3751  9  38  86  23  100  102  27 
Rail  5968  61  1041  24  1608  100  51  31 
Air  8577  15  1284  14  303  100  0  0 
Porta  1272  68  234  58  104  100  3  3 
Tot.l <•I  76617  35  13485  40  5373  98  445  27 
f•J Includes spending on other modes 
Table 17 
Improvements In market access due to TENs 
(Increase In% population reachable within a 6 hour round trip) 
Major Cities - Core  Major Cities - Periphery  Medium Cities - Core  Medium Cities- Periphery 
Paris  5%  Madrid  20%  Liege  61%  Cuenca  10% 
Frankfurt  11%  E.arcelona  20%  Utrecht  35%  Umea  11% 
Brussels  28%  Lisbon  16%  Lilla  29%  Alexandropoulous  11% 
Amsterdam  19%  Athens  26%  Odense  61%  Made  5% 
Table 18 
Output and employment 
In the energy sector, 1985 and 1992 
%total GOP  % total employment 
1985  1992  1985  1992 
B  4.9  4.4  1.8  1.1 
DK  2.4  2.6  0.8  0.8 
D  A.9  3.7  2.1  1.7 
GR  4.4  4.0  2.4  2.2 
E  5.6  6.2  1.9  1.3 
F  5.0  5.1  1.5  1.2 
IRL  5.1  3.1  2.0  1.7 
4.7  5.5  1.3  1.2 
L  2.1  1.4  0.9  0.5 
NL  11.8  6.4  1.6  1.3 
p  3.7  3.0  1.4  1.2 
UK  10.7  5.3  2.6  1.7 
EUR12  6.2  4.7  1.9  1.4 
EUR4  5.3  5.3  1.9  1.4 
EUR8  6.4  4.6  1.9  1.4 
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Table 19 
Funding for TEN energy projects (ECU mn) 
Cost  EIB  ElF  SF  OtherEU 
B  294.9  88.5 
DK  1538.0  280.4 
D  1727.7  563.8 
GR  601.0  70.7  178.5  83.0 
E  2791.7  1126.4  160.2 
IRL  913.5  370.9  116.0 
4193.6  1312.0  86.8 
p  1947.0  598.8  107.2  222.0  102.0 
UK  145.4  91.8 
Total  14447.7  4591.8  107.2  763.5  185.0 
EUR4  6253.2  2166.8  107.2  676.8 
Table 20 
Expenditure on environmental protection In the Community, 1992 (a) 
Total  Division by medium r-4)  Environmental expenditure  Environmental 
I  nvestmentldJ 
ECUbn  Waste  Air  Water lbl  Noise (c)  Nature  %GNP  ECU  ~.total 
protection  per head  Investment 
BIL  1.2  40  17  30  5  8  0.7  120  1.1 
OK  1.2  33  10  53  1  3  1.1  225  3.0 
D  20.5  24  23  50  2  1  1.5  255  3.0 
F  12.9  34  8  54  2  2  1.3  226  1.6 
I  6.8  47  4  47  1  1  0.7  119  0.6 
NL  3.5  33  13  43  4  7  1.4  232  1.6 
UK  12.4  35  12  46  3  4  1.5  214  4.9 
GR  0.3  22  2  72  1  3  0.5  29  1.0 
E  3.9  35  2  46  1  16  0.8  100  1.4 
IRL  0.3  52  11  33  3  1  0.7  73  2.0 
p  0.3  30  4  52  1  13  0.5  34  1.0 
Total  63.3  33  13  49  2  3  1.2  163  2.2 
f•J Expenditure on environmental protectioo, excluding R&D, nuclear power and water resource management (dams. drinking water). 
mprovement In Oiling conditions (urban spaces, pedestrian zones). development of renewable energy sources and better energy 
use, expendture by private households ("ecoproducts"). On the other hand, expenditure on strBflt cleaning and additional cost of 
dean technolog/8s we Included 
(bJ Waste water treatment, excluding protection of  ground water snd water abstraction (though in some countries the latter is partly 
included) 
(c:J  The definition snd  the accounting of  expenditure on this vaty widely from one count/)' to snother; the estimates must,  therefore,  be 
Interpreted with caution 
(d) Figures vary substantially from year to year due to cyclical fluctuations In tots/Investment, the timing of which itself differs between 
countries. 
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Table 21 
Estimated environmental Investment requirement. In the cohealon countrlea 
up to 2005 (ECU mn) 
GR  IRL  p  E  I!UR4 
Urban WMte Willer  1000  1m  1300  7700  10S)() 
Industrial Wllste wattr  200 
(a)  2000  2~  4eOO 
Urben solid wute  100  200  100  ~  800 
Industrial soUd WIISW (Ill  10  1  200  110  311 
Other (maintenance, training  100  100  200  310  700 
end education) 
Total  1410  901  3800  10900  17011 
(~ Included in urban water 
fbJ For Spain Includes only Objective 1 regiOns 
Table22 
The Spanish economy In 2010: alternative environmental policy scenarios 
PIP, INT and INT  + relative to bue projection 
(unl"a otherwlae stated} 
PIP  INT  INT+ 
GOP  0.02  -{)1  0.6 
lnveatment  1.4  2.6  3.0 
Employment  0.1  0.7  2.2 
Unemployment rate Cal  12.7  12.4  12.2 
(Difference from bau  .Q.1  -0.4  .Q.6 
projection} 
Public deficit(% GOP)  -2.9  -2.5  -2.7 
Base projection, policy enacted up to 1992 
PIP (policy  in the pipeline), projectioolncorporating th8 5th Environmental Programme 
/NT (integration  of environmentsl objectives Into economic policy), projection with revenue from  environmentsl taxes spent on the 
environment and returned to consumers In lowsr other taxes 
/NT+  (integration  of envircn1118fltal  objectives  Into  economic policy plus  'double  div ldend'),  projection  with  revenue  from 
environmental taxes used to reduce taxes on employment (soc/sf charges) 
(~ Levels in each scenario 
Table 23 
Community resources, 1988-99 
1881  1883  1QM 
ECUbn  %  ECUbn  %  ECUbn  % 
(1881 prlcea)  (1QQ2 prlcea}  (1Qft prlc•) 
Agriculture  27.5  60.7  35.2  50.9  38.4  45.7 
Structural action of which:  8.9  19.6  21.3  30.8  30.0  35.7 
Cohesion Fund  1.5  2.2  2.6  3.1 
Structural Funct.  8.9  19.6  19.8  28.6  27.4  32.6 
Internal pollcl•  2.2  4.8  3.9  5.6  5.1  6.1 
External action  4.0  5.8  5.6  6.7 
Other  6.7  14.8  4.8  6.9  5.0  5.9 
Total commltmenta  45.3  100  69.2  100  84.1  100 
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Table 24 
Scale of structural Intervention (Including Cohesion Fund and Community lnltlatlvee), 
1989-93 and 1994-99 
1989-93 (annual average) 
Total  EU Intervention  Total  EU Intervention 
ECUmn  %Gop<•l 
B  485  173  0.30  0.11 
OK  274  86  0.15  0.08 
D  6741  1680  0.53  0.13 
GR  3091  1834  4.47  2.65 
E  6201  3017  1.54  0.75 
F  4114  1387  0.42  0.14 
IRL  2212  980  5.99  2.66 
I  5485  2374  0.63  0.27 
L  41  15  0.45  0.17 
NL  488  163  0.21  0.07 
p  3789  1892  6.15  3.07 
UK  2659  1066  0.34  0.13 
EUR12  35580  14666  0.71  0.29 
1994-99 (annual average) 
Total  EU Intervention  Total  EU Intervention 
ECUmn  %GDP(bl 
B  1089  349  0.57  0.18 
OK  426  140  0.34  0.11 
0  13954  3622  0.81  0.21 
GR  5793  2956  7.20  3.67 
E  13747  7066  3.38  1.74 
F  7107  2491  0.63  0.22 
IRL  2180  1234  4.98  2.82 
I  9722  3608  1.13  0.42 
L  57  17  0.49  0.15 
NL  1498  436  0.53  0.15 
p  5300  2940  7.17  3.98 
UK  4779  2164  0.56  0.25 
EUR12  65651  27024  1.1 1  0.45 
A  1572  316  0.94  0.19 
RN  1134  331  1.38  0.40 
s  878  261  0.53  0.37 
EUR15  69235  27932  1.12  0.51 
t•J average GOP.  1989-93 
fbi GOP in  1994 
N.B.  Data related to the 1989--93 period are extracted from monitoring reports and correspond to actual financed interventions. As 
some programmes have not  been yet completed at mid-1996, available  data tend to underestimate the funds commited during this 
period. In addtlion, as regards ESF.  data do not include achievements made in  1989 as these beloog to transitory period based on 
management by projects. 
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Table 25 
Breakdown of Structural Funds by ObJective, 1989-93 and 1994-99 
1181-13 (ECU mn) 
CJ.(a)  ObJ.1  ObJ.2  ObJ.3  Obj.h  Obj.h  Obj.llb  Total 
&4  qrlc.  llah. 
B  - 214  344  134  15  33  740  124 
DK  - 25  171  91  94  21  402  28 
D  2955  581  1054  878  36  511  6015  416 
GR  7528  - - - - - 7528  712 
E  10171  1506  837  229  92  265  13100  1129 
F  957  1225  1442  1274  135  874  5907  566 
IRL  4460  - - - - - 4460  295 
I  8504  387  903  493  106  360  10753  667 
L  - 12  11  29  - 3  55  22 
NL  - 165  405  79  43  33  725  89 
p  8450  - - - - - 8450  724 
UK  793  2015  1502  316  58  132  4816  513 
EUR12  43818  6130  6669  3523  579  2232  62951  5285 
%  69.6  9.7  10.6  5.6  0.9  3.5  100  -
1994-99 (ECU mn at 1994 prices) 
Obj.1  Obj.2  Obj.3  Obj.4  Obj.Sa  Obj.Sa  Obj.6b  Obj.6  Total  C.l.!•) 
agrlc.  flah. 
B  7~  341  396  69  170  25  77  - 1808  288 
DK  - 119  263  38  127  140  54  - 741  102 
D  13640  1566  1681  260  1070  75  1227  - 19519  2211 
GR  13980  - - - - - - - 13980  1154 
E  26300  2415  1474  369  326  120  664  - 31668  2781 
F  2190  3769  2562  641  1746  190  2236  - 13334  1605 
IRL  5620  - - - - - - - 5620  484 
I  14860  1462  1316  399  681  134  901  - 19752  1897 
1- - 15  21  1  39  1  6  - 83  19 
NL  150  650  923  156  118  47  150  - 2194  422 
p  13980  - - - - - - - 13980  1061 
UK  2360  4580  3377  186  89  817  - 11409  1573 
A  162  99  329  60  386  2  403  - 1432  144 
FIN  - 179  254  83  331  23  190  450  1503  151 
s  - 157  342  170  90  39  135  247  1178  126 
EUR15  93991  15352  12938  2246  5270  885  6860  697  138201  14018 
%  68.0  11.1  9.4  1.6  3.8  0.6  5.0  0.5  100  -
(•J Community Initiatives. Including 200 mn. ECU (at 1995 prices) resulting from a revision to the financial forecasts decided by the 
Council in order to lund the PEACE Initiative, but excluding around 64 mn. ECU for networks. 
See note In table 24 
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Table 26 
EIB financing of regional development 
EIB financing  1QIII-M  1QQ4  19Q5 
lndlvldualloana and credlta extended on  Amount  %total  %regional  Amount  Amount 
global current loana  (ECU mn)  activity  development  (ECU mn)  (ECU mn) 
To~l  EIB activity In Member S~~s  70,008  100  16,605  17,782 
Regional developi'IWnt  47,128  67  100  12,035  12,143 
Objective 1 regions  25,046  36  53  5,748  5,881 
Objectives 2, 5b and 6 regions  16,916  24  36  4,875  5,449 
Other regior·o; In receipt ol Community  1,5000  2  3 
assistance 
Other regions In receipt ol national aid  1,306  2  3  60 
Projects covering several regions  2,360  3  5  1,352  813 
Regions eligible under Structural Funds  41,962  10  10,623  11,330 
- of which: Individual loans In receipt of  10,669  25  3,246  4,434 
Community subvention 
EIB financing (Individual loans and credits on global loans) In areas eligible for Structural Fund aid: 
division by Objective and sector 
Transport  Telecom  w.wt  Energy  Other  Total  Agriculture,  Total  of which: 
envlronmert  infrastruct.  Industry,  credits on 
services  global 
loans 
1989-93 
Objective 1 
ECUmn  5598  5176  1498  4859  1169  18300  6745  25045  3757 
%  22  21  6  19  5  73  27  100  15 
Objectives 2+5b 
ECUmn  5016  1423  2411  1276  542  10669  6246  16916  4171 
%  30  8  14  8  3  63  37  100  25 
Total Obj. 1+2+5b  10614  6599  3909  6135  1712  28969  12991  41960  7928 
% total Objectives  25  16  9  15  4  69  31  100  19 
Total regional  12677  7466  4473  6339  1816  32771  14359  47130  9320 
development 
%total reg. devel.  27  16  9  13  4  70  30  100  20 
Obj. 1+2+5b,%  84  88  87  97  94  88  90  89  85 
regional development 
Total activity  17809  8935  7830  12018  2123  48715  21293  70008  14490 
1994 and 1995 
Objective 1 
ECUmn  4307  1901  900  2320  549  9167  2461  11269  1044 
%  37  9  8  20  5  79  21  100  9 
Objectives 2+5b+6 
ECUmn  3949  297  1040  1614  240  7140  3184  10324  2061 
%  38  3  10  16  2  69  31  100  20 
Total Obj. 1+2+5b+6  8256  1388  1940  3935  789  16307  5645  21953  3104 
% total Objectives  38  6  9  18  4  74  26  100  14 
Total regional  8595  2810  1995  4113  789  18302  5877  24178  4645 
development 
%total reg. devel.  36  12  8  17  3  76  24  100  19 
Obj. 1+2+5b, e;.  96  49  97  96  100  89  96  91  67 
regional development 
Total activity  12079  3040  3668  6467  941  26195  8192  34387  7098 
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Table27 
Breakdown of Cohesion Fund,1993 and 1994-99 
Actu.l comrnltmenta for 1113 (!CU mn at  curNnt prtcea) 
Tranaport  Environment  Toll!  I 
ECUmn  %  ECUmn  % 
Spain  606  71.0  252  29.0  859 
Portugal  161  57.0  123  43.0  284 
Greece  105  38.0  175  62.0  280 
Ireland  86  61.0  56  39.0  142 
Tota~_,  958  61.0  6>6  39.0  1565 
Eatlrnat.a tor 1194-W (ECU mn at 1884 prlcea) 
Spain  3983  50.1  3967  49.9  7950 
Portugal  1380  53.0  1221  47.0  2601 
Greece  1235  47.5  1367  52.5  2602 
Ireland  665  51.1  636  48.9  1301 
Totll~•l  7262  50.2  7192  49.8  14454 
(~ Including technlcaJ assistance 8lld studies 
Expenditure on transpol1 and the environment for 1994-99 is estimated on the basis of  actual commitments in  1994 and 1995 
Table 28 
Distribution of Structural Funds by broad target area In Objective 1 regions, 
1989-93 and 1994-99 (%) 
1818-13  1  884-SISI 
lntraatructure  Human  Productive  lnfraatructura  Human  Productive 
resources  environment  resources  environment 
B  - - - 18.9  34.7  45.8 
0  22.5  26.5  48.5  40.5  28.0  30.5 
GR  40.9  25.6  34.7  45.9  24.6  27.8 
E  54.0  24.2  21.5  40.4  28.4  30.5 
F  39.4  28.7  31.1  27.9  27.2  34.2 
IRL  27.7  38.0  33.4  19.7  43.9  36.2 
I  38.7  21.6  39.3  29.8  21.4  48.2 
NL  - - - 24.0  26.7  37.3 
p  29.2  26.1  37.7  29.7  29.4  35.7 
UK  29.5  46.0  22.5  28.4  37.9  ~2 
A  - - - 19.8  25.9  51.9 
Average  35.2  29.6  33.6  29.5  29.8  37.1 
EUR4 average  38.0  28.5  31.8  33.9  31.6  32.6 
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Table 29 
Income and unemployment trends In assisted regions, 1983-93 
Reglo_rwl data by Objective  EUR12 
1  2  Sb  Average 
GOP per heed  1983  64.6  98.0  86.0  100 
(PPS, EUR12 • 1  00)  1989  65.4  96.3  84.4  100 
1993  67.2  92.1  85.3  100 
Unemployment rate  1983  12.4  12.5  7.7  9.6 
(% labour force)  1989  14.5  11.0  6.5  8.8 
1993  16.2  12.2  6.9  10.3 
Note: the figures for Objective 2 and 5b are estimates, since the geographical coverage does not correspond precisely with any 
regional classification for which comparable dais exist. 
(a) Objective 1 excludes new L~der 
Table 30 
Distribution of Structural Funds by broad target area in Objective 2 regions, 
1989-93 and 1994-99 (%) 
1989-93  19i4-IMI 
Physical  Human  Productive  Phyalcal  Human  Productive 
regeneration &  resources  environment  1•1  regeneration &  resources  environment l•l 
environment  environment 
8  23.9  19.1  56.2  16.9  33.1  47.5 
OK  - 60.0  34.5  - 57.0  41.0 
0  37.8  5.8  54.5  25.1  40.0  33.4 
E  18.0  265  55.5  18.9  28.0  52.4 
F  37.0  19.3  43.1  23.5  34.8  40.2 
I  42.4  17.9  38.3  19.6  29.8  49.0 
L  85.2  4.3  7.8  57.2  28.6  14.3 
NL  16.9  43.6  37.1  15.4  37.8  43.8 
UK  13.4  19.0  67.5  15.8  34.2  49.0 
A  - - - 10.3  27.9  603 
FIN  - - - - 31.7  65.1 
s  - - - 15.8  34.2  49.0 
Average (b)  23.9  20.9  55.1  18.2  34.8  45.4 
(a) Includes expenditure on economic infrastructure 
(bJ  Technics/assistance, representing an average of 1.3% of tots/ funding, not included 
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Table 31 
Distribution of Structural Funds by broad target area In Objective Sb regions, 
1989-93 and 1994-99 (%) 
1818-83  1884-H 
lnfr•  Environment  Human  Productive  lnfr•  Environment  Human  Productive 
structure  ....ourcea  environment  structure  IWSOurcea  environment 
B  9.1  11.9  24.0  54.9  3.8  8.3  16.6  69.9 
OK  28.2  .  30.0  41.8  .  .  19.6  78.3 
D  9.0  27.9  17.4  44.5  11.9  16.9  17.9  51.5 
E  39.6  16.9  14.8  28.7  10.3  10.2  13.4  66.1 
F  17.0  13.3  20.3  47.6  9.2  10.9  12.8  65.1 
I  18.9  9.3  14.2  55.9  0.8  10.5  13.4  74.0 
L  17.9  .  10.7  71.4  34.4  8.2  12.8  41.0 
NL  6.7  19.8  26.8  45.4  0.7  23.8  11.4  62.8 
UK  33.9  9.8  21.3  35.0  8.4  7.8  16.1  66.5 
A  .  .  .  .  4.0  7.8  16.9  69.9 
FIN  .  .  .  .  7.1  8.1  16.6  66.6 
s  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Average <•l  20.0  12.1  20.0  47.2  8.4  10.3  15.3  64.7 
C•J  Technical assistance, representing an average of 1.5" oftctal funding. not included  -
Table 32 
Distribution of Structural Funds by broad target area In Objective 6 regions, 1995-99 
lnfrastructu,.  Human  Productive  Other  Total 
resources  environment 
•,4  %  %  %  ECU mn 1994 
Finland  6.0  25.4  66.7  1.9  450.0 
Sweden  4.0  27.6  63.5  4.9  246.8 
Total (ECU mn 1994)  36.7  182.2  456.9  21.1  696.8 
Total(%)  5.3  26.1  65.6  3.0 
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Table33 
Breakdown of expenditure on human resources (ECU mn) 
under Objectives 3 and 4 
1i8N3  1ii4-i&li9 
Obj. 3 & 4  Obj.3  Ob .4 
%  %total  of which (% ex_p_endlture In Member States):  %total  of which: 
LTU  Y.P.  E.P.  E.O.  A.W. 
B  5.2  3.6  33.6  21.5  31.3  6.8  1.5  92.3 
OK  2.6  2.4  54.8  20.9  22.1  0.0  0.8  92.3 
D  15.8  15.2  56.6  26.3  4.6  9.5  6.2  100.0 
E  12.5  13.3  33.8  49.2  12.7  4.2  21.9  100.0 
F  21.6  23.2  27.5  38.5  27.9  0.7  17.8  100.0 
I  13.5  11.9  32.1  43.0  10.0  8.0  23.7  80.5 
L  0.2  0.2  28.6  14.3  47.6  4.8  0.1  1000 
NL  6.1  8.3  52.0  13.0  300  00  93  1000 
UK  22.5  13.6  37.4  31.6  23.9  6.0  00  0.0 
A  - 3.0  34.0  7.0  32.6  18.2  3.6  96.7 
AN  2.3  42.4  31.8  23.9  00  4.9  95.2 
s  .  3.1  27.9  50.0  18.2  00  10.1  91.2 
Total (•/.)  100.0  100.0  38.1  33.7  19.7  4.7  1000  93.9 
Total (ECU mn)  6670  11065  4220  3733  2182  523  1682  1580 
L  TU: Long-term unemployed 
YP · Youth  unemployed 
E P: People excluded from the labour market (unemployed and inactive) 
EO.: Equal opponunies 
A W.:  Adaptation of workers to industrial change 
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Table 34 
Population assisted and allocation per head by ObJective, 1989-93 and 1994-99 
1989-93 
01Jtectlw1  Objective 2  ObjecUve5b 
% natiONII  allocation  "'  Nltlonal  allocaUon  %national  allocation 
population  (ECUih•d)  populaUon  (ECUihead)  population  (ECUih•d) 
B  22.1  19.0  2.7  26.0 
DK  4.9  20.0  2.1  39.0 
D  62.0  12.4  16.0  7.4  23.0 
GR  100.0  150.0 
E  57.7  91.0  222  35.0  2.5  53.0 
F  2.7  120.0  18.3  2!>.0  9.7  34.0 
IRL  100.0  253.0 
36.4  82.0  6.6  21.0  5.0  25.0 
L  38.0  16.0  0.8  187.0 
NL  9.9  22.0  3.0  15.0 
p  100.0  171.0 
UK  2.8  87.0  35.5  20.0  2.6  16.0 
EUR12  21.7  123.3  16.8  20.6  5.0  29.6 
1994-99 
Objective 1  Objective 2  Objective Sb  Objective 6 
%national  allocation  %national  allocation  %national  allocation  %national  allocation 
population  (ECU/head)  population  (ECU/head)  population  (ECUihead)  population  (ECU/head) 
B  12.8  95.0  14.2  40.0  4.5  290 
DK  8.5  45.0  6.8  25.0 
D  20.6  145.0  8.8  37.0  9.7  26.0 
GR  100.0  225.0 
E  59.7  188.0  20.4  51.0  4.4  64.0 
F  4.4  143.0  25.1  43.0  16.7  38.0 
IRL  100.0  262.0 
I  36.7  117.0  11.0  39.0  8.3  310 
L  34.6  19.0  7.9  33.0 
NL  1.5  115.0  17.4  42.0  5.4  31.0 
p  100.0  235.0 
UK  5.9  115.2  30.9  43.0  4.9  48.0 
A  3.7  120.0  7.5  31.0  28.7  35.0 
FIN  15.7  45.0  21.6  35.0  16.7  107.0 
s  11.5  32.3  9.2  33.8  5.3  110.0 
EUR15  26.6  169.5  16.4  41.9  8.8  35.0  0.4  108.5 
151 Statistical annex 
Table 35 
Allocations on Community Initiatives, 1989-93 
ENVIREG  PRISM  A  INTER  REG  REGEN  RECHAR  RESIDER  RENA  VAL  REGIS  STRIDE 
8  - - 41.6  - 27.6  18.6  6.5  - 4.5 
DK  - - 2.4  - - - 12.4  - 2.2 
D  - - 59.2  - 87.6  93.2  37.3  - 4.3 
GR  84.0  17.7  252.5  89.9  - - - - 59.3 
E  139.2  32.2  265.3  - 25.3  52.4  18.2  78.4  155.9 
~.,  32.5  0.2  95.8  52.4  58.8  65.3  49.6  16.4 
IRL  30.4  9.4  42.2  118.4  - - - - 13.1 
I  171.2  22.6  42.6  2.0  - 23.0  20.5  - 94.9 
L  - - 9.1  - - 8.7  - - 2.1 
NL  - - 30.3  - - - 27.6  - 4.6 
p  101.8  17.5  179.8  82.2  3.4  5.0  24.0  53.4  54.1 
UK  17.7  5.7  54.3  - 184.2  4.7  87.3  - 30.2 
Total  576.8  105.3  1075.0  292.5  380.4  264.4  299.1  181.4  441.5 
f•Jtncludes  14.7 Ill/lion ECU for Envireg/Stride and 5. 1 million ECU for PRISMNTELEMA T/OUE 
See note table 24 
Table 36 
Allocations on Community lnltiatlv~s, 1994-99 (ECU mn) 
INTERREG &  LEADER  REGIS  EMPLOI  ADAPT  RECHAR  RESIDER 
REGEN 
Floods and 
drought 
non  Obj. 1/6  non  Obj.1/6  non  Obj. 1/6  non  Obj. 1/6  non  Obj.1/6  non  Obj. 1/6  non  Obj.1/6 
Obj.1  Obj.1  Obj.1  Obj.1  Obj.1  Obj.1  Obj.1 
8  46  51  6  4  - - 29  16  30  8  16  1  17  11 
OK  22  - 10  - - - 14  - 31  - - - - -
D  159  287  113  91  - - 121  76  178  73  83  96  150  55 
GR  - 620  - 161  - - - 69  - 33  - 3  - 6 
E  36  643  71  326  - 214  108  333  106  181  6  28  38  35 
F  211  53  219  6  - 262  181  7  266  7  27  8  63  3 
IRL  162  - 82  - - - 87  - 27  - - - -
I  93  287  121  201  - - 116  277  124  91  1  1  60  31 
L  4  1  - - - - - - - - 13  -
NL  185  - 9  3  - - 60  1  68  1  - - 23  -
p  348  - 128  - 124  - 45  - 21  - 2  - 9 
UK  52  69  52  25  - - 164  25  303  7  178  1  49  -
Network  - - 12  22  - - - - - - - - - -
EUR12  808  2520  613  1048  - 600  794  934  1107  449  311  140  414  149 
A  37  12  24  3  - - 26  - 12  1  2  - 5  -
FIN  18  30  16  12  - - 26  6  19  4  - - - -
s  31  15  12  4  - - 22  2  12  1  - - - -
EUR3  86  57  52  18  - - 74  8  43  6  2  - 5  -
EUR15  895  2577  665  1066  - .600  868  942  1150  455  313  140  419  149 
Part of the commitments on Community Initiatives allocated at 1995 prices has been converted to 1994 prices for comparison 
See note table 24 
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Table 35 (continued) 
Allocations on Community Initiatives, 1989-93 
TELEMAnQUE  LEADER  EUROFORM  NOW  HORIZON  RETEX  KONVER  TOTAL 
B  - 6.9  75  4.8  5.3  - 0.9  124.0 
OK  - 2.2  3.0  1.5  3.6  - 0.8  28.0 
D  - 23.8  21.5  tt.O  38.8  1.9  37.5  415.9 
GR  41.3  59.1  24.1  13.8  54.0  10.8  5.0  711.5 
E  75.5  120.0  65.7  34.4  41.4  17.4  7.6  1128.9 
~·I  1.7  65.0  41.0  19.0  32.0  4.0  32.4  566.0 
IRL  11.0  27.2  14.3  7.1  19.5  2.0  0.2  294.7 
I  64.7  80.9  55.2  31.4  28.3  12.1  17,.9  667.4 
L  - 0.8  - 0.2  1.3  - - 22.1 
NL  - 1.4  9.3  4.6  7.5  - 3.6  88.9 
p  35.6  52.0  33.1  16.9  33.9  30.0  1.8  724.4 
UK  5.4  15.4  39.3  10.3  30.2  8.2  20.1  512.8 
Total  235.2  454.6  313.8  154.8  295.5  86.4  127.8  5284.7 
(•)Includes 14.7 million ECU for Envireg/Stride and 5. 1 million £CU for PRISMA/TELEMA TIOUE 
See note table 24 
Table 36 (continued) 
Allocations on Community Initiatives, 1994-99 (ECU mn) 
RETE  X  KONVER  PME  URBAN  PESCA  PEACE  Total  TOTAL 
non  ObJ.116  non  ObJ.118  non  Obj. 118  non  Obj.118  non  Obj.118  ObJ.1  non  Obj.118 
Obj.1  Obj.1  Obj.1  Obj. 1  Obj.1  Obj.1 
B  2  3  13  1  3  9  6  13  2  - - 172  116  288 
OK  .  - 2  - 3  - 2  - 19  .  - 102  - 102 
D  15  59  130  202  34  152  31  82  10  13  - 1026  1186  2211 
GR  - 77  - 22  - 62  - 50  - 30  - - 1154  1154 
E  42  62  11  12  25  223  51  166  12  33  - 506  2275  2781 
F  37  - 85  - 49  9  71  8  33  - - 1242  363  1605 
IRL  - 9  - - - 28  - 20  - 8  59  - 484  484 
I  39  35  51  12  30  158  28  105  18  19  - 681  1217  1897 
L  - - - - - - 1  - - - - 19  - 19 
NL  1  - 27  - 8  2  22  - 11  2  - 414  8  422 
p  - 172  - 14  - 122  - 49  - 29  - - 1061  1061 
UK  29  11  125  14  53  14  84  38  36  7  236  1126  447  1573 
Network  - - - - 5  20  - - 3  3  - 20  45  64 
EUR12  165  428  445  276  209  819  295  552  144  143  295  5306  8355  13661 
A  3  - - - 8  1  13  - - - - 129  17  146 
FIN  - .  - - 6  5  - 4  3  1  - 88  62  149 
s  - - 3  - 13  4  5  - 4  - - 102  25  127 
EUR3  3  - 3  - 27  9  18  4  7  1  - 319  103  423 
EUR15  168  428  449  276  236  829  313  556  151  143  295  5625  8459  14084 
Part of  the commitments on CommUIIity Initiatives allocated at 1995 prices has been converted to 1994 prices for comparison 
See note table 24  . 
153 Sources and methods 
Most of the data analysed in  this Report have pre-
pared within the Commission. The main exceptions 
are the estimates of net budgetary transfers within 
Member States in Chapter 3 which are the results of 
a  special study of selected countries and the esti-
mates of net transfers under the CAP in Chapter 4. 
The  analysis  of disparities  in  Chapter  2 is  based  on 
national and regional  accounts data and on series  for 
employment and unemployment, compiled by the Statis-
tical Office of the European Commission (:::urostat}. 
GOP (Gross domestic product) is  a measure of the 
total output of resident producers. It corresponds to 
the production of goods and services in the economy, 
excluding consumption  of  intermediate  goods and 
services, but (when measured at market prices rather 
than factor cost) including value-added tax on pro-
ducts and net taxes on imports. It is also an indicator 
of the income generated from such production. 
For comparisons between Member States, the figures for 
GOP are expressed in terms of PPS, or purchasing po.ver 
standards,  Vvtlich  allow not only for exchange rate dif-
ferences but also for differences in the overall price level 
in  one  country relative  to  that  in  others  (ie  even  after 
conversion of GOP figures into ECU, comparisons are still 
affected by differences in the level of prices Vvtlich the 
PPS adjustment is aimed at correcting). 
The figures for  employment for  Member States are 
from the national accounts and are averages for the 
year; for regions, the figures are based on the annual 
Community Labour Force Survey (LFS), which is also 
the source of the sectoral data. 
For unemployment, the data for Member States are from 
the  Eurostat  comparable unemployment  series  (Vvtlich 
are based on the LFS). The data on regional unemploy-
ment are estimated from the comparable series on the 
basis of registration figures at laboUr offices. 
The specific source for each of the graphs, maps and 
tables is listed below. 
NUTS classification of regions 
The NUTS (NomenciCtture of territorial unit for statis-
tics) classification represents a standard framework 
for analysing economic and social developments in 
the Union's regions, which is largely based on institu-
tional spatial divisions. The analysis in  Chapter 2 is 
mainly carried out at the NUTS 2 level, which distin-
guishes 206 regions across the Union as a whole. This 
is the level at which eligibility for aid from the Structur-
al Funds for Objective 1 and Objective 6 purposes is 
determined (for other regional Objectives, the level is 
NUTS 3).  Thoogh most of the  regions  are  broadly 
comparable in size and pc.pulation, there are a num-
ber which differ markedly (lie de France and Lombar-
dia, for example, have 9--10 million inhabitants, while 
16 regions have less  than 300 thousand,  including 
Corse, Burgenland and Highlands and Islands). For 
more details, see Eurostat. Regions, nomenclature for 
territorial unit for statistics. NUTS,  March 1995. 
Studies 
Apart  from  various  studies  cited  in  the  text,  the 
preparation of the  Report was  assisted by outside 
experts as follows: 
Chapter 3: EPRC, UK and OEIL, F 
Chapter 4: College of Europe, Bruges, B 
Chapter 5:  ECO~EC,  UK 
155 Estimates of budgetary net 
transfers between regions 
The  estimates  of interregional  transfers  reported  in 
Chapter 3 are based on a study corrmissioned speCially 
fa this Report carried out  by the  EPRC,  University of 
Strathclyde  in  conjunction with  L'OEIL in  France.  This 
covered 7 Member States (the four largest countries plus 
Spain, Portugal and Sweden) and was based on a unified 
approach, breaking CbNn  national budgets (exduding 
social insurance funds as far as possible) for 1~  into 
separate revenue and expenditure items which were then 
allocated between regions using a number of different 
indicators and various assumptions about the regional 
incidence of different taxes.  Estimates of expenditure 
assigned to each region and of  the tax revenue originating 
from each were then aggregated to give the net amJUnt 
of transfer (the difference between the amount received 
and the amount contributed to the budget). 
Two  approaches to the allocation of  expenditure between 
regials were adopted in the study. The one most relevant 
for this report, and referred to here, is the 'flow' method 
which attempts to measure where expenditure is incurred 
or where transfers go. The expenditure on a particular 
government function on this method is allocated to the 
regial (or regions) where the ministry or department and 
the various agencies attached to it are located. (The other 
meth:x:i is the 'benefit' approach under which spending 
is allocated to where the beneficiaries of the service in 
question are located.) 
Expenditure, however, excludes spending on social pro-
tection in France and Germany on both approaches and 
the  estimates  for  these  two countries  may,  therefore, 
significantly understate net transfers. 
Since the transfers estimated do not confam to national 
accounting conventions, they are not  directly comparable 
with GOP and, accordingly,  are  indicative only of the 
relative scale of budgetary flows between regions. 
Estimates of 
net transfers under the 
Common Agricultural Policy 
The calculation of transfers associated with the CAP 
was undertaken by external experts from the College 
156 
Sources and methods 
of Europe, Bruges. It involves a number of simplifying 
assumptions, due to the individual nature of different 
agricultural markets and the fact that for some pro-
ducts, there is no international reference price. 
Transfers between Member States 
Transfers from taxpayers  in  each country are  esti-
mated by assuming that the share of each in the EU 
agricultural budget equals the share of its contribu-
tion to the overall Community Budget. Transfers also 
arise between consumers and producers as a result 
of price support. This gives rise to transfers between 
Member States - 'the net trade transfer' - which 
depends on national  patterns of consumption and 
production. Transfers from consumers are estimated 
by multiplying the amount of each product available 
for  consumption  in each country by the  EU  'price 
support'. 'Total support' is based on OECD data used 
to calculate PSEs (Producer Subsidy equivalent) and 
CSEs  (Consumer  Subsidy  Equivalent).  Because 
these  data relate  to a  period  before  the  Uruguay 
Round Agreement, they may not necessarily reflect 
the relationship between EU prices and world prices 
after the agreement. This could mean that the scale 
of  EU  price  support  is  over-estimat~d. Since  the 
OECD does not compute support rates for fruit,  ve-
getables, wine  and olive oil,  these  had to be esti-
mated. 
Transfers between regions 
Food consumption per head and average tax rates 
are  assumed to be the same across all  regions in 
each Member State.  Both assumptions are likely to 
mean that the burden on richer regions is under-esti-
mated in relation to that on poorer regions, and more 
refined  assumptions  might,  therefore,  produce  a 
greater cohesion effect. In the case of Portugal and 
Spain, comparisons involving data for the period be-
fore 1993 are of limited relevance because their agri-
cultural  sectors  were  subject  to  transitional 
arrangements, negotiated on accession in 1986, dur-
ing that period. 
Measures of disparity 
Two statistical  measures of the degree of disparity 
between regions or individuals are used in the report, 
the standard deviation c;ind the Gini coefficient. Sources and methods 
Standard deviation 
The stanaard deviation measures the dispersion of 
data (such as for unemployment rates) around the 
mean.  In  formal  terms,  it is the  square root of the 
variance which is defined as I.((Xr><n-n)2}/n, where Xt is 
the ith observation and Xn-n is the mean of the obser-
vations  (ie  in  the  case of regional  unemployment 
rates, it is  essentially a measure of the average dif-
ference of the rate in each region from the mean). To 
allow for variations in the size of  the regions analysed, 
regions are weighted in each case by the most rele-
vant variable (ie population in the case of income per 
head and the labour force in the case of unemploy-
ment). 
Glnl coefficient 
The Gini coefficient measures the degree of inequality 
in the distribution of a particular set of data (such as 
income). More formally, it is a measure of the degree 
of  curvature of  the Lorenz curve, which itself indicates 
the relationship between the cumulative percentage 
of individuals, groups or regions and the cumulative 
percentage of the total of a particular variable, such 
as income, which they account for, ordered by size 
(ie it shows the percentage of total income in a given 
country going to a given percentage of the popula-
tion).  If there were a perfectly equal distribution of a 
given variable,  the  line describing the  relationship 
would be straight and  45 degrees to each of  the axes. 
The Gini coefficient is defined as the area between 
the Lorenz curve and the 45 degree line as a ratio of 
the area above the 45 degree line. The value of the 
coefficient,  therefore,  varies  between 0  (when  the 
Lorenz curve follows the 45 degree line) and 1 (where 
it follows the axis and there is perfect inequality), and 
the higher the value, the more unequal the distribu-
tion. 
Graphs 
1  Commission services 
2  Eurostat, calculations OG XVI 
3  Eurostat 
4-13  Eurostat, calculations DG XVI 
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